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Contents

The Thoughtways of Contemporary Sociology	703
. GEORGE A. LUNDBERG	
Nationality and Crime	724
. DONALD R. TAFT	
The Prediction of Adjustment in Marriage	737
. ERNEST W. BURGESS AND LEONARD S. COTTRELL, JR.	
The Concept of Cultural Lag Re-examined	752
. MICHAEL CHOUKAS	
Legal and Medical Aspects of Eugenic Sterilization in Germany	761
. MARIE A. KOPP	
Research with Relief Funds—Past, Present and Future	771
. HOWARD B. MYERS	
The Application of Attitude Tests in the Field of Parole Prediction	781
. FERRIS F. LAUNE	
Roberto Michels— <i>In Memoriam</i>	797
. DINO CAMAVITTO	
Official Reports and Proceedings	800
Persons and Positions	803
Current Items	804
Periodical Literature	808
Book Reviews	810
Books Received	873

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THE THOUGHTWAYS OF CONTEMPORARY
SOCIOLOGY*

GEORGE A. LUNDBERG

Bennington College

I

“**M**EN BEGIN with acts, not with thoughts. . . . If asked why they act in a certain way in certain cases, primitive people always answer that it is because they and their ancestors always have done so.”¹ Since Sumner wrote these words, the idea has gained headway that thoughts, too, are acts, and that the explanation of thought-patterns is the same as of other folkways. However, this doctrine runs counter to the very general craving of man for something permanent and stable, and hence encounters special resistance. Faced by the insecurities of a changing and frequently hostile world, we seek security by creating “eternal verities” in our thoughts. The more inadequate we feel, the more we indulge in this type of wishful thinking. Conversely, as the clergy has always complained, in times of prosperity and security man tends to neglect his gods. It has been suggested that the Platonic preference for the changeless may have been due chiefly to the fact that the Greeks did not have a mathematical technique, such as the calculus, for dealing with modes and rates of change. The transition to a dynamic viewpoint in sociology has been retarded by the same condition. Social scientists are fond of expatiating upon the complexity and instability of their subject-matters but they have thus far shown comparatively

* Read at the annual meeting of the Eastern Sociological Conference, New Haven, April 18, 1936.

¹ W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, Ginn and Co., 1906, pp. 2, 3.

little interest in the only way in which we can reasonably hope to master these complexities, namely, by an improvement in the symbolic system employed by the Greeks.

The craving for something permanent and generally valid led to the invention of logic, a set of rules and postulates supposed to govern all valid thinking. Here the thirst for something stable and absolute finds expression in the fact that these laws are commonly not regarded as an invention of man but as the discovery and gift of the gods.² They are thus removed from the flux and instability of man-made and other changeable things. They are said to be inherent in the universe itself. The "discovery" of these laws is now quite generally credited, in the Western world at least, to Aristotle. They have been generally accepted so long that the word logic usually means Aristotelian logic. To its devotees, any departure from this system is *ipso facto* ill-logic or non-logic, just as the real devotees of a religion feel that any other religion is after all irreligion.

Until recently the social sciences have been occupied almost entirely with subject matter rather than with questions of method. The latter have been taken for granted as having been in the main settled once and for all in that specious union of Platonic "essences" and Aristotelian logic which has been accepted for some thousands of years. Sociologists have exposed the fallacies of carrying primary group patterns of behavior into secondary groups, but they have failed to apply the lesson to their own methods of thinking. Unfortunately, the academic fraternity frequently fails to apply to itself the excellent analyses it makes of cultural lags, of the bondage to outworn custom, and the survival of antiquated thought-patterns. The present paper will deal with a very restricted but a very important sector of this lag, namely the survival in the social sciences of a linguistic technique and a logic which are as inadequate for the solution of present scientific problems as the mechanical tools of medieval man would be inadequate for the needs of our industrial age. Illustrations could be drawn from almost any field of contemporary sociological discourse.³ I shall confine myself to some of the subtler

² Demosthenes, a pupil of Plato, took this position also with respect to other laws; e.g., his statement (prefixed to the Digest of Justinian, 6th century A.D.): "This is law, to which it is proper that all men should conform, chiefly because every rule of law (*nomos*) is a discovery and gift of the gods." This doctrine finds, of course, its strongest expression in theology, both as regards the laws of conduct and of logic.

³ For more obvious examples in a variety of subjects, see Read Bain, "Our Schizoid Culture," *Sociol. and Soc. Res.*, 19, Jan.-Feb. 1935, 266-276.

examples of such thoughtways as we find them in current discussions regarding sociological measurement.

The best general illustration of the phenomenon here under consideration is, of course, furnished by the history of the repeated departures from Aristotelian logic in the physical sciences.⁴ The milestones marked by Galileo, Newton, Lobatchewsky and Einstein are common knowledge. More recently the idea has taken hold that, whereas logic is usually assumed to be the science concerned with the phenomenon of thought in general, actually this is the province of psychology.⁵ Logic from this point of view becomes merely the rules by which we deal with the data of logic, namely, words. This in turn means that the postulates and rules constituting a system of logic may be indefinitely varied so as to be compatible with our observations. In short, any system of logic is justifiable or true if it provides a set of postulates which are internally consistent, that is, from which propositions can be deduced without contradiction. It is precisely this practice which has marked the great epochs of science. The Euclidian geometry set it down as an axiom that *only one* straight line can be drawn through a given point parallel to a given straight line. Lobatchewsky chose to postulate that *more than one* such line can be drawn,⁶ and on this axiom proceeded to evolve what has come down to us as non-Euclidian geometry. Riemann in turn chose to postulate that *no* parallel line at all can be drawn parallel to a given line⁷—a procedure which to the conventionally minded is simply false. Yet it was by proceeding on the Riemannian postulate that Einstein evolved the relativity theory. I recite these facts not to prove that similar departures *must* be undertaken in the social

⁴ It is not necessary to become involved here in the question of whether these departures are contradictions of Aristotelian logic or merely extensions of it. The fact seems to be that these later developments consist essentially of showing that the older systems are merely special cases of, and therefore included in, the broader postulates of Lobatchewsky, Riemann, and Einstein. I am using the term non-Aristotelian purely as a term generally (and perhaps erroneously) employed to designate these later developments. The reasoning in this paper, therefore, is in no way concerned with or dependent upon what Aristotle actually said or what is a legitimate interpretation of his remarks. There is, however, a considerable number of qualified scholars who regard the more recent dynamic and functional viewpoints of science as so basically at variance with the thought-patterns which preceded them that the former must be regarded as really non-Aristotelian. See E. T. Bell, *The Search for Truth*, Williams and Wilkins, 1934. Ch. 7; K. Lewin, *A Dynamic Theory of Personality*, McGraw-Hill, 1935, Chap. I; A. Korzybski, *Science and Sanity*, Science Press, 1933; A. F. Bentley, *Linguistic Analysis of Mathematics*, Bloomington, Ind., Principia Press, 1932, p. 304.

⁵ R. Carnap, *Philosophy and Logical Syntax*, London, Kegan Paul, 1935, p. 34.

⁶ E. T. Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

⁷ I am indebted for this illustration to Dr. N. Rashevsky of the University of Chicago.

sciences, but to suggest that it is one legitimate way out of an impasse, if, and only if, it serves to speed us toward the generally accepted goal.

II

Sociological measurement is generally regarded as a somewhat recondite side-issue or at least as a small sub-division of larger and more important problems. It is regarded as especially removed from that nebulous part of sociology which calls itself sociological theory. I shall begin therefore with a consideration of the basic relation of measurement to scientific theory.

I suppose that nearly everyone would agree that the backbone of any science is a series of relevant verifiable, consistent generalizations called principles, or laws. It will probably be further agreed that to attain such a set of principles it is necessary first to formulate a set of hypotheses and second to test them empirically. Does sociology today have a frame of observation, description and interpretation which can be employed by the great body of investigators in a concerted attack upon sociological problems?

For some years I have examined the annual grist of sociological researches as they are reported. In addition to my interest in the details of method I have had in mind such questions as the following: What hypothesis or theory does this research formulate or proceed upon? What generalization or principle of sociology is more firmly established or is rendered more dubious by the results of this research project? If all these studies had succeeded in achieving their alleged objective, would the verifiable sum total of scientific societal knowledge be increased noticeably? If ten thousand similar studies were made, would our framework of scientific principles be measurably stronger? I am forced to the conclusion that for nearly all of the researches I have seen, the answer to each question would be of a negative character.

This does not mean that these researches have been useless. Frequently they have provided valuable material for public agitation, propaganda, and desirable social reforms. Many have definitely contributed to more intelligent administration of public affairs. All the studies have provided for the most part harmless employment and sometimes desirable training for the people engaged in them. Thus they have been instrumental in redistributing the wealth, which is generally regarded as desirable. The studies have frequently contributed to the entertainment and social knowledge of the read-

ing public. All of these results are entirely desirable or at least defensible, and so long as they do not demand to be taken more seriously, they should not be criticized for contributing little or nothing to the science of sociology. Nor is it my purpose to make derogatory comparisons between such types of research⁸ and that directed avowedly at the advancement of science. But since the latter is generally conceded to be basic in the long run, it is permissible to inquire why so small and doubtful a portion of sociological research is fundamentally scientific.

The main reason appears to be that there exists for sociology no coherent body of scientific theory with reference to which research can be undertaken or evaluated. There is no workable set of postulates to guide and organize research. There is a vast amount of common sense generalizations about alleged uniformities in social behavior. Folklore adages and proverbs and the pronouncements of present-day journalists and sociologists, ranging from local folklore to generalizations of cosmic scope, are probably far more numerous and varied than commonsense generalizations in any other field. What we do not know is (1) under *what conditions* these generalizations are true, and (2) to *what degree* they are true under these conditions. Until we can answer these two questions with greater accuracy than is now possible, the "principles" of sociology cannot be said to be either scientific or generally useful.

It is here that the insistent and important problem of measurement arises. The degree to which a generalization is true must always be especially important in sociology because of our inability to achieve (for the present, at least) the more perfect laboratory controls. This problem implies its own answer, namely, measure-

⁸ For one thing, the scientific theory which I have said is desirable, must itself be drawn from the accumulated experience of the race, the bulk of which must always be in the form of largely unrelated records of local adjustments made for immediate purposes. I am not deploring this type of research or advocating its abandonment. This reservation is all the more necessary here on account of the current practice in sociological discussion of assuming that if a person advocates some one approach he is *ipso facto* against all others. I therefore categorically state that, while the present paper confines itself to the conduct of systematic research directed by integrated theory instead of isolated and vagrant hypotheses, I also warmly favor (1) random observation, (2) systematic exploration, (3) testing of isolated hypotheses, and (4) any procedure whatever which yields results relevant to human adjustments. Under the limitation of certain definitions, I may be compelled to call all of these alternative procedures unscientific or non-scientific. But this is not necessarily a derogation of them. I have elsewhere elaborated this subject; see "Is Sociology Too Scientific," *Sociologus*, Sept. 1933. For an excellent discussion of the criteria of science as compared with other forms of knowledge, see also J. Michael and M. Adler, *Crime, Law, and Social Science*, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1932, pp. 44-76.

ment. The growing interest of sociologists in quantitative research, therefore, cannot be attributed justly either to a childish desire to ape other sciences or to an esoteric intellectual interest. We are *compelled* to deal with measurement in sociology because it is implicit in that testing and verification of hypotheses which everyone admits is the *sine qua non* of natural science. Furthermore, the chief source of enlightening new theories in sociology as in other fields is likely to be the by-product of just such testing of present hypotheses. The main stimulus to the creation of a new theory is the demonstration of the inadequacy of the old. The bulk of scientific research must always consist of the testing of the currently accepted "principles" and their modification in the light of that more adequate determination of fact, which is measurement. But at present most of the generalizations of sociology are so stated that empirical testing is impossible. This is true because they do not satisfy the basic requirements of a scientific theory.

A sound scientific theory should satisfy the following basic requirements:⁹ (1) A clear and unambiguous definition of terms must be set forth.¹⁰ (2) The postulates upon which the theory proceeds must be explicitly stated in these terms. (3) The deductions from the postulates and the implications of them must be worked out and exhibited step by step. (4) Theorems must be formulated, stating specifically what should, according to the theory, be the outcome of empirical observations and experiments. These experiments or observations should be as crucial as possible for the guidance of systematic research. (5) The theorems must be susceptible of empirical test and not be of a metaphysical character.¹¹

On the basis of these requirements, I am forced to conclude that present sociological theory is highly defective in every respect.

III

Why does the vast amount of informal social knowledge not lend itself readily to formulation in accordance with the above requirements?

⁹ Cf. C. L. Hull, "The Conflicting Psychologies of Learning—A Way Out," *Psychol. Rev.*, Nov. 1935. Also, Michael and Adler, *op. cit.*

¹⁰ For further discussion of the requirements of such terms see my paper "Quantitative Methods in Social Psychology," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, Feb. 1936. The content of these definitions will, of course, be determined by what appears to be important behavior-segments for sociology to study. In the selection of these behavior-segments, as well as in their combination into a comprehensive theory, all the observation, imagination, insight, intuition, and speculation of the artist will be welcome.

¹¹ Cf. R. Carnap, *op. cit.* and P. W. Bridgman, *The Logic of Modern Physics*, The Macmillan Co., 1932.

I have said that the first requirement of a sound scientific theory is a clear definition of terms. This does not mean mere agreement on present terms, although even this is helpful. It means more especially (a) the selection of significant behavior-segments and (b) their representation by symbols which lend themselves to operational representation of relationships. That sociologists exhibit only slight agreement even in the use of the most common terms is a matter of common knowledge.¹² The same sociologist frequently uses the same term in various senses in the same article. This state of affairs is not surprising, because the only way of defining anything objectively is in terms of the operations involved. The individual sociologist seldom defines his terms in this manner, even to himself. Most of the current terms cannot be defined operationally because they are mere verbalisms derived from metaphysical postulates incapable of operational definition. In other cases, the operational definition is deliberately avoided because it would definitely circumscribe the meaning of words which are now used to express not relations, but feelings, usually vague in meaning but very strong in emotional significance. Rigid definition would therefore interfere with rhetorical diction and block the release which the latter affords. Many of the present terms are highly valued because of their familiar and reassuring sound, and are therefore not infrequently mistaken for data, "fact," and "truth."

We encounter here the first obstacle to a sound scientific theory, namely, the thoughtway which fails to recognize the nature and function of scientific language. Everywhere throughout the literature of sociology there is confusion between words and the things words stand for.¹³ Take, for example, the voluminous arguments over the "correct" or "true" meaning of a word. Thus, Thurstone records his observation of certain behavior. This behavior, explicitly defined operationally, he calls an attitude. Whereupon his critics vigorously proclaim that this is not an attitude at all.¹⁴ *Attitude* is something else—and they proceed to define it not by other operations than Thurstone's, but by another series of noises, which have an expressive function comparable to exclamations of joy or sadness, laughter,

¹² See E. E. Eubank, *The Concepts of Sociology*, D. C. Heath and Co., 1931.

¹³ See A. Korzybski, *Science and Sanity*, Science Press, 1933. This difficulty has been attributed to the survival of the first of Aristotle's three laws of thought, namely, the law of identity.

¹⁴ E.g., R. M. MacIver, *Society: Its Structure and Changes*, Long and Smith, 1931, p. 45. "They seek to apply mechanical methods of measurement to things whose very nature they fail to understand." (Italics mine.)

or lyric poetry, but which have no objective representative function at all. The metaphysician fails to recognize this, and hence he wants to argue about the truth or falsity of his expressions and definitions, whereas the poet or the musician contents himself with calling his opponent's work, not true or false, but merely bad.¹⁵ Since the language in which such arguments are couched refers to no behavior which can be operationally defined, they are, of course, incapable of solution.

Perhaps the best known illustration of futile quarreling over the meaning of words instead of arbitrarily agreeing on them (which is how they got their meaning in the first place) is the voluminous controversy over intelligence testing or more specifically whether what the tests tested really was intelligence. Indeed, it was regarded as a complete *reductio ad absurdum* when a distinguished journalist some years ago accused the testers of defining intelligence as *that which* the tests tested—an entirely defensible definition. Logically, and particularly in the logic of natural science, this is perhaps the best definition that can be given. No platitude is more common in sociology than the remark that in order to measure, we must first define, describe, or "know" what we are measuring. The statement usually passes as a self-evident fact which needs no examination.¹⁶ That measurement *is* a way of defining, describing and "knowing" seems to have been overlooked. If one confuses words with the things they signify and regards the process of definition as a mysterious intuitive revelation, instead of an ordered and selective way of responding to a situation, the idea of measuring anything without first defining

¹⁵ Cf. Carnap, *op. cit.*, pp. 29 ff.

¹⁶ For recent illustration from two separate authors, see *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, Feb. 1936, pp. 55, 75, 78. We have here another illustration of the tendency which I have discussed in a recent paper ("Quantitative Methods in Social Psychology," *op. cit.*) to mistake the degree of formality of a process for fundamental difference in kind. Thus, the process of defining, especially when numbers are not employed, is not considered a form of measurement. Now, of course, for some purposes it may be useful to distinguish processes purely on the basis of the formality with which they are carried out. But in the present case where the issue involved is whether measurability is a trait, property, or characteristic inherent in phenomena or merely a rather formal and standardized way of responding, the essential operational identification of definition and measurement is of basic theoretic importance. Consider the following concession by Nagel, who on the whole takes an opposite view from that advanced in the remainder of the present paper: "Measurement has been defined as the correlation with numbers of entities which are not numbers . . . But in a larger sense, in a sense to include most of those acts of identification, delineation, comparison, present in everyday thought and practice, numerical measurement is only infrequently used . . . From this larger point of view, measurement can be regarded as the delimitation and fixation of our ideas of things so that the determination of what is to be a man or a circle is a case of measurement. The problems of measurement merge at one end with the problems of predication." Ernest Nagel, "Measurement," *Erkenntnis*, 2, 1931, 313.

it (in words supposed to possess some final essence), seems the height of absurdity. In the meantime, however, it happens that physical scientists have proceeded in just this manner. Since Einstein, at least, they have blatantly declared that space *is* that which is measured with a ruler; time *is* that which is measured by a clock; force *is* that which makes pointers move across dials, etc. For a couple of thousand years before Einstein, physicists too, were of the impression that they must first "define" these "entities" before measuring them. Let the history of science bear witness to the barrenness of the quest, and to the enslavement of intelligence for some two thousand years by the persistence of this thought-pattern. Today the *definition* of force and its *measurement* turn out to be the same *operation*. Contrast the liberation and the forward strides of physics through the acceptance of the latter doctrine, namely, that things are *that which* evokes a certain type of human response, represented by measurement symbols.

In my opinion the present futile disputation over social measurement will soon be solved in the same way. It is granted, of course, that the concepts thus arbitrarily defined by the operations which register our responses will usually not mean the same as they did before, assuming that we retain many of the old words stripped of their vague, folklore connotations. Thus the term *attitude* would under an operational definition have a very much narrower but a more definite meaning than at present. This does not mean that all the other meanings which it now has would be denied or ignored, as seems to be assumed by the critics of this type of measurement. The *other* meanings in so far as they are scientifically relevant would be similarly defined operationally by *other* words or symbolic devices. Each shade of meaning would be designated by adjectives or other symbols distinguishing them with whatever rigidity is regarded as desirable. Thus, Waller is entirely right when he says that "in stating a concept statistically, changes are made in it" by which it "is so simplified as to be almost unrecognizable."¹⁷ In the same way the physicists' definition of the concept "horsepower" is quite unrecognizable in terms of its folk-meaning. This "degradation" (?) of concepts is, I fear, a necessary cost of scientific progress. Not only will some existing sociological concepts have to be redefined or abandoned, but others will have to be invented because there may

¹⁷ *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, Feb. 1936, p. 59.

be at present no words for some social behavior-segments of basic importance.¹⁸

The procedure by which natural science has evolved its present terminology is undubitably significant for sociology and its logical justification is the same. Of course, the serious and difficult task of developing useful and valid measuring scales still remains. We only remove by the above reasoning the logical prohibition which declares their development to be impossible. The protracted work by which measuring instruments have been invented and perfected in the physical sciences remains to be done in sociology. How long did it take to develop the modern microscope? This work must be performed as a condition of progress. In the meantime, it is the height of futility to argue the immeasurability of this and that social phenomenon while every day we are engaged in weighing and measuring them by the primitive commonsense methods of "more and less" as our ancestors did. The inadequacies of our adjustments in the social world is a fair index of the crudeness of our measurements.

The problem of more accurate social measurement is not an academic question which can be avoided by calling names and indulging in personalities. It will recur as long as men have to adjust to a changing world. The proponents of sociological measurement realize that the ultimate test of the validity of their position depends upon the continual refinement of the crude instruments that have thus far been developed. We are entirely willing to await the verdict of history on these attempts. In the meantime, the theoretical rationale here presented is demanded both as an hypothesis on which to work and as a justification for devoting ourselves to the slow and undramatic labor upon technology which always has been and always will be the principal condition of scientific progress in all fields.

While there is at present considerable disagreement as to the proper province of measurement in sociology, everyone probably admits that one of the most essential requirements for further advance is a more objective selection and definition of the behavior-segments that we regard as basic or at least important in this field. I have argued above that the problem of definition is inseparable from

¹⁸ For some suggestions of this character, see A. F. Bentley, *Behavior, Knowledge, Fact*, Principia Press, 1935, Pt. III. Waller is also right when he points out that one of the most important lessons we can learn from other sciences is "that method must always be flexibly adapted to subject-matter." (*Op. cit.*, p. 55) The adoption or adaptation of concepts or methods from other sciences in so far as we find them useful in sociology proceeds exactly from this kind of flexibility and freedom. It is the barring of this "imitation" which constitutes a violation of the principle mentioned.

the problem of measurement, and, further, that social measurements can and do fulfill the same logical requirements as measurements in the other sciences. Since the point is a basic one and since some highly qualified people who have themselves made noteworthy contributions to the development of sociological and psychological measuring devices find theoretical difficulties in the position I have taken, it is desirable to consider here some of the objections that have been raised.

Perhaps the subtlest is that which finds certain things intrinsically measurable while others are regarded as measurable only in a secondary or less fundamental sense. It is contended, for example, that whereas weight, distance, time, or force are phenomena fundamentally and truly measurable, temperature, hardness and density are measurable only in an ordinal or secondary sense, and that attitudes, aptitudes, ability or intelligence are not measurable in either sense, if at all.¹⁹

For purposes of this discussion we shall adopt the most restricted definition of measurement, namely, that which requires scalar units, which are additive and interchangeable as units. In short, we shall accept the definition which everyone admits characterizes the measurement of such phenomena as weight, distance, and time. On this basis, Nagel finds density not in the same sense measurable as weight. Many others find that such devices as Thurstone's attitude scales are not of the same logical class as measuring scales of weight, time, space, etc. Since the argument is basically the same in each case, let us first examine Nagel's contention that "there is no clear sense in which two liquids equally dense could be added to produce a liquid twice as dense."²⁰ This is not a question of sociological

¹⁹ Attention should here be called to the present connotations of such words as "attitude," "aptitude," and "skill." As generally used today throughout sociology and psychology they denote hidden, mysterious, and intangible entities rather than the observable behavior. This is, of course, another illustration of the Aristotelian tendency to reify words and confuse them with the entities for which they are supposed to stand. Thus behavior of a certain kind is spoken of as *evidence of* intelligence of a certain kind or degree, the implication being that the behavior is merely a *sign* of the article itself. The thing itself turns out to be not further definable. It is a Kantian *ding an sich* or a Platonic "essence." It represents a metaphysical position which is incompatible with the metaphysics of modern science.

²⁰ Nagel, *op. cit.*, p. 320. The basic issue involved in this position is the philosophical dichotomy between intensive and extensive qualities. It may be said at the outset that if one chooses to postulate such a dichotomy as inherent in phenomena, the reasoning leading to the conclusion here under attack regarding the immeasurability, or different logical nature of measurement, in the cases of certain phenomena doubtless follows. But I reject this postulate and accept instead the position of Bertrand Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, p. 164 ff., and others which regards the extension-intension controversy as a purely conventional dichotomy like all other linguistic and logical constructs and, therefore, subject to modification whenever

measurement at all, but it illustrates the basic fallacy involved in most objections to sociological measurement. It is significant to note also that the concept of density and its measurement is a much more recent and, therefore, unfamiliar development than the measurement of weight.

Before continuing with the examination of the question, it is necessary to have clearly before us certain basic postulates on which all science proceeds.²¹ (1) All data or experience with which man can become concerned consist of *the responses of organisms-in-environment*. This includes the postulate of an external world and variations in both it and the responders to it. (2) Verbal symbols are invented to represent these responses. (3) These symbols are the immediate data of all science and of all communicable knowledge. (4) All statements or assumptions regarding the more ultimate "realities" must always consist of extrapolations from these symbols and the responses which they represent. (5) These extrapolations are in turn represented symbolically, and we respond to them as we respond to other phenomena which evoke behavior.

If the immediate data of science are symbols, it follows that we never actually measure or weigh either liquids or bricks in all their aspects, i.e., in all the respects in which they are capable of evoking responses. We respond selectively to some one aspect, property, or quality at a time. It may be weight, mass, color, density, hardness, sweetness, malodorousness, radicalism, or what not. This response is the immediate datum for science. We devise various means of ordering successive or numerous responses of the same kind. As between two of them we say that one is better, pleasanter, greater, harder, sweeter, or brighter than the other. Among larger numbers we arrange them in series according to the pressure sensations they evoke in us, the tactile resistance they offer, the visual space they occupy, or their behavior manifested to us through any other of our senses.

The next step in formalizing the process is to interject a mechanical device between our elementary original responses and *that which* evokes the response. For example, instead of gauging verbally ("heavier," "lighter,") the relative weights of two bricks by the

a modification promises a more adequate approach to the problems involved. Carnap's position regarding the proper function of logic is also relevant in this connection.

²¹ The philosophic formulation of these postulates in their modern implications has been most ably developed by the Vienna neo-positivist school and by Bertrand Russell. The names of E. Mach and H. Poincaré are outstanding in the earlier development of the viewpoint.

directly experienced pressure sensations felt by balancing one in each hand, we may construct a balance (according to principles established previously by similar processes) and draw our conclusions about the weight of the two objects from visual instead of tactile stimuli, i.e., the balancing of a beam or the position of a pointer on a calibrated dial.

Now all the steps (operations) in the construction and calibration of this device are essential considerations in interpreting its behavior as a measurement of weight.²² But to all who are familiar with and accept the validity of these steps, the beam is accepted as a device for *standardizing responses* and securing more perfect agreement among a number of observers. The units, whether of mass, weight, color, density, hardness, or anything else, are not "parts" or "fractions" of any two bricks or of bricks in general.²³ They are abstractions,²⁴ *symbols of magnitude*. *Magnitude* is the name of a selective response. *Units* of magnitude are symbols invented to represent various types of magnitude responses. As such, units of a given scale are *per se* interchangeable and may be subjected to any mathematical manipulation considered meaningful, regardless of what phenomena in a given case they may refer to. Thus, we may not add

²² Nagel, (*Op. cit.*, pp. 316-317) makes the excellent point that "it is important to remember, however, that the experimenter, working with marked or calibrated instruments, assumes that the calibrations indicate various qualitative continuities not *explicitly* present. The process of measurement has not been fully exhibited until all those operations of calibration have been noted. When a weight is attached to a spring balance, and the position of a marker on the scale read, only a very small fraction of the process actually necessary to estimate the weight as five pounds has been observed; the operations entering into the construction and *correlation* of scale and spring must be included. It is of the essence of an experiment that it be repeatable. Therefore it is not the particular instrument used any more than it is the unique experiment which has such overwhelming importance in science; it is rather the repeatable process capable of producing the markings on the instrument which is. Every marked instrument implies the construction and existence of some standard series of *magnitudes* (italics mine), correlation with which constitutes the calibration. A whole-hearted recognition of this reference of instruments to something beyond themselves, is a recognition that other characters of existence besides the spatial are capable of, and are involved in, the process of measurement."

²³ E.g., C. Kirkpatrick (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, Feb. 1936, p. 80) says, "in measuring population by counting people, the units are part of the thing measured." *Units* are *never* part of the "thing" measured. Units are symbols of human response. What is counted are symbolized responses to population. To count cells, families, weights, intelligence units, degrees of radicalism, etc., etc., is to make different types of responses to population. But populations can be "measured" in all these respects by counting units appropriate to the type of response involved.

²⁴ For a brilliant chapter on the meaning of "abstraction" and related subjects see A. F. Bentley, *op. cit.*, Chap. 21, "The Visibility of the Social." E.g. "Not that the words 'concrete' and 'abstract' have significance in modern scientific application; they are nebulous wraiths surviving from primitive man's attempts at description, serving today merely for the crudest contrasts and reports." (pp. 209-210.) See also his Chap. 14 on "Isolationality."

bricks and hogs; but pounds, i.e., abstractions called weight magnitudes, may be added. Likewise, it is perfectly true that "there is no clear sense in which two *liquids* equally dense could be added to produce a liquid twice as dense."²⁵ Only *magnitudes* (abstractions) are ever added (mathematically).²⁶ Two equal units of density-magnitude can assuredly be added and a new density-magnitude twice as great be secured. The familiarity of the operations with which we carry out some measurements has caused us to believe that others, less familiar and formal, involve other logical (or "fundamental") principles. The same reasoning will hold for the alleged differences in "direct" measurability of such phenomena as hardness and temperature as compared to weight.

Let me now summarize my criticism of the four principal thought-ways regarding the measurability of different types of phenomena, and the resulting impasse in social research.

1. The main reason for asserting that some things are measurable while others are not is the implicit assumption that measurement is not a way of defining things, but is a process which can be carried out only after the "thing" to be measured has been defined. This, of course, implies in turn some kind of "existences" of phenomena as "common essences." As has been repeatedly pointed out above, natural science cannot deal with these hypothetical "entities" but must confine itself to the data of human responses, however evoked.

²⁵ In a more recent publication, "The Logic of Reduction in the Sciences," *Erkenntnis*, Aug.-Sept. 1934, Nagel takes a position quite compatible with that of the present paper, although it does not deal with the specific problems here at issue. His emphasis upon the selectivity (abstractness) of all responses and, by implication, of all units and terms, may be a necessary elaboration, if not a contradiction, of his earlier view.

²⁶ I am entirely unconvinced by Nagel's criticism of Russell's position with respect to magnitude, namely, that the latter holds magnitude to be not "the ordered relations of and between existences, but as a domain of immaterial entities having no necessary reference to existence." (Nagel, *op. cit.*, p. 323). The so-called "immaterial entities," namely, magnitudes, are *responses to something*. It is these responses, symbolically represented, which are subject to the manipulations constituting measurement. We may extrapolate these responses into the "external" world and postulate objects, qualities, or other "material" or "real" "things." All the so-called "concrete" actualities are postulated in this way. The mysterious words that lend a certain plausibility to Nagel's criticism above are "existence" and "common essences." Magnitudes he apparently feels are not "common essences," whereas pounds (?) are. These terms imply a postulate going beyond that to which science must confine itself, namely, that the only immediate subject matter with which science can deal is human responses.

I find Russell's position, even as set forth briefly by Nagel, correspondingly tenable: actual foot rules are *quantity*, their lengths are *magnitude*. It is only by an ellipsis that two quantities can be said to be equal: they are equal because they possess the same magnitude; and it is improper to say that one of two quantities is greater than the other; what is meant is that the magnitude which the first quantity possesses is greater than that of the second. (*Principles of Mathematics*, p. 164 ff. Cited by Nagel, *op. cit.*, p. 324.)

2. Under this restriction the postulation of some units as "natural" and other as "artificial" must also be abandoned. Thus, Kirkpatrick says that "a person is a natural unit in measuring population"; whereas, degrees, calories, and ergs, not to mention the units of attitude scales, are artificial.²⁷ By what postulate can this distinction be made? To distinguish "natural" from "artificial" units we must postulate that some units have inherent existence as "common essences" in the universe, whereas others are the constructs of man's convenience—a way of responding to a situation symbolically represented. It is my contention that *all* units are of the latter character. The former postulate is implicit or explicit in nearly all social science today. The social sciences are hopelessly entangled in the notion that some phenomena are "directly" known and are "material," as contrasted with "mental" and "immaterial" phenomena. Such postulates are not only incompatible with modern science; they completely block further systematic advancement of knowledge in the social field. Being a kind of verbal metaphysics, these assumptions lead to endless, wearisome, and completely futile discussions of the relative "realities" of the individual, of society, of culture and of "physical" things. The only escape from the impasse is to do what physics has done with respect to its units, namely, recognize that they are all linguistic constructs ("artificial") symbolizing human responses to aspects of the universe relevant to particular problems which man faces.

Closely related to the above misconception of the nature of scientific units is that which holds "man" to be the natural unit of sociology. This is analogous to saying that earth, air, fire, or water are the "natural" units of physics. But physics no longer attempts to operate with such units. The units of physics are abstractions—symbols standing for *our responses* to certain situations, problems, or phenomena. The "nature" of these phenomena we postulate by extrapolating our responses. All questions of naturalness, artificiality, or "existence" of the units are completely obsolete because units are *defined* as symbols of our responses to *that which* evokes them.²⁸

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 80.

²⁸ See Bentley's revealing analysis of the persistence of the assumption of the "basic," "natural" "existence" of the "individual person," "each assumed to have definite independent 'existence' and isolation, each in its own *locus* apart from every other. Here is direct descent in the mind-language from ancient 'souls,' each alone, face to face with its God." (*Op. cit.*, p. 29) See also his Chapter 14 on "Isolationality." Bentley has also made concrete suggestions as to the type of units that may be basic to sociology. (*Op. cit.*, Chaps. 23–25) I believe that Michael and Adler (*Op. cit.*, pp. 82, 83) had a somewhat similar idea in mind when they de-

The assumption of the naturalness or "existence" of some units as against the artificiality and abstractness (non-existence) of others is a clear Aristotelian survival incompatible with modern natural science and is being rapidly abandoned. All that can be said is that "man" is a convenient unit for certain crude purposes just as certain commonplace physical adjustments are made by regarding tables, chairs, and stones as units. But what was the state of the physical sciences while these natural, convenient, and obvious units, or even earth, air, fire, and water, were regarded as the "units"?

3. A third important reason for the apparent difference between social and physical units and measurements is the implicit or explicit assumption that we measure the *behavior* of some things, but the *being, quality* or *quantity* of others. The latter set of words have, of course, been reified into things, although they actually stand only for human responses. Take, for example, the statement that degrees, calories, and ergs are "artificial" units because here "*effects produced* constitute units in the indices of the *thing to be measured*."²⁹ (Italics mine.) The unit "man" is likewise an "*effect produced*"—upon the sense organs of the perceiver. It is only when there is relative stability and uniformity in the sensory responses of numerous competent observers that we can postulate either his existence or his unitary nature with reference to the attendant situation to which we also respond. Degrees, calories, ergs, are *words symbolizing sensory responses*. "Man" is just another such a word, but a very crude one because it leaves to the context the task of determining what aspect of "man" (always implicit) is meant, instead of denoting it specifically. The character of the stimuli that evoked any of these responses is postulated from extrapolations of these responses. Our alleged "knowledge" of the phenomena that evoke our responses consist of just such extrapolations.

4. Finally, there is the problem of the alleged physical "counter-

clared that the social environment of man, *not* human behavior, is the proper subject-matter of sociology. If so, I think their position is sound but badly stated and subject to misinterpretation. *Environment* cannot be either defined or studied except in terms of *behavior* with reference to some constant. The behavior of the constant is an implicit part of the situation. This is recognized in the illustrations subsequently used by these authors. (*Ibid.*, pp. 84, 85)

²⁹ Kirkpatrick, *op. cit.*, p. 80. As for the contention that some measures are only indexes of that which is to be measured, this is merely to point out that in cases where we have previously established a correlation between two variables we sometimes find it more convenient to measure the one indirectly through the other. But this process is as practicable with reference to one type of units or phenomena as with another. Any measure of anything can be used as an index of any other measure of any other phenomenon, if the correlation between the two (which has to be first determined in any case) is reasonably constant.

parts" of some scales or measures as compared with others. This is the question of the "objective existence" and "meaning" of the units of sociological scales and is probably adequately covered by the preceding discussion. Thus, Kirkpatrick says that when a scale value of 5.7 is assigned to a certain statement on a Thurstone scale "the number 5.7 is not a multiple of any objective unit." (p. 83) This seems to contradict his own earlier concessions to the position advanced in the present paper and to confuse the meaning of his own terms. He has previously admitted that "all units are perceptually and conceptually defined by human beings and have only relative interchangeability." (p. 82) He would presumably further admit that "objectivity" is a postulate resting solely on the confirmatory response of numerous qualified observers. If so, a unit (i.e., a spatial marking) on a Thurstone scale is "physical," "observable," manipulable and "objective" in precisely the same sense that a gram is. With respect to interchangeability he says: "Let it be assumed that a score on a Thurstone scale is five. The question arises 'five what?' The answer is five intervals on an eleven point scale which were supposedly equal appearing to judges reared in a particular culture." (p. 84) This is precisely the only legitimate answer that can be made to a corresponding inquiry as to the meaning of the following question: "Let it be assumed that a 'score' on the beam or dial of a druggists' scale is 5. Five what? Five intervals on (say) a hundred point scale, supposedly equal in the judgment of those who calibrated the scale.³⁰ Kirkpatrick goes on to say: "The equal appearing unit (in the Thurstone scale) had no direct physical counterpart in the sense that a brass gram weight corresponds to the idea of a gram as a unit rather than as a symbol like the word 'gram'." (p. 84) This is a clear case of postulating "existence" of brass *gram weights* as "common essences" and therefore finding them "different" from the "existence" (behavior) which must by the same logic be postulated (by extrapolation) for the behavior-in-environment *represented by* the statements originally sorted by Thurstone's judges.

Brass gram weights or the "idea of a gram as a unit" do not exist for science or knowledge prior to man's ordered reactions to kines-

³⁰ It is even questionable whether cultural influences were less important in influencing this calibration than they are in calibrating social measuring scales. The units of the metric system have nothing in common with units of the English measure. It is probable that present reactions to social phenomena vary from culture to culture more than do reactions to physical phenomena. The reason, however, is that physical science is already an international culture. In prescientific days the physical orientations of different tribes were perhaps no more uniform than their social.

thetic pressure sensations. When he *has* such sensations he symbolizes them, perhaps first by sounds (words), perhaps then by pebbles, or other objects arranged in order of size, since volume in this case has been observed to correlate highly with intensity of pressure sensations. He may then, on account of the high observed correlation between volume and weight in certain material, proceed to divide metals into equal volumes and by combining them represent mathematical interchangeability and other convenient manipulatory effects. He may further represent all these operations graphically.

Now the raw material of a Thurstone scale on (say) economic radicalism is certain behaviors-in-environment of human beings which are observed by themselves or by others. In attitude scales, certain behavior ("the physical counterpart") has been observed and has been symbolized by words and statements which, in writing, have been collected. Judges whose sensory apparatus and reaction tendencies are similar to those of the original reagents, (i.e., those whose behavior is described by the original statements) arrange these statements (*they* are now the physical counterparts) into a series, of more and less, of a quality (radicalism) which they indicate. A scale with arbitrary divisions representing an average of the reactions (serial placements) of the judges is then arranged. These divisions or units are then represented spatially on paper, or could be constructed of brass and be arranged in any order desired. When arranged they are always numbered successively by agreement, from left to right, as are other scales, dials, etc.

Now, if by the procedure described, one person scores 5 and another 10,³¹ one may be called "twice" as radical as the other with precisely the same logic which declares that one stone is twice as heavy as another. The latter statement means that we have abstracted weight-quality out of a total complex of some kind and represented the abstraction by symbols of some kind, in this case, units-on-a-scale. In *terms of this scale*, one stone is twice as heavy as another and in no other "inherent," "fundamental" sense. In either case, it is a meaningful statement only to people who accept the symbolic operation involved. Note that in the above illustration, I have first defined radicalism in terms of the scores-on-a -scale, just as weight must be so defined in terms of its scale.³² It is unnecessary

³¹ For the full details of how scale values are assigned to different statements, see L. L. Thurstone, "Attitudes Can Be Measured," *Amer. Jour. Sociol.*, 33, Jan. 1928, 529-554.

³² In using this illustration I am not here expressing any opinion as to the sociological value of attitude measurement, the validity or relative value of different types of scales, or other

to argue whether what is tested is "really" an attitude, because attitude is defined as *that behavior* evoked by this test. It is likewise futile to argue whether a certain behavior considered in a test is "really" radical. For the constructors of the test and the scale agree to *call* it radical. It is therefore, unnecessary to argue whether the statement that one individual is twice as radical as another is "comparable," "similar," and as logically defensible as the statement that one stone is twice as heavy as another, because in terms of the units of the two scales (both of which assume an arbitrary, rational origin) one is obviously twice the other in both cases. Controversy over such matters illustrates the hopeless current confusion of linguistic and logical constructs with metaphysical postulates of existences, essences, beings, etc., The great contribution of relativity theory was to expose this confusion. Hence its vast significance for the social as well as the physical sciences.

It has been my main interest in this section to emphasize and illustrate the tendency to overlook the basic nature of language units, knowledge, and logic. I have confined myself to illustrations of only a few of the fallacious thoughtways in sociology. But most of them derive from the same basic considerations. We assume too lightly that the knowledge more familiar to us has an inherency in the universe instead of being only well-established and therefore more uniform ways of responding. We *overlook* the postulates of well-established thought-patterns, and either assume there are none or at least that they are self-evident, eternal, and inherent in the universe, just as the postulates of Euclidian geometry, Aristotelian physics and logic, and every basic postulate of folk-belief has been taken for granted. Now all postulates must and should be taken for granted. But we must remember that we do *take* them for granted and that they are not divinely imposed on us. Otherwise, we handicap ourselves fatally in the development of new science which frequently requires new postulates. If sociologists were compelled to make *explicit* the postulates which are *implicit* in their present orientation, they would speak with less condescension about the thoughtways of their primitive ancestors.

IV

If the above diagnosis is in the main a correct characterization of the present situation in sociology (and in the other social sciences

methods now employed or any of the other technical points involved. I have confined myself in this paper solely to the *logical validity* of such measurement as a means of describing social behavior and its logical comparability with other recognized measurement techniques.

as well) the following general approach is indicated:³³ 1. A survey of the terms at present in common use and by fairly common agreement admitted to represent the phenomena of special interest to sociology. 2. Agreement on the definition of these terms in operational language.³⁴

3. A survey of the present body of sociological theory and "principles" (a) to sift out the matter which seems most relevant to basic problems, and (b) to scrutinize and render explicit the postulates upon which present theory and principles are based. 4. The formulation, on the basis of the above work, of a comprehensive theory fulfilling as nearly as possible the requirements specified in Part III of this paper.

This program does not contemplate, it should be noted, any wholesale scrapping of any existing sociological theory, principles, or empirical research without the most careful consideration of its possible value in whole or in part. A new scheme or system spun out of thin idealistic air, the aura of other sciences, or the pronouncements of Aristotle, Marx, Aquinas, and Einstein is not contemplated. All of these, and others, will, however, be considered as legitimate sources of suggestions as to the meaningful arrangement of the considerable body of empirical and other research upon which present sociology rests. Necessarily, the principal source of any new formulation will be the existing body of sociological theory and fact. It is proposed to assemble the amorphous mass of tangible results of research around the generalizations upon which these researches may conceivably be supposed to bear, and then to attempt to arrange the more specific generalizations under the broader princi-

³³ From the technological viewpoint, the most promising beginning along the line here indicated is in my opinion to be found in the work of S. C. Dodd, *A Controlled Experiment in Rural Hygiene in Syria*, Beirut Univ. and The Oxford Press, 1934, Part IV. Also his "A Theory for the Measurement of Some Social Forces," *Scientific Monthly*, July 1936. See also Read Bain, "Die Behavioristische Einstellung in der Sociologie," *Sociologus*, March 1933, pp. 28-44. For the most comprehensive theoretical outline on a mathematical level, see N. Rashevsky, "Outline of a Mathematical Theory of Human Relations," *Philos. Sci.*, Oct. 1935. The ablest attempt at systematic sociological theory is perhaps L. von Wiese, *System der allgemeinen Soziologie*, 2nd ed. (reviewed in this issue), or Wiese-Becker, *Systematic Sociology*, John Wiley and Sons, 1932. For valuable suggestions see also A. F. Bentley, *op. cit.*, and "Sociology and Mathematics," *Sociol. Rev.*, Oct. 1931; F. S. Chapin, *Contemporary American Institutions*, Harper and Bros., 1935, Pt. 5; J. F. Brown, "Towards a Theory of Social Dynamics," *Jour. Soc. Psych.*, 6, 1935, 182-213; R. Mukerjee, "The Regional Balance of Man," *Amer. Jour. Sociol.*, Nov. 1930. The ecological approach is especially promising.

³⁴ A recognition of the need of this step is found in the work of a special committee of the Social Science Research Council to define the term "acculturation" and to suggest more systematic research regarding the phenomenon. See *Amer. Jour. Sociol.*, Nov. 1935, pp. 366-370. See also D. Young, *Amer. Jour. Sociol.*, 42, July 1936.

ples which they seem to support. This procedure will doubtless reveal vast gaps in sociological knowledge. But the first step in filling a gap is locating it as definitely as possible. Further research can then be centered upon the crucial sectors, those problems the solution of which is a prerequisite for further advance. Such research will also serve as a constant check on the postulates and the theory upon which we proceed. "If the deductions involve conditions of observation which are now impossible of attainment, the theory is metaphysical rather than scientific; and if the deduced phenomenon is not observed when the conditions are fulfilled, the theory is false."³⁵ From the cumulative results of research based upon a coherent set of postulates and directed at clearly stated hypotheses there should emerge an increasingly adequate set of postulates, concepts, and verifiable theorems forming the basic framework of sociology.

³⁵ Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 513.

NATIONALITY AND CRIME

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THE INADEQUACY of statistics has long prevented the measurement and explanation of variations in criminal behavior as between the several national groups in the United States. The Department of Justice's constantly improving, if still inadequate, Uniform Crime Reports cannot, of course, give the national origin of the often unknown suspects, and most police authorities do not report the information needed for those arrested. For years the Bureau of the Census has given some attention to nativity and national origin in reporting commitments of felons to state and Federal penal institutions, but at least until recently these reports have been inadequate for our purpose. Apart from their incompleteness, commitment statistics are known to be very poor indices of criminal behavior. Crime may conceivably increase during a period of decreasing commitments and vice versa. This, as is well known, is because commitments are affected by changes in laws, in the efficiency of law enforcement and in the disposition of cases after conviction.

It seems probable, however, that commitment rates are more valid as bases for comparisons between national groups than for comparisons between rates at different periods of time or between different geographical areas. This is because it is arguable that, except where national groups are highly concentrated in one area, or where prejudice against them exists, differences in local efficiency and policy would probably affect nationalities equally. The reader may judge as to the degree of concentration of these groups from data given below. The factor of prejudice might indeed be important, but the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, alert for such prejudice, found that it did not affect seriously the administration of justice, except perhaps in the case of the Mexicans.¹ Yet if any reader feels such comparisons as are presented below are for these reasons invalid, the writer would not

¹ National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, *Report on Crime and the Foreign Born*, 1931, p. 171.

defend them except to say that the Census Bureau uses them, that reputable students have used them with caution, that they are presumably somewhat less faulty when corrected as we attempt to cor-

TABLE I. NUMBER OF MALE PRISONERS RECEIVED FROM COURTS PER 100,000 OF POPULATION 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER, OF SAME RACE, NATIVITY AND SEX: 1933

(Ratios based on 1930 population)

	Total	Total White	Native white			For- eign- born white	Negro	Other races
			Total	Native par- centage	For- eign par- centage	Mixed par- centage		
<i>United States</i>	144	117	134				43	294
<i>26 states where more than 90 per cent parentage re- ported</i>	135	114	133	144	120	91	43	334
Federal	18	17	19	21	13	12	10	81
26 states	108	90	106	110	105	76	31	175
<i>States where ratio native parentage greater than for- eign</i>								
Indiana	133	116	121	128	81	65	46	51
Michigan	148	125	148	156	151	110	57	234
Minnesota	116	113	137	190	108	77	36	459
Dist. of Columbia	365	159	172	169	168	207	65	949
West Virginia	182	163	171	177	77	58	43	408
Arkansas	190	152	153	156	79	63	101	298
Louisiana	163	97	98	98	97	99	65	283
Oklahoma	283	242	246	257	74	108	52	780
Texas	152	115	118	126	47	38	37	363
Wyoming	144	130	139	147	120	109	73	997
Nevada	196	171	211	277	111	26	35	2789
Wisconsin	88	84	97	116	72	95	34	485
Iowa	89	85	92	114	35	54	27	512
So. Dakota	107	101	114	139	74	108	27	—
Nebraska	142	129	143	181	76	71	33	1109
Washington	155	146	175	193	122	165	50	1079
Oregon	109	103	116	119	73	158	36	285
<i>States where ratio foreign parentage greater than na- tive</i>								
Massachusetts	54	51	67	45	95	64	20	273
Connecticut	78	75	101	67	149	70	25	265
New York	64	55	70	53	99	57	27	320
New Jersey	112	91	115	80	178	88	39	501
Pennsylvania	57	46	53	48	70	50	18	264
Ohio	110	88	95	89	136	68	49	542
Vermont	198	194	204	188	233	268	141	2655
Rhode Island	80	75	99	85	124	72	30	445
Illinois	88	74	91	87	112	57	19	378

rect them, and that even if they are wholly useless, the demonstration of the need for corrected rates may be of interest.

In addition to the above-mentioned difficulties there is the fact that the numbers of prisoners upon which rates are figured are sometimes rather small. Table VII, printed at the end of this article gives the numbers of prisoners involved in the present study for each national group. For the foreign-born, data for four years are available. For the second generation, we have only those for 1933, though these often exceed in numbers those for four years for the immigrants themselves. We have figured rates for all of the groups mentioned, leaving to the reader the determination of their adequacy. In some cases, like the Welsh, the numbers seem clearly inadequate, yet the consistency of results argues somewhat for their reasonableness.

Last year the Bureau of the Census published a bulletin² which threw new light on commitment rates especially of the second generation. Table I reproduces part only of their most significant table.³ This table confirms the fact, already well established, that the foreign born as a whole are committed to penal institutions for felonies in proportions far below their normal ratio. As compared with the rate for native-white population (134), their rate (43) is less than a third of their quota.

The table also shows that natives of mixed parentage have in 17 states a rate lower than that where both parents are foreign born. The reverse is true, however, for the other 9 of the 26 states for which parentage was reported with sufficient completeness to be significant. Some sociologists would expect mixed parentage to be a handicap in adjustment because of the culture conflict involved. They would perhaps expect this conflict to be particularly important where one parent was a member of a group, such as the Southern and Eastern European, where contrasts in culture are relatively great. Yet, curiously enough, the 9 states where people of mixed parentage have relatively high commitment rates, have an unusually large proportion of the "old" as compared with the "new" immigrants. In the 26 states as a whole the proportions are 36.0% and 46.5% respectively, as compared with 53.7% and 24.8% in the 9 states where mixed marriage is associated with relatively high rates. My colleague, Professor W. R. Tylor, suggests that mixed

² *Prisoners in State and Federal Prisons and Reformatories*, Washington, 1935.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

marriage may itself be an indication that culture conflict has largely ceased between the parents, and that, therefore, the conflict is less serious for the children of such marriages.⁴ We might add that

TABLE II. NATIONALITY COMPOSITION OF NATIVE WHITE POPULATION OF FOREIGN OR MIXED PARENTAGE IN THE 17 STATES AND IN THE 9 STATES—PERCENTAGES AND RATIOS OF PERCENTAGES

Nationalities Pre-dominating in the 17 states	% in 9 States	% in 17 States	Ratios 17-9
Norwegian	.72	7.28	11.11
Finnish	.28	1.74	6.21
Danish	.50	2.68	5.31
Dutch	.60	2.44	4.07
Swedish	2.33	6.86	2.94
German	16.24	30.05	1.85
Canadian	6.60	9.22	1.40
All other	2.72	3.47	1.28
French	1.11	1.36	1.23
Yugoslavian	1.01	1.07	1.06
N. and W. European	44.54	64.87	1.46
Nationalities Pre-dominating in the 9 States	% in 17 States	% in 9 States	Ratios 9 to 17
Italian	3.19	15.49	4.86
Lithuanian	.37	1.40	3.78
Austrian	1.05	2.86	2.72
Russian	3.00	7.18	2.39
Irish	5.94	13.96	2.35
Rumanian	.32	.72	2.25
Hungarian	.77	1.66	2.16
Polish	6.38	10.54	1.65
Greek	.35	.54	1.54
Welsh	.53	.75	1.42
Czechoslovakian	3.57	4.08	1.14
Scotch	1.87	2.03	1.09
Spanish	.12	.13	1.08
English	5.86	6.30	1.08
S. and E. European	21.93	45.89	2.09

possibly an economic factor is involved. The more successful immigrant may be better able to marry the more exacting American-

⁴ At a recent conference under the auspices of the Foreign Language Information Service a number of addresses were made significant to the subject matter of this article. Of particular interest was Dr. Eleanor T. Glueck's *Culture Conflict and Delinquency*, summarized in *Interpreter Releases*, Series C, No. 9, July 17, 1936, and Dr. Thorsten Sellin's *Crime and the Second Generation of Immigrant Stock*, *Ibid.*, Series C, No. 7, May 23, 1936. Both of these addresses and the findings of Dr. Glueck's research (to be published in *Mental Hygiene*) suggest that culture conflict in some degree explains the adjustment problems and delinquency rates among immigrant stock.

born girl. If this economic theory is tenable, it may well be that mixed marriage among the "new" immigration is still more an index of economic success than among the "old." This explanation would seem to be less reasonable where the groom is native-born and the bride foreign-born. The relationship between mixed marriage and crime seems to need further study.

Perhaps the most surprising fact shown by Table I, however, is that, taking the 26 states as a whole, the sons of immigrants show commitment rates lower than the sons of natives. Leaving sons of mixed marriages out of consideration, the relative rates are 144 for sons of natives and 120 for sons of immigrants. As the Census Bureau points out, however, this somewhat unexpected finding applies to 17 states of the 26 but not to the other 9. What differences between these two groups of states may account for this difference in commitment rates of the second generation?⁵

Though the 17 states include Michigan and others with large industrial interests, the 9 states where the children of immigrants are committed relatively frequently are the more industrial. Except for Illinois, they are also concentrated in the northeastern part of the country. The 9 states have more large cities: that is, the 28 cities with over 100,000 population each in the 17 states have a total of 1,046,331 foreign born, as against 5,366,433 in the 41 cities of this size in the 9 states. 38.5% of the foreign-born population of the 17 states live in cities of 100,000 population or more, as against 61.1% in the 9 states. Differences in age composition also exist which are important in rates which like those mentioned are based on population 15 years of age and over, but these largely disappear when corrected rates such as we give below are used. The 9 states also had in 1930 by far the larger number of foreign born, 8,782,633, as against 2,720,540 in the 17 states. Speaking generally again, a larger proportion of the white population in the 9 states are of foreign stock, four of them and none of the 17 having over three-fifths of their white population either foreign born or children of foreign born. Yet there are exceptions, Ohio among the 9 states for example, having but 30.2% foreign stock, and Minnesota among the 17 having 55.5%.

Finally, the composition of the foreign stock varies greatly as between the two groups of states. Table II shows that the 17 states

⁵ For the sake of brevity these two groups of states will be referred to as "the 17 states" and "the 9 states" hereafter. The reader should not confuse "the 9 states" with the other 9 states referred to above, where the population of mixed parentage had relatively high commitment rates.

TABLE III. AGE COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN BORN AND NATIVE WHITE OF FOREIGN OR MIXED PARENTAGE,
FOR SPECIFIED NATIVITY GROUPS, 1930

Born in	Under 15	15-24	25-44	45-64	65 and over	Age unknown	Totals
N. and W. Europe %	101,331 1.8	338,937 6.1	1,778,647 32.2	2,220,981 40.2	1,073,275 19.5	4,335 .1	5,517,511 99.9
S. and E. Europe %	79,723 1.3	424,130 7.2	3,078,234 52.1	1,977,505 33.5	341,909 5.8	3,939 .1	5,905,440 100.0
Mexico (whites only) %	2,037 8.6	5,729 24.1	11,699 49.2	3,514 14.8	733 3.1	31 .1	23,743 99.9
Canada %	95,800 7.5	153,745 12.0	415,958 32.5	427,095 33.4	185,155 14.5	668 .1	1,278,421 100.0
One or both parents born in							
N. and W. Europe %	2,053,658 14.9	2,099,271 15.2	5,079,136 36.7	3,567,173 25.8	1,022,646 7.4	6,910 .5	13,828,794 100.0
S. and E. Europe %	4,399,248 51.4	2,611,346 30.4	1,387,636 16.2	151,771 1.8	11,116 .1	2,140 .0	8,563,257 100.0
Mexico %	20,879 49.4	7,991 18.9	8,781 20.8	3,802 9.0	753 1.8	19 .0	42,225 99.9
Canada %	534,150 25.9	401,594 19.5	720,703 35.0	335,716 16.3	66,034 3.2	727 .0	2,038,924 99.9

TABLE IV. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION WITHIN THE AGE GROUP 15 YEARS AND OVER FOR POPULATION ELEMENTS SPECIFIED, MALES ONLY, 1930

Origin	Foreign Born White				Total	Native White of Foreign or Mixed Parentage				Total
	15-24	25-44	45-64	65 & over		15-24	25-44	45-64	65 & over	
N. and W. Europe										
England	6.4	33.6	42.1	17.8	99.9	17.8	40.5	31.3	10.4	100.0
Sweden	4.4	32.6	43.4	19.7	100.1	29.0	55.6	14.6	1.0	100.2
Germany	5.8	27.2	40.9	26.2	100.1	14.2	43.7	33.2	8.9	100.0
Scotland	10.6	42.1	34.7	12.7	100.1	17.8	40.0	31.3	10.8	99.9
Wales	4.9	27.1	44.7	23.2	99.9	14.7	42.1	33.8	9.5	100.1
Ireland	6.2	33.9	41.8	18.1	100.0	14.5	37.7	36.1	11.7	100.0
Norway	4.5	33.9	40.7	20.8	99.9	26.5	49.8	21.1	2.6	100.0
Netherlands	7.5	40.2	38.4	14.0	100.1	27.6	43.0	23.7	5.7	100.0
France	6.7	35.0	40.0	18.3	100.0	14.7	39.3	34.0	12.0	100.0
S. and E. Europe										
Poland	5.8	51.6	36.5	6.0	99.9	63.4	32.5	3.9	.2	100.0
Czechoslovakia	4.6	43.3	42.4	9.8	100.1	49.8	39.4	9.7	.7	99.6
Lithuania	2.9	50.3	42.6	4.3	100.1	73.8	25.1	1.1	.4	100.4
Greece	3.8	71.3	23.8	1.1	100.0	81.2	15.6	2.9	.3	100.0
Italy	7.0	53.6	33.8	5.5	99.9	67.8	29.9	2.1	.2	100.0
Austria	5.1	46.9	40.4	7.6	100.0	49.8	42.5	7.1	.7	100.1
Hungary	7.1	44.8	42.6	5.5	100.0	66.9	29.8	3.0	.3	100.0
Jugoslavia	5.3	55.4	36.5	2.9	100.1	82.1	16.9	1.0	.1	100.1
Russia	7.3	51.1	35.7	6.0	100.1	56.0	40.6	3.2	.2	100.0
Finland	3.7	44.2	45.3	6.9	99.9	62.0	36.0	1.9	.1	100.0
Rumania	6.3	52.7	36.5	4.5	100.0	71.4	27.4	1.1	.1	100.0
Spain	7.9	71.2	18.9	1.9	99.9	42.5	35.8	17.3	4.5	100.1
Canada,	12.5	34.8	36.6	16.0	99.9	26.8	46.5	22.3	4.4	100.0
Mexico (colored)						34.2	52.3	11.4	2.1	100.0
						(Percentage not distinguished)				

have 1.46 times as large a proportion of Northern and Western European descent among the second generation; while the 9 states have over twice (2.09) as large a proportion of Southern and Eastern European descent. The significance of the preponderance of particular national groups depends, of course, both on their relative commitment rates and their relative numerical importance. In the light of both these factors the predominance of Scandinavian, German and Canadian⁶ stock in the 17 states, and of Irish,⁶ Italian, Polish and Austrian in the 9 states seems significant. When both numbers and commitment rates are considered, the presence of no large group seems greatly to augment the commitment rank of the 17 states.

Do commitment rates of the various national groups vary sufficiently to help account for the contrasts between our two sets of states? Apart from this these national rates are of interest in themselves. The writer has elsewhere⁷ called attention to the need for correcting crime rates for age variations within the base usually used—namely the total population or the male population 15 years of age and over. Birth statistics have taken on new significance when corrected for age composition of the female population within the period 15-44; crime statistics require refinement by a similar technique. The need for such correction is evident when we examine both the wide differences in commitment rates according to age, and the wide differences in the age composition of national groups. The Census bulletin referred to above gives, on page 30, for 1933 a general commitment rate for males 15 years of age and over of 144.0 per 100,000, but the rate at age 20 is 338.0, while that at ages beyond 65 is but 12.6.

Tables III and IV show the age composition of groups of different national origin and of regional combinations of these groups. Table III shows that in 1930 the foreign born were passing out of the younger age groups where serious crime is prevalent. In age group 25-44 a much higher proportion of the "new" immigrants are found than of the "old." A lower proportion of the "new" than of the "old" is found at ages 45-64; while nearly four times as large a proportion of the "old" as of the "new" are 65 or over.

Contrasts in age distribution are more significant among the second generation. Table III shows that whereas only 14.9% of the children

⁶ The foreign-born Irish and the native-born Canadians do not, however, show relatively high rates.

⁷ Donald R. Taft, *Human Migration*, New York, 1936, pp. 213 ff.; also, "Does Immigration Increase Crime?", *Social Forces*, October, 1933, pp. 69-77.

of "old" immigrants are under 15 years of age, 51.4% of the children of the "new" fall within this group. Moreover the "new" group here have twice the proportion (30.5% vs. 15.2%) of the "old" in the "criminally significant" age group 15-24. The reverse is true between 25 and 44, while almost no (1.9%) children of the "new" immigration have passed the age of 45. The proportion of children of the "old" immigration is over 14 times that of the "new" between

TABLE V. COMMITMENT RATES AND CORRECTED COMMITMENT RATES FOR MALE FOREIGN-BORN FELONS COMMITTED TO STATE INSTITUTIONS, 1930-1933, BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH

Born in	Rate per 100,000 male Pop. 15 years of age and over	Corrected Rate	Ratio to English rate
N. and W. Europe	26.4	42.0	.96
England	28.6	43.7	1.00
Scotland	30.1	38.1	.87
Wales	14.4	16.6	.38
Ireland	21.5	32.9	.75
Norway	26.3	42.1	.96
Sweden	19.7	32.1	.73
Netherlands	45.0	61.6	1.41
France	41.4	63.0	1.44
Germany	27.4	47.1	1.08
S. and E. Europe	56.4	78.4	1.80
Austria	96.4	125.3	2.87
Poland	46.4	56.5	1.29
Czechoslovakia	16.7	23.0	.53
Hungary	45.6	58.5	1.34
Yugoslavia	45.4	53.7	1.23
Russia	44.9	46.3	1.06
Lithuania	33.5	43.6	1.00
Finland	58.1	80.2	1.84
Rumania	37.5	44.5	1.02
Greece	87.0	90.0	2.06
Italy	74.8	88.0	2.01
Canada	84.3	112.0	2.56

45 and 64, and 74 times after the age of 65. It is apparent, therefore, that any commitment rates which fail to take account of these large differences would be grossly unfair to some national groups.

Table IV leaves children under 15 out of consideration and shows variations within the age range over 15. Unlike table III, this table is for males only and distinguishes the various national groups within the larger groups. Among the foreign born few contrasts between the ages 15 and 24 are noted; if, however, comparison were made between Lithuanians and Scotch the difference would be signifi-

cant. The contrasts between the several national groups and the two European regional groups is startling, however, when we turn to the second generation. Consider, for instance, the fact that, whereas nearly half of the sons of Irish immigrants are over 45 years of age and so almost incapable of committing our most prevalent felonies, only 1.2% of Rumanians and 1.5% of Lithuanians are beyond that age. Over four-fifths of adult sons of Jugo-Slavs and of Greeks are between the ages of 15 and 24 when active crimes are committed, and over two-thirds of adult sons of Italians, but only one-seventh of adult sons of Germans are of that dangerous age. Differences in proportions of the aged are notable even among the foreign born, where, for example, more than a quarter of all adult Germans are over 65 as against scarcely one per cent of Greeks. These differences are significant for the statistics of crime.

Using a method similar to that employed in vital statistics⁸ we have figured corrected commitment rates for the several population elements in question, which eliminate the influence of age so far as Census data make possible. It seems probable that considerable further correction within the age groups for which data are available would be of some value. Table V shows uncorrected and corrected commitment rates for *male* foreign-born felons for a period of four years, and also the ratio between the corrected rates and the corrected rate for the English. These corrected rates show how many of each national group would have been committed had their age distribution been that of the male population of the United States

⁸ Cf. George C. Whipple, *Vital Statistics*, John Wiley and Sons, 1923, pp. 291-292. Corrected commitment rates are figured according to the following formula:

$$CCR = \frac{\frac{P}{4}}{x} \cdot \frac{\frac{C}{O}}{\frac{y}{x}}$$

when CCR is the corrected commitment rate; P is the number of male prisoners of the group in question committed during the four years 1930-1933; x is the total male foreign-born population 15 years of age and over of the group in question in 1930; C is the total male prisoners 15 years of age and over committed in the United States during the four year period in question; O is the total male population in the United States 15 years of age and over in 1930; y is the sum of the products of (1) specific commitment rates by age groups 15-24, 25-44, 45-64, and 65 and over, for the total male population of the United States 15 years of age and over, and (2) the male population of the national group in question in 1930 in the corresponding age groups.

A similar formula was used for the second generation groups, except that but one year, 1933, was available; age data were for both sexes so rates had to be for both sexes. Special tabulations of prisoner data were made for the study by the Census Bureau. All population data are computed from tables of the Fifteenth Census of the United States.

as a whole. These rates are given for particular national groups and also for regional combinations of them.

TABLE VI. COMMITMENT RATES AND CORRECTED COMMITMENT RATES FOR FELONS (NATIVE WHITE OF FOREIGN AND MIXED PARENTAGE) COMMITTED TO STATE INSTITUTIONS, 1933, BOTH SEXES, BY NATIONAL ORIGIN AND GROUPS OF STATES OF ORIGIN

Origin	9 States		17 States		26 States		Ratio to English
	Rate per 100,000 Pop. 15 Yrs. of age and over	Corrected Rate	Rate per 100,000 Pop. 15 Yrs. of age and over	Corrected Rate	Rate per 100,000 Pop. 15 Yrs. of age and over	Corrected Rate	
N. and W. Europe	22.9	25.4 ⁴	35.4	39.3 ⁴	27.8	30.9 ⁴	1.14
England	19.9	21.5	34.3	42.9	24.2	27.1	1.0
Scotland	27.6	29.3	60.0	75.6	37.3	41.4	1.5
Wales ¹	10.8	12.1	38.6	49.0	16.9	19.4	.7
Ireland ²	30.5	35.7	56.0	88.5	34.8	42.4	1.6
Norway	19.9	16.9	37.3	35.1	34.4	32.0	1.2
Sweden	15.3	12.7	35.4	30.4	26.7	22.7	.8
Denmark	30.8	26.5	50.0	43.5	44.4	38.6	1.4
Netherlands	31.3	30.0	32.4	30.8	32.0	30.4	1.1
France	21.7	25.2	61.3	80.3	35.8	43.3	1.6
Germany	19.5	22.8	29.7	33.3	24.1	27.7	1.0
S. and E. Europe	95.3	66.7 ⁴	95.2	72.4 ⁴	95.3	67.6 ⁴	2.5
Austria	72.8	53.9	114.1	93.6	81.2	60.9	2.2
Poland	111.3	76.8	120.4	90.3	113.4	80.5	3.0
Czechoslovakia	34.4	25.1	28.5	24.5	32.5	24.7	.9
Hungary	85.1	59.6	129.4	88.0	91.4	63.1	2.3
Yugoslavia	55.5	36.6	89.7	59.2	66.2	43.7	1.6
Russia	53.5	38.0	84.2	62.3	58.1	41.8	1.5
Lithuania	126.5	84.8	223.1	149.5	136.0	91.1	3.4
Finland	54.2	37.4	54.9	39.0	54.7	39.9	1.5
Rumania	54.0	36.7	151.1	101.2	66.3	45.1	1.7
Greece	270.1	175.6	124.5	84.7	242.4	160.0	5.9
Italy	137.2	94.7	145.8	103.5	138.0	95.2	3.5
Spain	221.4	194.8	255.3	257.9	232.1	211.2	7.8
Canada ³	43.5	40.0	57.7	57.1	49.2	46.7	1.7
All other	60.6	52.1	56.5	55.4	58.9	53.6	1.9

¹ Numbers of prisoners of Welsh descent probably too few to be significant.

² Impossible to separate Northern and Southern Ireland.

³ Impossible to separate English and French Canadians.

⁴ Estimated rates for males only N. and W. Europe: 9 states, 48.3; 17 states, 74.7; 26 states, 58.7. S. and E. Europe: 9 states, 126.7; 17 states, 137.6; 26 states, 128.4.

We first note that for every national group among the foreign born correction raises the rates. No allowance has been made for the fact that prisoner statistics are for 1933 and population for 1930,

NATIONALITY AND CRIME

735

TABLE VII. MALE PRISONERS COMMITTED FOR YEARS INDICATED BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH OR ORIGIN¹

Country of Origin	Foreign Born				Native White of Foreign ² or Mixed Parentage 1933 only
	1930	1931	1932	1933	
N. and W. Europe	734 ²	788	643	591	3165
England	129	122	119	90	313
Scotland	51	61	56	38	155
Wales	8	5	2	3	23
Ireland	86	97	76	87	903
Norway	68	61	36	39	197
Sweden	76	71	57	56	197
Denmark	33	36	20	20	94
Netherlands	34 ²	51	29	21	66
France	27 ²	29	29	24	91
Germany	222	255	219	213	1126
S. and E. Europe	2125	2128	1881	1705	4284
Poland	334	356	321	240	1103
Czechoslovakia	34	36	50	48	161
Austria	203	222	159	158	303
Hungary	54	78	63	58	145
Yugoslavia	55	58	57	67	56
Russia	283	306	257	246	514
Lithuania	41	35	37	34	162
Finland	66	48	40	24	55
Rumania	34	38	20	24	41
Greece	116	107	102	119	46
Italy	858	812	732	655	1669
Spain	47	32	43	32	29
Canada	520	525	447	426	635
Mexico	49	53	25	33	4
Cent. and South America	33	43	39	45	9
Other countries	192	193	196	192	282
Not Reported	15				
Totals	3668	3730	3231	2992	8379

¹ Derived from *Prisoners in State and Federal Prisons and Reformatories*, U. S. Bureau of the Census, reports for 1930-1933, and from special tabulations made for the writer by the Bureau.

² Netherlands and France estimated for 1930 as one-third of total for 1931-1933.

³ Where parentage was reported. Parentage of 8978 not reported. Hence, elsewhere in this report we have only figured rates for the 26 states where parentage was reported for 90% or more of prisoners of foreign or mixed parentage.

but such allowance would further raise the rates. Table V also shows that it is especially the rates of the "old" immigration among the foreign born which need correction, since their crude rates are

raised 59%, as against 39% for the "new." Correction raises the German rate by 70%.

Table VI shows similar uncorrected and corrected rates for the second generation, and in addition compares rates in the 9 states with those in the 17 states. Corrected rates for the 26 states are also shown and these latter rates expressed in terms of ratios to the corrected rate for the children of the English. Here correction is important but has an opposite effect on the second generation of the two regional groups. In the case of the children of the "old" immigrants, correction raises the rate 11 per cent, whereas it reduces the rate for children of the "new" by about 29 per cent. In spite of this radical change, rates for the "new" immigrants still are about 2.2 times as high as those for the "old."

It is clear, then, that the fact that children of immigrants have higher rates than the children of the native born in nine states but lower in 17 states, may be partly due to the greater preponderance of children of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe.

On analysis, the finding of the Census Bureau that the second generation has in 26 states a more favorable commitment rate than the children of natives, is not inconsistent with the fact that many children of immigrants have a difficult adjustment problem. There are, as we have seen, a number of possible explanations of the varying record in different groups of states. Evidence has been presented to show both the need for proper correction of crime rates for age, and also the need to consider the adjustment problem of each national culture group separately because their several rates vary greatly. This variation is no doubt due largely to differential exposure to adverse conditions, but it may also be due to contrasts in particular cultural values which different national groups bring. The nature of these and their several influences upon adjustment and crime need further investigation.

THE PREDICTION OF ADJUSTMENT IN MARRIAGE*

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THE PROBLEM. We do not feel it necessary to justify an effort to increase skill in guessing right about the future. Particularly is this true of fields of experience wherein correct guesses are relevant to immediate acts of personal adjustment. Hence without apology we submit a brief outline of an exploratory effort at predicting adjustment in marriage.

Briefly stated, the problem in this study was to discover what prediction as to adjustments in marriage could be made from a knowledge of certain items in the background of prospective husbands and wives. The background items selected were those which would not require the subtle powers of the psychologist or psychiatrist to detect, but were chosen purposely on the basis of the ease with which the information could be elicited from persons willing to co-operate in the study.

Such a choice of items should in no sense be taken to imply that we discount the importance of more elusive psychological and physiological factors in marital adjustment. Indeed, in the work of collecting schedule data we accumulated information on personality factors in marital adjustment that appeared more basic than any of the items on our schedules.

We wish to reiterate, however, that we were after background material which would be easily obtainable and which could be used for predicting the probabilities of successful adjustment in marriage. A precise description of the relationships obtaining between

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our various items and marital adjustment was not the central interest in this study.

The Population-Sample Studied. The materials upon which this study was based were taken from schedules returned by couples who were living in the state of Illinois, and who had been married not less than one and not more than six years. Certain characteristics of the group will enable the reader to place it approximately as to its position in the social-economic order.

Over 70 percent had been married from two to four years. The median age at the time of marriage was 27.2 years for husbands and 23.1 years for wives. Fifty-six percent of the husbands and 52 percent of the wives had completed one or more years of college or graduate work at the time of marriage. Only 10 percent of the husbands and 5 percent of the wives had less than a high school education at the time of marriage. Most of the sample was from an urban environment, only 10 percent coming from places of less than 10,000 population. Seventy percent were from cities of over 200,000 population, which in this case means that most of them came from Chicago. Slightly over half of the husbands and 58 percent of the wives were brought up in the city, while less than 10 percent of the total were reared on the farm.

Our group for the most part were from the middle class. Forty-three percent lived in moderate rent apartment house areas and another 43 percent lived in the better class single family residential and suburban communities. Only 10 percent were from immigrant, rooming house and similar communities of low social-economic status.

Only about 25 percent of the husbands had experienced as much as one month or more of unemployment since marriage, and over half of the wives had held positions since marriage. The occupation of husbands and wives were for the most part white-collar and professional.

Only 10 percent of our sample had bought or were buying their homes, and 25 percent stated they were planning to buy. The majority were renting and not planning to buy homes.

Practically all of our sample were native white. Fifty percent of the husbands and 58 percent of the wives had fathers who were native white Americans. Fifty percent of the husbands and 58 percent of the wives were Protestant in religious affiliation, while 15 percent of the husbands and 9 percent of the wives claimed no religious

affiliation. There was about an even distribution of the remainder among the Catholic, Jewish and other faiths.

These characteristics point to the conclusion that we had a roughly homogeneous, middle class, native-white, urban American group.

The data on this group were collected on eight-page printed schedules that were filled out anonymously. Many students, colleagues, friends and a few social organizations participated in getting nearly 7000 schedules into the hands of possible subjects. About 1300 couples responded. Of these, 526 conformed to the requirement that they be residents of Illinois and that their marriage date be not less than one year and not more than six years in the past at the time of filling out the schedules. Most of the schedules were collected during 1931-33.

With this description of our sample and method of collection of data we may now turn to a description of the way the materials were handled.

A Criterion of Adjustment in Marriage. Any attempt at predicting adjustment in marriage calls for some definition of what is meant by adjustment, and some method of indicating varying degrees of adjustment.

A highly generalized definition of a well adjusted marriage might be the following: A well adjusted marriage is a marriage in which the attitudes and actions of each of the partners produces an environment which is highly favorable to the proper functioning of the personality structures of each partner, particularly in the sphere of primary relationships.

Four corollaries follow from this definition: 1. The degree to which the indicated conditions are met would be the degree of adjustment realized. 2. Since personality structures differ from individual to individual it follows that a particular combination highly favorable to a given personality would be entirely unsuited for another. 3. Since personalities are not unitary but are composites of role patterns, a marriage which is favorable to the functioning of one part of the personality may not be favorable for another part of the structure. 4. Since personalities are not static but are in process of development, a combination favorable to the functioning of the personality at one time may not be so for a later period in the development; and hence recurring periods of poor adjustment are necessary conditions of "growth" until a relatively mature and stable level of personality organization is achieved.

Setting aside all questions of the relative adequacy of this definition and its corollary propositions, it is quite evident that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to give it a direct quantitative expression. However, in this as in other instances where a numerical index is desirable, it is possible to give symptoms of adjustment a quantitative expression even though we may not be able to measure directly the variables operating in adjustment. This means, of course, that we do not measure adjustment directly but must be content with an inferential criterion. Moreover, we are measuring present adjustment only.

In constructing a numerical index of adjustment it was necessary to make certain assumptions. We assumed that those subjects whose marriages approximated our definition would make statements which would indicate: 1. That the individual regards his marriage as happy. 2. That there is essential agreement on critical issues in the relationship. 3. That there is a substantial amount of common interests and activities. 4. That there are frequent demonstrations of affection. 5. That there is a minimum of regret concerning the marital choice and a minimum of complaint about the marriage or the partner.

If our assumptions are correct, then we should expect replies to questions centering around the above points to have some value for indicating the degree of adjustment realized in a given marriage. Moreover, if the replies to such questions were appropriately weighted or scored, a composite of these individual weights should give at least a rough numerical index of the degree of adjustment in marriage.

Proceeding on such an assumption we assigned numerical values to the various types of replies on a list of twenty selected questions. At first we were disposed to assign values arbitrarily but finally decided on a more empirical method. We correlated replies to each of the selected questions with the way the subjects rated the degree of happiness of their marriages. The replies were then weighted according to their correlation with happiness ratings. How these weights were assigned and the score computed is described below.

Since the ratings of happiness in marriage were used as a guide in the assignment of weights to the various replies, we should first devote our attention to these ratings. We asked each subject to rate his marriage on a scale with five steps designated as "very happy," "happy," "average," "unhappy," "very unhappy."

Now happiness is a nebulous and elusive affair, especially when one attempts to define it. Offhand one would expect a great deal of variability in the way a subject would rate the happiness of his marriage from time to time. It might be expected also that husbands and wives would rate the marriage differently. Moreover, one would expect that an outsider's rating of a marriage would differ from that of the marriage partners.

Thus far these expectations have not been borne out by our experience. The following data show that there is a rather consistent agreement in: 1. Independent ratings given by the two partners in a given marriage. 2. The ratings given by outsiders more or less familiar with the marriage and one of the marriage partners. 3. The rating of a given marriage by two outsiders. 4. The rating given by the same person at different times.

Table I shows a comparison of the way husbands and wives independently rated their marriages.

TABLE I. COMPARISON OF THE WAY HUSBANDS AND WIVES RATED THE HAPPINESS OF THEIR MARRIAGE

Ratings	Husband's Rating						Percentage Distribution
	Very unhappy	Unhappy	Average	Happy	Very happy	Total	
Wife's Rating:							
Very happy	1		3	24	112	140	55.6
Happy			12	38	12	62	24.6
Average		3	14	7	6	30	11.9
Unhappy	1	11	2			14	5.5
Very unhappy	5	1				6	2.4
Total	7	15	31	69	130	252	100.0
Percentage Distribution	2.8	5.9	12.3	27.4	51.6	100.0	

Of the 252 pairs of ratings 180, or 71.4 percent, agree; 62, or 24.6 percent, disagree by only one scale step, and only 10, or 4.0 percent, disagree by two or more scale steps. The tetrachoric correlation between the two sets of ratings is $+.89$.

Table II shows the comparison of ratings of a marriage, one rating being by one of the marriage partners and one being by an outsider who is well acquainted with the couple. The ratings were of course given independently, and the persons who were being rated were not aware of the fact.

In this comparison we find that 132, or 48.5 percent, are identical

ratings; 116, or 42.7 percent, vary by only one scale step; and 24, or 8.8 percent, disagree by two or more scale steps. The tetrachoric correlation coefficient for the table is $+ .91$.

TABLE II. COMPARISON OF THE RATING OF MARRIAGES BY A MARRIAGE PARTNER AND AN OUTSIDER

Ratings	Marriage Partner's Rating						Percentage Distribution
	Very unhappy	Unhappy	Average	Happy	Very happy	Total	
Outsider's Rating:							
Very happy			4	16	57	77	28.3
Happy		2	4	31	35	72	26.5
Average	1	4	6	16	8	35	12.9
Unhappy	10	27	20	3		60	22.0
Very unhappy	11	11	5	1		28	10.3
Total	22	44	39	67	100	272	100.0
Percentage Distribution	8.1	16.2	14.3	24.6	36.8	100	

Husbands and wives were asked to give independent ratings of the happiness of their parents' marriages. Table III shows the way husband and wife rated the marriage of the wife's parents.

One hundred and thirty, or 68.8 percent, of the ratings are the same; 52, or 27.5 percent, of the ratings differ by one scale step, and

TABLE III. COMPARISON OF RATINGS BY HUSBAND AND WIFE OF WIFE'S PARENT'S MARRIAGE

Ratings	Husband's Rating						Percentage Distribution
	Very unhappy	Unhappy	Average	Happy	Very happy	Total	
Wife's Rating:							
Very Happy			4	15	41	60	31.7
Happy			16	38	7	61	32.3
Average		2	37	5	2	46	24.3
Unhappy	2	8	5	1		16	8.5
Very unhappy	6					6	3.2
Total	8	10	62	59	50	189	100.0
Percentage Distribution	4.2	5.3	32.8	31.2	26.5	100	

only 7, or 3.7 percent, differ by two or more scale steps. The tetrachoric coefficient of correlation is $+ .90$.

The same comparison was made of the way husbands and wives rated the marriages of the husbands' parents. Here again we found very close agreement. Only 3 percent of the ratings differed by two

or more scale steps. The tetrachoric correlation coefficient was $+.91$.

On a small number of cases (34) we made careful reports of case interviews. These interviews, properly disguised were read by two competent judges. The judges gave what they regarded as a correct rating of the happiness of the marriages. In all the comparisons made: between rating of judge number one and the rating by the subject; between judge number two and the subject; and between the ratings of the two judges, there was very close agreement. None of the coefficients of correlation fell below $+.95$.

A small number of subjects (38) were available for a second rating after a lapse of time varying from eight months to two years.¹ A comparison of the first and second ratings of this group showed that only four of the ratings differed by as much as two scale steps. The correlation coefficient was $+.86$.

This study of happiness ratings suggests that the rating scale has sufficient reliability and validity to allow its use as a guide in selecting questions which discriminate between good and poor adjustment and in assigning proper weights to the various answers to such questions.

By correlating the replies to each of our questions with the happiness ratings, we were able to select twenty questions. These questions elicited replies that were indicative of the degree of adjustment.

The twenty questions include such things as the following: (a) Extent to which couple engages in common activities. (b) Extent of agreement on a number of points such as, handling finances, recreation, friends, dealing with in-laws, manners, intimate relations, etc. (c) Extent to which affection is demonstrated. (d) Extent to which partners confide in one another. (e) The number of complaints listed regarding the marriage or the partner.

Replies to each question were given numerical values which varied with the proportion of "very happy" subjects giving the reply. Thus, if in our sample, 40 percent of those who rated their marriage as very happy gave answer "a" to question "x" and only 5 percent gave answer "b," the numerical value assigned to answer "a" would be roughly 8 times as great as that assigned to answer "b." This procedure can best be illustrated by showing a few tables

¹ Due to the fact that most of our schedules were anonymous, we were not able to contact very many of the subjects for subsequent study.

in which replies to certain of the questions are correlated with the ratings of happiness.

In Table IV the replies to the question on extent of agreement in ways of dealing with in-laws are correlated with the rating of happiness.

TABLE IV. COMPARISON OF RATINGS OF HAPPINESS IN MARRIAGE WITH EXTENT OF AGREEMENT ON WAYS OF DEALING WITH IN-LAWS. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION

Extent of Agreement	Rating of Happiness					Number of Cases
	Very Unhappy	Unhappy	Average	Happy	Very Happy	
Always Agree	3.8	2.7	11.5	19.2	62.7	182
Almost Always Agree	4.5	6.3	17.1	29.7	42.3	111
Occasionally Disagree	7.7	20.0	23.1	20.0	29.2	65
Frequently Disagree	18.6	25.6	23.2	16.3	16.3	43
Almost Always Disagree	20.0	50.0	20.0	5.0	5.0	20
Always Disagree	38.2	38.2	11.8	8.8	2.9	34
All Cases	9.1	12.9	16.0	20.5	41.5	455

As one might expect, replies indicating essential agreement on the in-law question are much more frequent among those who rate their marriage as very happy or happy than are replies indicating serious disagreement.

In the "very happy" column the percentage of those who checked "always agree" is about twenty times as great as the percentage who checked "always disagree." Hence we may assign a value of twenty to the answer "always agree" and zero to the answer "always disagree." We followed this procedure in principle. When the distribution on all of the "agreement" questions were averaged and the two scale steps "almost always disagree" and "always disagree" were combined to get enough cases to make the proportion stable, we found it desirable to give a maximum value of ten to the answer "always agree" and zero to the answer "always disagree" for all questions of that type.² The intermediate answers were given values graded down evenly from ten to zero.

Table V shows the comparison of happiness ratings with the extent to which couples engage in outside activities together.

Here again the expected distribution results. The proportion of the "very happy" group who say they engage in all outside activities together is about fifteen times as great as those engaged in few or

² These were eleven "agreement" questions.

none of their outside activities together. Hence we may assign a value of 15 to the answer "all of them" and zero to the answers "few of them" and "none of them."

TABLE V. COMPARISON OF RATINGS OF HAPPINESS IN MARRIAGE WITH EXTENT TO WHICH HUSBAND AND WIFE ENGAGE IN OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES TOGETHER. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION

Number Joint Activities	Rating of Happiness					Number of Cases
	Very Unhappy	Unhappy	Average	Happy	Very Happy	
All of them	3.9	2.6	6.5	19.6	67.3	153
Some of them	5.3	12.8	20.2	24.4	37.2	226
Few of them	27.6	34.5	22.4	10.3	5.2	58
None of them	36.4	31.8	13.6	13.6	4.5	22
All cases	9.1	12.9	16.0	20.5	41.5	459

This procedure was followed for each of the twenty selected questions, and resulted in a numerical value for each possible reply to each of the questions. This done, it was possible to take a schedule properly filled out and compute a marriage adjustment score by summing up the numerical values on replies to the twenty questions.

TABLE VI. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF MARRIAGE ADJUSTMENT SCORES BY HAPPINESS RATING CATEGORIES

Adjustment Score	Happiness Rating						Total	Percentage Distribution
	Very Unhappy	Unhappy	Average	Happy	Very Happy	No Rating		
180-199				7	65		72	13.7
160-179			5	31	118	1	155	29.4
140-159			12	34	32	1	79	15.0
120-139	2	9	27	24	6	2	70	13.3
100-119	3	13	23	8			47	8.9
80-99	13	19	5	3		1	41	7.8
60-79	15	17	3		3		38	7.2
40-59	7	8		1			16	3.2
20-39	2	5	1				8	1.5
Total	42	71	76	108	224	5	526	
Percentage Distribution	8.0	13.5	14.4	20.5	42.6	1.0		100.0

Mean score = 140.8; σ = 38.8

Table VI shows the frequency distribution of adjustment scores for the whole group and for each happiness rating group.

As would be expected the adjustment scores show a fairly close correlation with the ratings of happiness, since the ratings were used as guides in assigning the score values to the individual questions. The tetrachoric coefficient of correlation between scores and ratings is $+.92$.³

Table VII shows that the score does discriminate between groups who are divorced or separated on the one hand and those whose marriages have not been broken on the other. Furthermore, among those not divorced or separated the score discriminates between those who state they have considered breaking their marriage and those who claim not to have contemplated this step.

TABLE VII. DISTRIBUTION OF MARRIAGE ADJUSTMENT SCORES BY GROUPINGS INTO THOSE WHO ARE DIVORCED, SEPARATED, HAVE CONTEMPLATED DIVORCE OR SEPARATION AND HAVE NOT CONTEMPLATED DIVORCE OR SEPARATION

Adjustment Score	Marital Status					Total
	Divorced	Separated and not Divorced	Have contemplated Divorce or Separation	Have not contemplated Divorce or Separation	No Reply	
180-199				64	8	72
160-179	3		4	141	7	155
140-159	1	6	8	54	10	79
120-139	9	6	19	29	7	70
100-119	10	13	13	11		47
80-99	15	12	9	4	1	41
60-79	12	18	4	3	1	38
40-59	6	8	2			16
20-39	5	2	1			8
Total	61	65	60	306	34	526

This table would suggest that our score has considerable validity.

Some evidence of the reliability of the score is seen in the fact that scores computed from schedules filled out independently by husbands and wives have a fairly high correlation ($r = +.88 \pm .03$).

Having constructed a score to measure indirectly the present marital adjustment, we then attempted to use certain background information to predict the adjustment score.

Construction of a Prediction Score. The schedules used in this study called for information on certain items in the premarital back-

³ For computing this coefficient the distribution of ratings was split into two groups so as to include the ratings of "happy" and "very happy" in one group and all other ratings in another. The adjustment scores were split into two groups at the median of the distribution.

grounds of husband and of wife. This information covered such things as age; place in the family; health; education; occupation; employment history; earnings; amount saved at time of marriage; religious affiliation and activity; participation in other organized social groups; friendships with men and women; length of courtship and engagement; attachments to and conflicts with parents; happiness of parents' marriages; and certain items on the occupation, religion, education and social-economic status of the parents of each.

Our problem with respect to these data was to devise a method of combining the information on each of the schedules into single numerical expressions, whose variations would correlate as closely as possible with the variations in the marriage adjustment scores.

The procedure followed in constructing such a prediction score was similar in most respects to our procedure in constructing the adjustment score. Since we were trying to predict the adjustment score we used that score as a guide in assigning numerical values to replies on questions regarding premarital information.

Each item of information on the premarital backgrounds of husband and of wife was correlated with the adjustment score. Those items which showed a significant relationship were selected for use in constructing the prediction score. Twenty-one items in the husband's background material and twenty items in the wife's background were selected for this purpose. Each type of reply was then given a numerical value in accordance with its frequency in the "very high" adjustment score group.

Table VIII illustrates the procedure. In this table is presented the relationship between level of educational achievement at the time of marriage and marriage adjustment score.

The data in this table indicate that in our sample the higher the educational level at the time of marriage the greater the chances are that the marriage adjustment score will be high. It also seems that contrary to certain recent pronouncements on the college girl as a poor marriage risk, the wife's educational achievement makes more difference in the chances for a high adjustment score in marriage than does the husband's.⁴

The numerical values assigned to the different educational levels were determined (with certain variations that we do not have space

⁴ As would be expected we found that wide differences in educational achievement were associated with low adjustment scores.

here to discuss) by the procedure already described in the discussion of the adjustment score. In the case of husbands, we gave twenty points to replies stating that the husband was in a graduate level of educational achievement at the time of marriage; fifteen if he was in, or had completed, college; zero if he was in, or had completed, high school; and five points if his education did not exceed the grades.

TABLE VIII. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MARRIAGE ADJUSTMENT SCORES AT DIFFERENT EDUCATIONAL LEVELS

	Marriage Adjustment Score*				Number of Cases
	Very Low	Low	High	Very High	
<i>Husband's Education</i>					
Graduate Work	3.8	8.6	36.2	51.4	105
College	9.8	15.1	26.8	48.3	205
High School	15.1	24.3	27.0	33.6	152
Grades only	21.6	19.6	21.6	37.2	51
No reply					13
<i>Wife's Education</i>					
Graduate Work	0.0	4.8	38.7	56.5	62
College	9.2	18.9	22.9	48.9	227
High School	14.4	16.3	32.2	37.1	202
Grade only	33.3	25.9	25.9	14.8	27
No reply					8
All Cases	11.8	16.7	28.4	43.2	526

* For convenience in presentation, the adjustment scores were grouped as follows: Very low 20-79; low, 80-119; high, 120-159; very high, 160-199.

In the case of the wife's schedule we gave forty points for the graduate level at time of marriage, thirty for collegiate level, twenty for high school level, and zero for the grade school level.

Table IX shows the relation between the number of social organizations the persons belonged to at the time of marriage, and the marriage adjustment scores.

This table seems to suggest that persons with proclivities for joining organized social groups are better risks for marriage adjustment than those who lack such tendencies. This item seems to be more discriminating for husbands than it does for wives.

Scores assigned husbands' answers were: 20 for membership in three or more organizations; 10 for membership in two; 5 for one; 0 for none. For the wives' answers the scores were: 15 for membership

in three or more organizations; 5 each for two and none; and zero for membership in one.

This procedure was followed for each of the forty-one items used in constructing the premarital background or prediction score. It is an admittedly crude procedure and doubtless has a number of serious fallacies. It is encumbered with such apparent inconsistencies as giving more score points to wives who were members of no organizations than to those who were members of one; or to take another instance, of giving more value to a grade school level of edu-

TABLE IX. RELATION BETWEEN MEMBERSHIP IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS AT TIME OF MARRIAGE AND MARRIAGE ADJUSTMENT SCORE. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION

Number Organizations	Marriage Adjustment Score				Number Cases
	Very Low	Low	High	Very High	
<i>Husband:</i>					
Three or more	8.6	9.9	27.2	54.3	81
Two	8.7	16.3	27.9	47.1	104
One	11.9	18.1	27.1	42.9	210
None	13.3	17.3	37.3	32.0	75
No reply					56
Total					526
<i>Wife:</i>					
Three or more	4.2	18.9	22.1	54.7	95
Two	13.3	15.9	25.7	45.1	113
One	13.0	14.3	34.2	38.5	161
None	12.5	17.0	28.4	42.0	88
No reply					69
Total					526
All Cases	11.8	16.7	28.4	43.2	

cation of the husband than to a high school level. The differences in score values cited were not great, but they violate one's feeling for consistency. However, we preferred to be consistent in our empirical procedure rather than violate that procedure for the sake of consistent weightings in some of our items.

It will be noted that the maximum score values vary from item to item and are not the same for the same item for husbands' and wives' answers. In each case the maximum score is approximately equal to the difference between the highest percentage and the lowest percentage in the column headed "very high" adjustment scores. Thus in Table IX, the percentages of replies from husbands in mar-

riages with "very high" adjustment scores varied from 32.0 to 54.3, a range of approximately 20. The percentage of replies from wives in marriage with "very high" adjustment score varied from 38.5 to 54.7 or approximately 15 points.

By following this method we were able to assign values which varied roughly in accordance with the discriminative value of the item.

With a numerical value determined for all types of answers to questions on the 41 selected items, we were in a position to take any given schedule on which a couple had answered the required questions, assign the numerical value to the replies, sum them and thus compute a background or prediction score. The background scores were computed for each of the 526 couples and these scores were correlated with the marriage adjustment scores. The Pearsonian coefficient of correlation was $+ .51$.

Table X gives a better idea of the relation between the two scores.

TABLE X. RELATION BETWEEN THE PREDICTION SCORES AND MARRIAGE ADJUSTMENT SCORES. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION

Prediction Score	Marriage Adjustment Score				Number Cases
	Very Low	Low	High	Very High	
700-779	0.0	10.0	10.0	80.0	10
620-699	1.5	12.1	25.8	60.6	66
540-619	5.8	21.9	29.2	43.1	137
460-539	27.6	29.4	25.9	17.1	170
380-459	39.8	31.1	15.1	14.0	93
300-379	57.2	25.7	11.4	5.7	35
220-299	75.0	25.0	0.0	0.0	8
Total					519*

Mean prediction score = 516.0; σ = 98.8.

* Seven cases thrown out because subjects failed to answer a sufficient number of background questions for computation of their scores.

It was of course to be expected that, since the adjustment score was used as a guide in assigning numerical values to the replies upon which the premarital score is based, the two scores would correlate fairly closely. However, our confidence in the prediction value of the score is increased somewhat by noting the relation between the background score and the status of the marriage. Table XI shows the percentage distribution of prediction scores for 73 divorced couples; 61 separated couples; 64 couples who state they have considered divorce or separation; and 342 couples who claim not to have contemplated breaking their marriage.

With our scoring procedure established, the important question was whether or not the scores would behave the same way when applied to a new sample. Schedules were collected from a new sample of 155 couples in the same general social-economic level from which we drew our first group. Their replies were scored in the manner described above. Notwithstanding the fact that the ranges in the adjustment and prediction scores were narrower than those of the original sample, the correlation coefficient was $+ .48$.

TABLE XI. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PREDICTION SCORES FOR THOSE WHO ARE DIVORCED, SEPARATED, HAVE CONTEMPLATED DIVORCE OR SEPARATION AND HAVE NOT CONTEMPLATED DIVORCE OR SEPARATION

Prediction Score	Marital Status				Number of Cases
	Divorced	Separated	Have contemplated Divorce or Separation	Have not contemplated Divorce or Separation	
700-789	0.0	0.0	9.1	90.9	11
620-699	2.9	0.0	5.9	91.2	68
540-619	2.9	4.3	6.5	86.3	139
460-539	13.9	15.0	13.9	57.2	173
380-459	25.0	17.0	16.0	42.0	100
300-379	34.2	21.9	21.9	21.9	41
220-299	50.0	37.5	12.5	0.0	8
Number Cases	73	61	64	342	540*

* Fourteen cases were added to the original sample of 526.

While our procedure will doubtless either amuse or irritate the sensitive statistician, there is no denying that the study does point to possibilities of a more thorough and adequate application of prediction techniques to the problem of marriage adjustment.

We are confident that by refining our schedule questions and our method of scoring, as well as adding certain items not now included in the score, we can increase considerably the precision of our predictions.

THE CONCEPT OF CULTURAL LAG RE-EXAMINED

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PROFESSOR OGBURN in a happy moment of inspiration conceived the idea of denoting the slowness of change that at times characterizes certain parts of human culture by the almost colloquial expression "cultural lag."¹ The attention of the students of society and culture was thus fixed as never before on the perennial question of social change, a phenomenon many felt, few understood, and no one dared say much about. The deep indebtedness that both the furtherance and clarification of human thought owe to linguistic symbols was shown once again.

The expression, or concept (as it came to be known), was quickly picked up by the sociologists and incorporated into the pattern of the current sociological theory. So eager were they, in fact, in accepting it and so convincing did the concept appear that no compiler of an introductory textbook on sociology in recent years dared omit it from his index and no serious attempt was made to refute its validity. In scanning the sociological literature of the last few years one is impressed with this universal silent recognition,² and also by the unwillingness of both the originator and other sociologists to secure a permanent place for the concept in the history of sociology by relating it basically to fundamental sociological principles. Whatever connection exists (as of course there must) between the concept and sociological theory is at present reflected indirectly in the qualifying phrases that precede or follow the expression "cultural lag." An explicit, orderly, systematic presentation has not as yet been made. This paper attempts it. And the writer suffers no delusion that its contents are final. He is only spurred on by the honest belief that his task is legitimate, and timely.

To begin then, the concept of cultural lag is meaningless unless

¹ W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*, N.Y., Viking Press, 1922.

² Even Professor James Woodard, though not so silent, recognizes the validity of the concept, adding a few modifications that are worthy of serious consideration. See, "Critical Notes on the Culture Lag Concept," *Social Forces*, March 1934; and "A New Classification of Culture and a Restatement of the Culture Lag Theory," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, Feb. 1936.

limited to a single culture pattern at a particular time. Eskimo culture traits cannot lag behind French traits; Professor Woods'³ Portuguese women may wash their milk bottles on sandy beaches in Portugal, but their practice is not lagging behind the American technique involving mechanical devices, nor are they in advance of the practices of other women who may scrub theirs with brushes. On the other hand, if Portuguese immigrants continue their practice in their new social environment, or if Eskimo and French cultures intermingle, lags appear. What tend to lag then are not whole cultures, but segments within an integrated culture pattern—traits and *symplegmas* of traits (culture complexes).⁴

In the above paragraph we find a clue to the conditions that may produce, if continued, cultural lags. The process of cultural diffusion is implicit both in the immigration of Portuguese and the hypothetical intermingling of French and Eskimo cultures. And with diffusion goes invention, at bottom a modified form of diffusion. Fundamentally, therefore, cultural lags spring out of the dynamic nature of culture. Yet, the fact that culture is dynamic is not sufficient to explain the appearance of such lags. If all the traits and symplegmas within a given culture moved, or changed, at the same rate, lags would be impossible. But of course they do not. This leads us to our next consideration—that of differential culture change.

The difference in the rate of change that characterizes various parts of the same culture in a varying degree is immediately related to the phenomenon of cultural lag. And this relationship is as obvious as it is difficult to explain. Why do certain traits or parts of cul-

³ This illustration is quoted by Professor Willey in Davis and Barnes' *Introduction to Sociology*, D. C. Heath and Co., 1927, p. 580.

⁴ Ever since my initiation into sociological thought I have been bothered no little by so loose and at the same time inelastic concept as that of culture complex. The many different meanings (psychological and lay) of the term make it practically impossible to use it without risking the danger of having one's thought cluttered because of its inflexibility, or one's colleagues confused because of its looseness. I hereby, therefore, propose the substitution of the term *symplegma*, the Greek equivalent to the Latin complex, in order to escape the foregoing difficulties. The term *symplegma* is a compound word (the Greek *συν*, together, and *πλεκω*, weave) which possesses all the advantages of the term complex (especially the idea of clusters of traits being woven together to form a *complex*, a very useful and convenient idea for the cultural sociologist) and further is devoid of all its weaknesses. The term *symplegma* has no past or present affiliation with either psychology or any other branch of science. Nor is it in use among the general public. It is free, therefore, from ambiguities. Furthermore, it possesses flexibility, a quality of great value to terms of a fast-developing new science like Sociology, since it tends to free and develop rather than obstruct and clutter its theoretical foundations. Traits do not complexize; but they do symplegmataze. In fact, the degree to which the term *symplegma* possesses this excellent quality will be illustrated sufficiently in the next few pages.

ture tend to lag behind others? Perhaps the question should never be asked. Ask the chemist why hydrogen atoms tend to combine with those of oxygen and he would leave you cold except for the warmth of his smile that accompanies his departure. Ogburn resorted to the distinction between material and non-material (adaptive) traits in his attempt to provide some answer to the question. Yet, both his assumption that traits are divisible into those two categories and his contention that the material change first are contestable.

Considering his contention first, that the material part of culture tends to undergo changes previous to the non-material, one can only accept it insofar as it is limited to a specific culture at a particular time. It is not acceptable as a universal generalization. Illustrations could easily be adduced to prove the opposite on a large scale. The culture of the monks of Athos, for instance, has undergone few important changes in its material aspects during the last one thousand years, and a very significant one in its so-called adaptive phases, such as political, and even religious ideologies.⁵

Since the contention is based on the supposed dichotomy of culture into material and non-material parts, it would pay us to look into that assumption. At first we are struck by its simplicity. A knife, a table, a car are material things; so much so that no normal human being would undertake to deny it. Religious beliefs, moral and political ideas are equally non-material, with again no possibility of denial. But, upon further cogitation we are impressed by the inadequacy of such an assumption. The sociologist is not primarily interested in the knife, the table, the car, as material objects. These things have functions; they are related and dependent one on another and on other traits within the same culture; they further serve as objects around which emotions and sentiments of persons are centered. Primarily, therefore, the significance of the so-called material traits in a culture lies in their non-material aspects. And the same knife may be used to slaughter animals at one time, to defend one's family or tribe at another. The distinction thus drawn between material and non-material traits disappears as one digs deeper under the surface.

There is one logical retreat for the *materialist*: to claim that

⁵ The cultural changes that have taken places in the monastic community of Mount Athos during the last thousand years are discussed to a great extent in my book *Black Angels of Athos*, Brattleboro, Vt., Stephen Daye Press, 1934.

changes first occur in the natural, physical conditions; and that cultural change ensues in response.⁶ In so doing, he becomes an environmentalist, escaping the dilemma implied above, and also our criticism, and the bounds of this paper.

We prefer to stay within the limits of the cultural field and search there for a possible explanation of cultural lag. We have just seen that dividing culture into two large and distinct (material and non-material) segments does not throw much light on the phenomenon under consideration. We may now take another step and assert that what we call *traits* are mere mental fabrications constructed by the sociologist to assist him in his analysis and study of culture, just as the physicist has created the concept of the atom to guide him in his specific study. And like the latter, who is aware of the existence of atoms through their behavior only, we apprehend and understand the traits only through their behavior (their functions).

This leads us to an important and promising discovery. Not two general types of traits, but four are discernible by following this process of reasoning. And what serves as the distinguishing mark is not some assumed and inadequately proven quality inhering in the trait, but the objective (hence susceptible of proof) influence of traits upon the rest of the culture, and ultimately, of course, upon the people within a culture area who use these traits as a means of adjustment to nature and to other people. The effect of traits upon the people themselves (a psychological result) is of no immediate concern to us at the moment. Their interaction with one another, however, if carefully observed discloses to us the four large types of traits present in every culture, each type distinguished from the others and characterized by a tendency peculiar to itself. Professor M. M. Willey⁷ has observed three characteristics in each culture trait. It has a history of its own, mobility (a basic assumption for a clear understanding of both invention and diffusion), and tends to adhere to other traits. We accept the first two without comment. They are self-evident. We are not satisfied, however, with the third,

⁶ Judging from his illustrations, Professor Ogburn seems to waver between two assumptions: first, that which attempts to explain the lag as a result of the tendency on the part of material *traits* to change faster than non-material—a purely sociological position, since the discussion is confined to the traits within culture; and second, that of the environmentalist which assumes that changes in the material *conditions* (the physical environment) initiate culture change. His illustration of the industrial changes forcing social legislation to lag behind until the passage of workmen's compensation acts is based on the former assumption. That of the changes in the American forests necessitating a new policy exemplifies the latter.

⁷ Davis and Barnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 520-522.

for it is incomplete. Traits do tend to adhere, but in different degrees. They also tend to repulse each other.

What is here suggested is the re-classification of traits on the basis of the four main tendencies they display in their interaction, their *objective* behavior. The first of such tendencies is evinced by traits which though functioning separately up to a certain time, upon some change in the social conditions fuse and henceforth their function (primary function, at least) is identical. Consider the bat and the baseball; the pen and the paper; the typewriter and the ribbon; any complex or even simple invention which tends to satisfy a general or specific need by performing a certain function. This tendency helps us to isolate a large part of our culture traits, and since traits which behave in this manner tend to weave themselves with others (functionally speaking) and to lose their previous individual function, we may call them *symplegmatic*.

A second large group of traits is comprised of those which display the tendency to adhere to other traits to a minor degree. We cannot play a game of baseball without the bat and the ball, but we can without the attractive designs on the players' backs or fronts; we cannot type a letter without a ribbon, but the covering of the keyboard with rubber keys is not essential to the process, and so on. Such traits, in other words, are not *symplegmatic*, but *periplegmatic*. Their functional identity is not submerged in that of the symplegma of traits to which they attach themselves. They tend to cluster *around* the central traits in a symplegma and in so doing they retain their individual, though minor, function.

The repellent tendency is exhibited by a third type of traits, the *antiplegmatic*. The eating of pork and Judaism; the indulgence in alcoholic consumption and Mohammedanism; the partaking of meat on Fridays and Catholicism, these are mutually exclusive. Nor is this tendency restricted to the religious field, as the three examples just cited may lead one to suspect. We find it at work in other fields of social life. Smoking and the conventional idea of a lady in the Western world until recently; types of dress and sex, ages, or various social functions; degree or forms of respect or disrespect and social rank; these may furnish one with further illustrations. It is the group of traits which display this tendency that are related at bottom to the mental and social conflicts in a society. But more of this anon.

The fourth and last tendency is illustrated by such things as coins

of foreign countries that the returned traveller finds in his suitcase and diligently lays aside in a drawer; stocks and bonds of a defunct corporation; German marks of the post-war days, or Russian rubles of the czarist regime. Traits in other words that may be imported from other culture areas and thus lose their function; also traits that come down from past generations (the "hangovers" that Willey mentions) devoid of their function. Such traits are *aplegmatic*⁸ for, functionally, they are as important to the particular culture as the barnacles attached to the bottom of the ship, though perhaps less harmful.

It is not to be assumed that in displaying the four tendencies outlined above, traits do so because of qualities inhering in them. The same trait may be symplegmatic, periplegmatic, antiplegmatic, or aplegmatic, depending on the particular time, culture, and functional relations of the trait to other traits. The habit of smoking, for instance, which only recently was antiplegmatic, so far as the conventional idea of a lady was concerned, is periplegmatic to many social functions of both sexes today, symplegmatic to an idea of *manliness* among many groups of men, and aplegmatic to our concept of a child's normal life. The behavior of traits is thus not inherently predetermined, but is socially conditioned by its associations with other parts of the culture. The four tendencies are directly controlled by the existing arrangement and pattern of culture traits within a culture at a particular time. For the pattern or design of a culture absorbs, modifies, or rejects new traits introduced through invention or diffusion. What we have here then is a *schemocracy*,⁸ or the automatic control over the behavior of traits of the *schema* (design) of a particular culture.

Now, it is the thesis of this paper that, whereas the doubtful dichotomy of culture into material and non-material traits fails to shed much light on the cultural lag concept, the classification of traits on the basis of their functional behavior as outlined above permits us to arrive at a clear understanding of that concept.

Professor Ogburn tells us: "Where one part of culture changes first, through some discovery or invention and occasions changes in in some part of culture dependent upon it, there frequently is a delay in the changes occasioned in the dependent part of culture."⁹ This delay is the cultural lag. And it could be studied, analyzed,

⁸ This term I have coined to designate the much-discussed *selectivity* of a culture pattern.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 201.

and even measured in terms of the four types of traits previously mentioned, and explained in the light of *schemocracy*.

For instance, a culture which is characterized by a large number of traits behaving symplegmatically is not conducive to such delays (lags) as one in which an accumulation of antiplegmatic traits is taking place. Indeed, any increasing accumulation of antiplegmatic traits is symptomatic of the presence of lags in a culture, indicating the failure of the culture pattern to assimilate or reject new traits, or to arrive at a proper degree of integration.¹⁰ Traits behaving periplegmatically are not as obstructive to this tendency toward integration (Sumner's "strain toward consistency") as those behaving antiplegmatically, though not as helpful, of course, as those of symplegmatic behavior. Aplegmatic traits are relatively unimportant unless a quick shift and rearrangement in the pattern of a culture (as through political upheavals or war) leaves a culture with the burden of a large group of such traits. Communistic Russia, Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany have all experienced this severely and are still preoccupied with the herculean task of culture *purification*.

Further on Progressor Ogburn tells us that this delay on the part of certain phases of culture to change in response to the changes occurring in other dependent phases is a period of *maladjustment*. But there are different types of maladjustment within a society. New traits tend to challenge old traits and vie for the performance of the function, a characteristic of many antiplegmatic traits; for instance, biblical knowledge of the world and the evolving scientific interpretations. This is the purely cultural type of maladjustment. Then, too, we have individuals maladjusted to the social environment, a psychological phenomenon reflecting their failure to arrive at an integration of their personalities in conformity with the demands of social life. Also, groups of individuals may be maladjusted to the social conditions under which they live (minority groups, for instance), or whole communities (characteristic of primitive tribes especially) may be unable to make a satisfactory adjustment to the

¹⁰ It may be objected here that the really important factor at work when failure at cultural integration is taking place is psychological (ideological)—that people feel and act conservatively, liberally, or radically, and hence the cultural structure is unable to maintain the equilibrium of its conflicting parts. I have no inclination to deny the truly important role that the psychological factor plays in culture-building, or demolishing (especially when it gets out of hand as in war and revolution). Normally, however, *primary* importance cannot be assigned to it, for the reason that a scrutiny of its functioning inevitably throws us back to the culture pattern—and schemocracy—since the feelings and acts of people can only find expression through the cultural channels at hand. It is to culture that primary consideration must be given.

forces of nature. It is here contended that all these types of maladjustment are interrelated, and that the basic one (causatively speaking) is the one mentioned first, the cultural maladjustment. For it is the failure of traits to symplegmataize (to fuse in a central function) that is reflected in the psychological maladjustment of individuals and groups; and it is that failure that is also responsible for the final breakdown of whole communities, when the latter fail to meet the requirements of an always exacting, if not hostile, nature. In the last case, the failure of the human group to survive as a social group is at bottom the result of the failure of their culture to arrive at integration. After all, the human race is hopelessly insecure without tools, and culture is certainly the means that mankind has unconsciously, for the greater part, invented in its struggle with nature.

The problem of adjustment, thus, both with respect to natural phenomena and to the social conditions reduces itself (for the sociologist at least) to the basic culture level. An abundance of antiplegmatic traits within a culture is not only symptomatic of existing lags, but a definite threat to its integrated pattern. In such a case, schemocracy may be assumed to be failing, endangering, or at least making uncomfortable both the lives of individuals and the existence of the group as a whole. An abundance of symplegmatic traits, on the other hand, is indicative of both the absence of serious lags, and a comfortable life and high degree of security for the group. Schemocracy functions satisfactorily in such a case. The integrated pattern of the culture is preserved. And the culture itself provides men with a relatively smooth-functioning weapon against forces of dissolution.

What light does the preceding discussion throw on the all-important question of social change and social reform? Obviously, the cardinal need of mankind is the possession of a well-integrated culture, though man was not consciously aware of this until recent times. The really fundamental, radical, social problems are not those of crime, poverty, unemployment and other such symptoms of cultural disintegration, but those of conflicting cultural units-traits and symplegmata.¹¹ In other words, they are the problems of increasing antiplegmatism, or decreasing symplegmataism.

¹¹ An analogy here may clarify this point further. In our dismal failure to rid humanity of war, we have provided armies with special corps and Red Cross ambulances to take care of the wounded. The poor, the unemployed, the criminal (with few exceptions where heredity plays a more forceful role than environment), and others, are all analogous to the wounded

Such problems cannot be handled haphazardly, nor by just anybody. We no longer elect, appoint, or assign to men having stentorian voices or reputations of magical powers to build and construct our manifold devices and contraptions which help us increase our control over nature. True, some of us still pray for rain in case of a severe drought, but it is not presuming the impossible if we think of this practice as destined to become an aplegmatic trait. The men to whom we entrust such functions are those who have been previously well trained in their respective fields.

Similarly, the discovery of lags, the shifting and reshifting of traits, the checking and rechecking of their functions, the general manipulation of our culture pattern, all the details involved in the process of rationally and consciously amending and directing the evolution of culture, will have to be done by men trained in the social sciences, and disciplined in the spirit (or habit) of science and objectivity. Perhaps we are looking too far into the future. Yet we are confident we are looking in the right direction, else we have missed the teachings of the past.

on the battlefield. They are the products of a cultural war that goes on incessantly, though unnoticeably to the majority of people. We try to save them through various political and economic schemes noted particularly for their attractive and all-promising names—New Deal, NRA, AAA, PWA, and the like. We miss the fundamental issue if we invest too much hope in these superficial "patchings." They are necessary of course, but only for a brief (though all-important to us personally) historical moment. They may influence the course of the future, but not necessarily in the way they were meant to. And just as Red Cross ambulances would be useless, if mankind succeeded in banning war, so would such panaceas remain unborn and unthought of, if mankind seriously tackled the real and basic source of social disturbance.

LEGAL AND MEDICAL ASPECTS OF EUGENIC STERILIZATION IN GERMANY

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THE National Socialist Government of Germany has as one of its avowed aims the improvement of the biological and racial qualities of the German people. For this purpose it has undertaken a variety of measures, carried on as part of the public health and social welfare services of the state. These measures are not arbitrary experiments. Every one of them is part of a large, permanent public health program which includes full records as to health and family history and an evaluation of the intelligence and competence of the people. With this goes a eugenic program designed to diminish the transmission of qualities making for lower standards of health, and for lower degrees of competence and well-being among the German people.

In the summer of 1935 the renewal of an Oberlaender Fellowship gave me an opportunity to study this new system, and to compare it with what I had previously seen in 1932. Through the kindness of a friend at the Kaiser Wilhelm Research Institute, I received official permission to interview officials and visit any public service within the scope of my study. This permitted me to observe people's reactions in the farming, industrial, and shipping sections of the country, as well as among various racial groups. I interviewed many leaders, including laymen as well as superintendents of hospitals and institutions, judges of the Hereditary Health Courts, and a large number of physicians, surgeons, psychiatrists, and social workers, who are called upon to give testimony in court and to carry out the provisions of the new laws. Aside from religious scruples, I found relatively few objections to the "compulsory" sterilization law. It is accepted as beneficial legislation designed to minimize the difficulties of those afflicted.

Three out of every hundred Germans are afflicted with physical and mental diseases which are believed to be hereditary, and which seriously interfere with their ability to earn a livelihood. In some sections of the country hereditary feeble-mindedness afflicts about six

out of every thousand inhabitants, according to the reports on children in special schools. This situation has come about as the result of inbreeding, or of emigration of the more capable to urban or foreign regions. To overcome some of the difficulties thus arising, the following measures have been adopted among others:

(1) Marriage loans are offered to encourage early marriages among healthy and intelligent persons by financing new homes for them. The applicants are predominantly office employees and skilled workmen. During the three years that such loans have been available more than half a million couples have received funds from the state treasury, after demonstrating their physical and mental fitness.

(2) Municipalities have become the sponsors of the third and fourth children in the more competent families. Such sponsorship means that the city pays to the parents a monthly allowance of Rm. 30 for the first year and Rm. 20 for the following thirteen years. Special arrangements are contemplated to give the more intelligent of these children unusual educational opportunities at the expense of the community. In Berlin more than 2,000 grants for third and fourth children had been made up to July 1, 1935. A perusal of case histories shows that descendants of some of the most outstanding people in Germany have applied for this type of "honor citizenship."

(3) Subsidies are granted for the children of healthy parents on farms, thus attempting to make up for the deficiency in births among the urban population.

These are examples of measures already in force to counteract the steady downward trend in the competence and intelligence of the people. In putting them into effect, all applicants are investigated as to health and intelligence, family history, character, and integrity. The work is carried on as part of the marriage consultation service, incorporated in the public health and social welfare services of the state.

The decline of births from more than two million in 1900 to less than one million in 1933 awakened the more thoughtful Germans to the dysgenic effect of an indiscriminate reduction of births. One woman in three had a baby in Germany in 1900, while in 1933 only one in ten became a mother, and in Berlin only one in twenty. A family with two children is now considered complete among the more competent citizens, while four or more children are born in families socially less competent. Health and intelligence determine

the value of any people. The present prevailing philosophy, therefore, is that if the social and cultural standards of the nation are to be maintained, the interest of the community must take precedence over individual interests even in very personal matters. Individuals afflicted with diseases believed to be hereditary in origin ought voluntarily and of their own free will to renounce procreation. The more intelligent and the more responsible people have in many instances lived up to such ideals. The mentally incompetent, however, cannot be relied upon to exercise self-control or to practice any control measures designed to limit their families. Hence a sterilization law has been passed.

The German sterilization law is not a hasty enactment, as some people believe. Educational work along eugenic lines goes back four decades. The first sterilization legislation was discussed before the Reichstag in 1907, about the time an American sterilization measure first became law in Indiana. Indeed the legal sterilization of mental incompetents originated in the United States, although sterilization in the interest of public good was begun by Professor Forel in Zurich, Switzerland, some 40 years ago. The leaders in the German sterilization movement state repeatedly that their legislation was formulated only after careful study of the California experiment as reported by Mr. Gosney and Dr. Popenoe. It would have been impossible, they say, to undertake such a venture involving some one million people without drawing heavily upon previous experience elsewhere. The main features of the present German sterilization law were very extensively discussed and approved at a meeting called by the Prussian Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare in July, 1932, before the present Nazi regime came into power.

Five mental and three physical groups are specifically named as hereditary in origin, and hence come under the provisions of the law. The mental groups are (1) hereditary feeble-mindedness, (2) schizophrenia, (3) manic-depressive insanity, (4) hereditary epilepsy, and (5) hereditary Huntington's chorea. The physical groups are (6) blindness, (7) deafness, and (8) severe physical deformity, so far as any of these are hereditary. The law also covers (9) severe habitual drunkenness. The term habitual drunkard applies legally to a person who, as a result of persistent drinking habits, has degenerated physically and mentally so as to need repeated institutionalization or imprisonment for acts done under the influence of alcohol or narcotics. Such alcoholism is not assumed to be hereditary in the same

way as other items listed above, but there is a widespread belief that a predisposition to alcoholism is inherited. When drafting the sterilization law the legislators were fully aware that the healthy carriers of defective genes and those afflicted with minor mental disturbances or infectious diseases cannot at present be reached.

Application for sterilization can be made by the afflicted person himself, by his guardian in the case of minors and incompetents, by the local public health office, or by superintendents of insane asylums, prisons, or homes for the feeble-minded. Parents, children, and siblings cannot petition for sterilization of a member of the family, nor can any representative of the state, such as a district attorney, mayor, or any other municipal officer, request sterilization proceedings. The state finally decides whether the applicant comes under the provisions of the law. If the patient's physical or mental disease is adjudicated as hereditary in origin, he *must* submit to the operation or subject himself to segregation for the duration of his reproductive life.

The law further provides that the sterilization operation may be carried out as a therapeutic measure, when, according to recognized rules of medical practice, such an operation is indicated. Persons suffering from tuberculosis, venereal diseases, or other conditions not specified in the law, can make application for sterilization through their private physicians. Sterilization without medical or eugenic indication in the sense of the law is looked upon as medical malpractice and would be prosecuted under the German criminal code as mutilation of the body. Court action would therefore be taken against the person upon whom the operation was performed as well as against the physician who performed the operation, and against any instigator of the act. Such action would surely mean heavy fines and imprisonment.

An amendment to the original law was enacted in June, 1935, providing for the interruption of pregnancy, if the woman is adjudicated unfit for procreation by the Hereditary Health Court. The unfitness of a presumptive father, however, is not taken into account because of technical difficulties of proof of paternity before the birth of the child. The mother's consent to such an operation must be obtained. Pregnancies go to term if such consent is not given, and the sterilization operation is then carried out after the birth of the child. This concession was made to counteract accusation of infanticide. Interruption of pregnancy must not take place after the com-

pletion of the sixth month or if the patient's life would be endangered by such an operation.

The German law of 1933 specifies very definitely that the sterilization operation in the legal sense is a severing, resection, or occlusion of the spermatic cords or the Fallopian tubes, not a removal or mutilation of any other parts of the reproductive organs. This regulation, however, was modified a short time ago, permitting irradiation by means of X-ray or radium to be used in specific cases. In common with many other states, Germany has enacted statutes for asexualization. This legal provision has no relation to eugenic sterilization, and is resorted to in cases of repeated sex delinquency and mainly as a therapeutic measure.

Executive orders designate that the operation of sterilization can be carried out only by competent surgeons or gynecologists and in specially equipped hospitals. It is believed that sterilization has no ill effects on health. It does not interfere with the endocrine balance and it does not affect sex desire or response.

In cases where discharge from an institution or prison is contemplated, the Hereditary Health Court must hand down its decision and the sterilization must be performed before the inmate can leave the institution or prison. This procedure differs, therefore, from the practices in the United States, where in some states persons permanently institutionalized are sterilized. Court proceedings are expensive, because medical examinations, family history investigations, and possible hospitalization for observation take at least three months. They involve a considerable amount of work by public health and social welfare offices apart from the testimony of medical specialists and other witnesses. It seems futile, inhuman, and unnecessary to subject a person to an operation for sterilization if segregation is to be his lot throughout his life, unless institutionalization is not meeting one of its chief functions—that is, the prevention of procreation.

Hereditary Health Courts, known in Germany as the "ERBGE-SUNDHEITSGERICHT" were specially established in January 1934, for the sole purpose of handling cases in which application for sterilization had been made by the District Public Health Office. Each court has three judges; a district judge acting as presiding officer, a public health officer, and one additional physician who in most cases is a specialist known to be competent in medical genetics. The district judge is selected for his familiarity with problems and

procedures pertaining to the guardianship of minors and incompetents and the procedure of the Domestic Relations Court. At present it is at the discretion of the Court to request the presence of the "Proband," or person whose physical and mental health and family history are in the process of investigation. There is considerable difference of opinion as to this, because the appearance of feeble-minded or mentally afflicted persons before the court involves difficulties of supervision, transportation, etc., and is therefore a considerable expense to the state treasury, which shoulders all costs of the court actions.

Through the District Public Health Office, the "Proband" or his legal guardian is notified of the decision handed down by the Court. The written notice contains the reason for the decision and for the order of execution. The right of appeal to a higher court, the Hereditary Health Court of Appeals (in German the ERBGESUNDHEITSOBERGERICHT) can be exercised for a period of two weeks. A written application for appeal must be filed in the District Public Health Office. The Court of Appeals reviews the whole case and then renders the *final* decision.

If no appeal is made, the "Proband" adjudicated to come under the provision of the law must, within two weeks from the date of notification, report either to one of the hospitals selected to perform the operation, or to an institution for segregation. Non-observance of the regulations and orders brings police action. There has, however, been little need for this.

The 205 Hereditary Health Courts and the 26 Courts of Appeals did a sizable piece of work during their first year.¹ For 1934, 84,525 applications for court proceedings were made and in 64,499 cases, or about 73 percent of the total number of applications, decision was handed down by the Hereditary Health Court. The sterilization operation was ordered in 56,244 cases (28,286 male and 27,958 female). In 3,692, or somewhat over 2 percent of the decisions, the illness was found not to come under the provision of the law mainly because of the hereditary aspect of the disease, and 4,563 cases were otherwise disposed of.

The Hereditary Health Court of Appeals handled 8,219 cases, or 14.6 percent of the decisions of the lower court. In about half of the total (4,559) the reasons for the appeal were found invalid after

¹ Massfelder: "Die Erbgesundheitsgerichtbarkeit im Jahre 1934", *Deutsches Aertzeblatt*, Aug. 1935, pp. 742-3.

careful study of all data. Appeals were made both on behalf of the "probands" and of the officials or others who brought the action for sterilization. There were 438 appeals requesting a review of the case because the Hereditary Health Court had decided that the person's illness did not come under the provisions of the law, and sterilization could not be undertaken. In 179 of these cases the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court and ordered sterilization.

Upon admission to the hospital the patient is subjected to a careful medical examination including Wassermann, urinalysis, and blood tests. The surgeon or gynecologist in charge of the hospital must make an appeal to the District Public Health Office and ask that sterilization be delayed if previously undiscovered diseased conditions are found which might endanger life or interfere with healing and convalescence. Persons afflicted with tuberculosis, diseases of heart, kidneys, and pelvis would fall into these groups. The pre-operative period of observation is about four days and the post-operative hospitalization ranges from seven to ten days for men, and from twelve to eighteen days for women. The final discharge of mental cases from institutional care is set at a date allowing sufficient time to recover from disturbances that might result from the anticipation of operation, or from a possible shock.

The average duration of the operation for men is between six and eight minutes, and it is mostly done under a local anaesthetic. With the women it is a more extensive operation, involving the opening of the abdomen, and must, of course, be performed under ether. Due to perfected operative technique in clean cases, there has been a remarkably small number of cases with post-operative complications. The mortality reported among the women is quoted to be 0.4 percent, a remarkably low rate because the mortality of clean laparotomy cases usually ranges around one percent. The low mortality is due: (1) to the utmost care in not subjecting patients to an operation when they are diseased; (2) to a brief and relatively simple procedure; and (3) to the group as a whole being physically healthy persons.

The cost of operation and hospitalization is borne by the afflicted person, or by the Sickness Insurance Fund, or in the case of public charges by the State Board of Social Welfare. Expenses for institutionalization for the duration of the reproductive period have to be borne by the individual or his family, or by privately financed charity. Up to July 1, 1935, some 150,000 persons had been sterilized

in Germany. Nearly one half of the group sterilized to date are congenitally feeble-minded. It is estimated that among the million mental defectives in Germany more than half came under the provisions of the law.

The present law makes no provision for sterilizing the asocial groups of criminals and habitual paupers who also are a serious handicap to any nation. No doubt subsequent amendments to the law will sooner or later include a number of other diseases and asocial characteristics when more is known about the essential hereditary factors. The social aspect is considered only in the cases of severe habitual drunkenness, where it takes account of the bad environmental influence on the family. In the case of hereditary deformities, the law is limited to those of a sufficient degree to interfere with normal life and capacity for earning one's livelihood.

Information relating to disease and abnormal conditions existing in a family is comparatively easily obtained in Germany, especially in the rural sections. People move little from place to place; residence registration is required of every one; and the holding of citizenship in a specific municipality and the school registration of all children over six years of age facilitate fact-finding procedures. A temporary withholding of information is of little value because of the ultimate coming to light of the real situation. Prosecution under civil law can impose fines and imprisonment for withholding the information.

In conclusion it may be said that, as in all such far-reaching changes, one can readily understand that opposition and difficulties of all sorts are encountered, but there is little doubt that sterilization of those unfit for procreation is a constructive social measure so far as it helps the afflicted person to avoid increasing responsibility which he and society have already found burdensome. All possible precautions and safeguards are taken to forestall miscarriage of justice in whatever form it may occur. Special courts were established with judges and alternates appointed for their highly specialized qualifications by the State's supreme government. Each local political district has its Hereditary Health Court with jurisdiction over its cases.

All notifications and applications have to be made in writing and must be substantiated by medical opinion. When application is made by a physician, it is assumed that the application is in accordance with his medical opinion, while a layman must submit a written

medical opinion supplemented by a statement that the applicant is familiar with the meaning, purpose, and effect of the law.

No medical, legal, or governmental person can serve on more than one body rendering a decision on a case. This is chiefly a precautionary measure to forestall malicious attempts against an individual. Proceedings of the Hereditary Health Courts are not public. All data relating to the individual or his family are zealously guarded as strictly confidential, because medical, legal, and governmental witnesses are obliged to divulge necessary information regardless of the tenets of professional secrecy. Hospitals and physicians eligible to execute the court decisions are specially designated by the State government, and they are selected on the basis of their ability.

Sterilization operations are authorized and may be performed only in a hospital by a physician licensed to practice in Germany, and one equipped with special training for this type of service. Under the present regulations, only the surgeon or the gynecologist in charge and his first assistant are allowed to operate.

The severing, tying, or resection of the vas deferens or the Fallopian tubes are the only operative measures allowed under the provisions of the law. Removal of sex organs due to diseased conditions would have to be considered in the light of their therapeutic aspects, supported by a specialist's testimony. Sterilization by X-ray and radium irradiation is permissible in selected cases only, because the possibilities of disturbance in the endocrine system, in later conceptions, and so forth, do not warrant an exposure of a patient under a "compulsory" law.

The operating physician must send to the District Public Office a written report of the method of operation, the course of convalescence, and possible mental and physical complications. Persons participating in any capacity in the proceedings of the court or subsequent operative procedure are obliged to maintain secrecy. Failure to do so makes a person guilty of breach of confidence subject to imprisonment up to one year, or to a money fine.

The present law is conceived with a desire to help the afflicted person to avoid increasing responsibilities already found to be onerous. The sterilization of the persons adjudicated unfit for procreation is not administered as a punitive measure. The carriers of diseased genes and the asocial groups of criminals and paupers do not come under the provisions of the present law, as it only reaches persons

who are ill or have been suffering from the group of diseases specifically indicated under the provisions of the law.

From these personal observations I am convinced that the law is administered in entire fairness and with all consideration for the individual to be sterilized and for his family, and that discrimination of class, race, creed, political, or religious belief does not enter into the matter, regardless of whether health, social welfare, or legal procedures are involved. I say this with confidence because I had a rare opportunity to examine case histories in large numbers in various sections of the country and the still more rare opportunity to familiarize myself with the proceedings of the Hereditary Health Courts.

No one seriously believes that sterilization will eradicate all mental diseases; for many causes of such diseases are environmental in origin. A great task will have been accomplished if, in two or three generations, fewer feeble-minded must be cared for. It would be most unwise to pass judgment on the sterilization measures in Germany or in any other country until we have more data on the merits of voluntary versus the compulsory laws, and on the mental and physical adjustments of the sterilized persons to their families, to the community, and to their general environment. The German legislation, apart from the eugenic aspects, is a great step ahead as a constructive public health measure, as a method of preventive medicine, and as a contribution to social welfare.

Justice Holmes, when handing down the decision in the *Buck versus Bell* case, expressed the guiding spirit of a truly constructive social policy for any country when he said: "It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. Three generations of imbeciles are enough."

RESEARCH WITH RELIEF FUNDS— PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

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Division of Social Research, Works Progress Administration

DURING the past three years we have witnessed a marked expansion of social research in this country. Much of this research has been a by-product of the relief program of the Federal Government, and it has been financed in large part from the Federal treasury. Not only have the C.W.A., the F.E.R.A. and the Works Program established and financed research organizations to guide administrative action—they have granted far larger sums for surveys and studies of the most varied character, conducted by Federal, state and local agencies participating in the various relief activities.

The research projects of 1933 and 1934 have been described in some detail elsewhere¹ and Mr. Beach¹ has indicated the variety and scope of Federal, state and local projects being carried on under the present Works Program.

To round out this picture it may be of interest to mention briefly some of the recent work of the administrative research organization of the F.E.R.A. and the W.P.A. in procuring and analyzing the social and economic data necessary for the proper administration of relief to twenty million people. The major problems of the relief administration during the past year have revolved about (1) the planning, initiation and direction of the first Works Program, (2) the withdrawal of the Federal Government from relief and the transfer of so-called "unemployable" cases to state and local agencies, and (3) more recently, the development of plans for providing assistance to needy families under the second Works Program. The Division of Social Research has, in consequence, devoted its main attention to these problems.

The need for a works program was emphasized and the broad outlines for its development were laid down by the surveys of occupa-

¹ These papers, and some other descriptions of the work are to be found in the *Proceedings* and *Journal* of the American Statistical Association, the *American Sociology Review* and in *Social Forces* for May, 1935. Reference is made to Mr. Beach's paper (unpublished) read at the 1935 meetings of The American Sociological Society.

tional characteristics of the relief population, 1934, described at the 1935 meeting of the American Sociological Society. A base for the development of administrative forms and procedures for carrying on this program was made available through analyses of the methods used by state and local relief administrations in planning and conducting work-relief projects. A detailed guide to the types of projects needed to absorb employable relief persons, at work for which they are equipped, was provided by a census of the occupational skills possessed by relief workers in every county of the United States. The census, which was taken as of March, 1935, also provided data concerning the age, sex, color and employment priority ratings of these workers.

A similar census, based on records kept current in W.P.A. offices, was taken on January 15, 1936. This, supplemented by a series of sample studies, has helped to measure the degree of success of the Works Program in performing its tremendous task of providing socially useful employment for 3,500,000 workers at jobs which will maintain their skills and their morale, and which will provide earned incomes for their support.

The serious social and administrative problems involved in the withdrawal of Federal aid from the so-called "unemployable" relief load have received a great deal of attention. The administration has been provided with data showing the number, location and types of unemployable cases, the financial ability of the states and localities to carry the burden which is being transferred to them, the legal and administrative machinery existing in each state for the care of such cases, and the types of aid needed by the various classes of unemployables. The probable effects of the transfer policy were forecast by a series of studies, and surveys have been made to determine whether the cases being turned back to the states were being adequately cared for. The extent to which unemployable cases will be provided for under the present social security legislation is being analyzed in co-operation with the Social Security Board.

A comprehensive survey of the nature and scope of the relief program, and the effectiveness of procedures employed by Federal, state and local public assistance agencies, now nearing completion, will summarize the experience of the last few years of unprecedented relief giving. This survey will assist state and local governments to develop appropriate organizations and procedures for the care of

cases transferred to them, and will provide a sound basis for the development of the future relief plans of the Federal Government.

This short summary of developments in administrative research is necessary to complete the picture of research with relief funds. It is, however, to the broader implications of the availability of relief funds for use in research, rather than to the narrower topic of research on the problems of relief administration that this paper is addressed.

Confronted with the wide variety of Federal, state and local surveys which have been described—in terms of dollars expended or volume of data collected probably the greatest research activity in the history of the nation—it is natural to ask, what social returns are accruing from it, what are its values, what are its shortcomings, and what is its future? It is yet too early to answer these questions with finality, but an attempt will be made in this paper to take a preliminary inventory, to outline the strengths and weaknesses of the work as they now appear, and to indicate some probable future developments.

It is obvious that relief research projects may be judged from at least two points of view; first, their effectiveness in providing employment and training, and in maintaining the morale of the relief workers employed, and second, their effectiveness in producing results of administrative or general social value. It should be emphasized that, from the standpoint of the relief program as a whole, the former criterion is the more important. The relief administration has been insistent that the projects developed be socially useful, but its primary objective has clearly been to put people to work as quickly as possible.

From the point of view of providing employment and maintaining morale the research activities have been, on the whole, quite successful. Research and statistical surveys have provided an appreciable proportion of the total employment for "white-collar" workers, a group for which it is especially difficult to develop good work projects. During the C.W.A. a maximum of about 80,000 persons worked on such projects; in the subsequent work-relief period employment volume declined to about 40,000. Under the Works Program employment on research and statistical projects has risen to 50,000, and is continuing to rise. While relatively slow in getting under way, surveys and researches make excellent work projects; they involve

small non-labor costs, they do not compete with private business activities, and they have proven exceptionally good at maintaining the morale of the workers engaged on them.

From the point of view of results attained the record is less satisfactory. Many of the surveys undertaken with great hopes on the part of their sponsors have been abandoned before completion, due to exhaustion of funds, loss of interest, or realization that they were improperly designed or executed. Others, upon completion, have proved valueless. Still others, while securing significant results, have fallen short of the full return which might have been expected of them. At the other end of the scale is a considerable and growing group of studies which have been properly planned, directed and executed, and which are yielding a product which may be compared favorably with the work done by research agencies of long standing.

Looking back over the first three years of activity, one of the most serious weaknesses of relief research has been inadequate advance project planning. There are many honorable exceptions, particularly among the Federal projects, but far too many studies have been rushed into the field by well-meaning enthusiasts without the careful definition of purpose, delineation of method, and planning of tabulation and analysis which are essential to good work. Administrative demands for the speedy employment of personnel, coupled with an access to funds in liberal volume go far to explain the lack of planning, but they do not mitigate its consequences. The excellent work of the Co-ordinating Committee of the Central Statistical Board and the Works Progress Administration has done much in recent months to improve the record in this respect. It was largely as a result of the Committee's insistence that projects be initiated only after adequate plans for their conduct had been laid, that scarcely one in six of the research proposals submitted in the first Works Program was approved. Continued insistence on this policy has resulted in more careful planning of projects, and approval at the present time of about one in three research proposals submitted.

Lack of co-ordination, unification and control have also seriously weakened the effectiveness of relief research. The statistical and survey activities financed by relief funds have not constituted a research program in the broad sense of the term; in the main they have consisted of a multitude of scattered and non-comparable studies, lacking integration or direction toward an orderly and unified analysis of basic problems. This unco-ordinated and uncontrolled

development was probably inevitable, in view of the rapid growth of the relief problem, and the experimental approach which the administration adopted toward it. Rapid shifts in the attack on the problems of relief were inevitable, but the task of developing planned, integrated research under a program which shifted from relief to the C.W.A., back to relief and then again to the Works Program within two years, and which for most of this period made commitments only on a month-to-month basis, was obviously an extremely difficult one. Despite the difficulties, the planning work of the National Resources Committee, and the steadily increasing control exercised by the Co-ordinating Committee have done much to bring order from the chaotic activities of two or three years ago.

Relief research has also been handicapped by some confusion of objectives. Many persons sponsoring projects of types which require a great deal of expert supervision apparently have operated on the theory that their activities, to be significant, must provide a large volume of employment. A frequent consequence of this view has been the expansion of a good project beyond the limits of effective operation. There is a clear place in the relief program for census types of research which give a considerable volume of employment—in fact it is to this type of activity that relief work is best suited—but it has proved a mistake to apply the census approach to studies which are naturally adapted to intensive, small-scale operations.

More has been made of the handicap caused by the restriction of projects to relief labor than is warranted by the facts. It is true that some projects have run into difficulty because they were unable to secure an adequate supply of capable employees, equipped with the necessary skills. The relief rolls include competent workers from all occupations, however, and the administration has been liberal in relaxing the relief requirements for good projects where necessary. Many of the criticisms against the labor supply have really been called forth by inadequate provision in relief offices for the classification and assignment of workers, a weakness which has now been remedied by the installation of a workable labor inventory and placement system.

A more serious criticism may be directed against the inadequacy of supervision and direction on many projects. Unfortunately, the planning and direction of good research is skilled work, and while the choice of supervisors has never been restricted to the relief rolls, the marked increase in volume of research activity has brought a

genuine shortage of skilled supervisory labor. The situation has been made worse by the failure of many sponsors of local projects to realize that competent direction is essential to the satisfactory conduct of research activity.

The impermanence of the labor supply, caused by the drawing off of the best workers into private employment, has of course raised some difficulties for project sponsors, but this can hardly be put forward as a criticism of a relief program which has as one of its fondest hopes the reabsorption of labor by private industrial activity. Other difficulties relating to the labor supply, in particular the requirement that employees could work only the number of days per month required to bring their income to the level of the relief budget, have been in large part eliminated under the present Works Program.

Charges that works projects are enmeshed in a maze of administrative red tape and are subject to constant political interference have been made with increasing frequency during recent months. It is true that the initiation of a research project is a complicated process. It should be emphasized, however, that the checks now employed have been designed solely as a protection against the inadequate planning and incompetent direction which caused the failure of many earlier research efforts, and that they are bringing marked improvement in the quality of work done. The charge of political interference with projects has no substantial basis. The few such attempts reported have been promptly and decisively dealt with, and project operation as a whole has been remarkably free from politics.

Standing over against the weaknesses and shortcomings of relief research during the past three years are a number of substantial elements of strength. In the first place, as already pointed out, research projects have provided a considerable volume of employment for needy "white-collar" workers, and have contributed to the maintenance of both the morale and the skills of these workers. The importance of this point can hardly be over-stressed at a time when the appalling labor wastes caused by the depression emphasize so strongly the need for pioneering work in the conservation of human resources.

Second, relief research activities have resulted in the accumulation, at relatively slight cost, of a tremendous volume of useful data which would not otherwise have been collected. This material forms a substantial basis for true social planning. The rich returns which

will follow careful sifting, correlation and analysis present a challenge which research students interested in economic and social problems cannot afford to overlook and a responsibility which they should not evade. The real property inventories may be cited as an example of the opportunities which have been opened up through relief research activities. These inventories are a relief development; practically unknown before 1933, they have now been taken in several hundred cities. They give us, for the first time, the data essential to proper city planning, and prepare the way for marked progress in the reconstruction of slum areas, the development of low cost housing and the reordering and improvement of urban living conditions.

The net cost of gathering data by means of work projects has been extremely small. The difference between supporting workers in idleness, on direct relief, and providing them with the necessary direction, materials, transportation and similar items has been less than twenty percent of the total expenditure. This relatively slight outlay has been more than justified by the social gains accruing from maintenance of the morale and work habits of relief workers employed; the valuable residue of information which has resulted is substantially a gift to society.

So, too, is the accumulated skill in research processes which has been developed through relief projects. Social research will profit richly in future years from the experience gained by project directors, supervisors, enumerators and other workers engaged on relief studies and surveys. This profit is, in fact, already being realized; to a steadily increasing extent business organizations and governmental agencies are drawing on the supply of research workers who secured their training through projects financed by the relief administration. A number of substantial additions to existing knowledge of statistical techniques and methods have already been made through relief research activities, particularly in the field of sampling. The Michigan unemployment census, the retail price surveys, and the studies of consumption habits may be mentioned as examples of projects which are outstanding in this respect.

Relief researches have made important contributions to the solution of pressing administrative problems. The Federal, state and local relief administrations probably provide the best illustration of this fact. Without the extensive work undertaken by these agencies in probing the causes of distress and the results of relief giving, in

analyzing the types of cases receiving public aid and the effects of relief policies and procedures, the task of developing and administering the relief and Works Programs would have been tremendously more difficult. Many other illustrations of the use of research with relief funds to assist administration may be found in the work of state and local planning boards, of legislative committees to revise welfare laws to conform to the requirements of the social security act, and of other state and Federal administrative agencies.

Repeated demonstrations of the administrative value of research, made during the last three years with relief funds, have brought a growing reliance on the use of this tool by many public officials. Plans are already under way in many localities for the continuation of emergency research activities as permanent governmental functions. The Social Security Board is planning to carry on much research and statistical work of the types previously undertaken by F.E.R.A. Other illustrations are afforded by the expansion of the work of state and Federal labor bureaus in labor research and statistics, and of state departments of public welfare and private welfare organizations in the relief field.

Surveys conducted with relief funds have also brought increased acceptance by the general public of the need for research findings as a basis for social action. A steady increase in interest on the part of the public has been evident during the period of emergency relief activities, and the demand for such services has been effectively demonstrated during the past year by the flood of requests for surveys and studies submitted to the Works Progress Administration with the backing of civic welfare groups, business organizations, labor unions, and various types of citizens' associations.

The preceding discussion of the values and shortcomings of emergency relief research activities has more than a mere historical interest. Such research has a future as well as a past; there is opportunity to improve the quality of the work done and to increase its effectiveness. For the remainder of the present calendar year, and perhaps for a somewhat longer period, research will be carried on in large volume under the Works Program. Beyond this period the future cannot, of course, be forecast with finality. This much seems clear, however; that in view of the apparent inability of most of the states adequately to care for the relief loads to be expected for some years to come, and in view of the President's assurance last November that "the Federal Government . . . does not propose to let people

starve after the first of July any more than during the past few years", Federal participation in relief to employables will continue.

In view of the popularity and undoubted advantages of work as a form of relief, and in view of the numerous clear expressions of governmental policy on the matter, it is highly probable that future Federal assistance to the needy unemployed will be largely in the form of work projects. The advantages of research projects as a means of supplying work to needy "white-collar" workers would seem to assure relief research a substantial place in future works programs. It appears, then, reasonably safe to assume a continuation of research activity financed by Federal relief funds for some time to come.

The future relief program will be smaller than that of the present, and it will probably allocate funds with more caution than in past periods. As the relief problem becomes better understood, the experimental approach of the past, with its sudden changes in policy and in volume of funds made available, may be expected to give way to a more permanent and stable program, better adapted to the conduct of planned research. Definite improvement has come during recent months; the present Works Program represents marked gains over the work-relief program of F.E.R.A. in provision against interruption of work, flexibility in employment of non-relief personnel, establishment of a more nearly full-time labor supply, and allocation of funds to meet publication and other non-labor costs.

With some assurance of continuation beyond the present year, and with the prospect of greater stability and flexibility in the future program, it seems definitely worth while to attempt to meet the shortcomings of past relief research, and to improve the quality and usefulness of future work. Out of the recent experience has emerged a great mass of statistical information which provides the basis for an attack on hitherto unsolved social and economic problems, and which is crying for further analysis. With this information assembled, the problems still remaining emerge more clearly and call for better planned research programs to fill in the gaps and to push forward further along strategic frontiers.

It is possible to look forward to relief research with somewhat greater optimism than in the past. The opportunities for co-operation and planning for the development of research activities are greater than at any time during the past few years of rapid development. Co-ordinated planning is making considerable strides. The

important project in consumption patterns being carried out by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Home Economics may be cited as an example of a project which has had the benefit of intensively developed work over a period of nearly a year. Many other projects are undergoing a similar process of development, as a result of a growing consciousness of the need for careful advance planning if statistical activities are to yield maximum results.

Agencies equipped for research work, both public and private, are responding to the opportunities offered by the availability of relief workers. Despite the fact that a large number of projects are being submitted which ought not to be undertaken, either because they are badly conceived or because they are poorly planned, there is an increasing number of projects which are both wisely conceived and planned for operation with relief workers.

Finally, a considerable amount of work has been done in the field of administrative control of research. The work of the National Resources Committee with its allied state and local groups is making great inroads upon the problem of planned and co-ordinated undertakings. The Central Statistical Board is co-operating with the Works Progress Administration through the Co-ordinating Committee in seeing that useful projects capable of accomplishment are undertaken and in rejecting projects which are ill-conceived or ill-planned. These bodies form the basis of an effective control upon the cumbersome mechanisms of relief research.

THE APPLICATION OF ATTITUDE TESTS IN THE FIELD OF PAROLE PREDICTION*

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IN RECENT years public attention has been directed more and more to parole as a method of release from prison. Many criticisms of parole systems have been offered particularly against the release on parole of men who leave prison and are soon again involved in criminal activities. Regrettable as is the circumstance that many parolees are apprehended in the commission of new crimes, it is by no means, as seems to be popularly assumed, a valid argument against continuance of the parole system. However, with the exception of the relatively very small number of prisoners sentenced for life, plus those who die during their term of incarceration and before the expiration of their sentence, all inmates of a penal institution will be released sometime. In Illinois, for example, no less than 94 per cent of all inmates of the penal institutions are released at some time and once more become free members of society. But, if all prisoners were incarcerated under definite sentence, this would presumably still remain the case—almost all of them would at one time or another be freed. Why then would they be less likely to commit new crimes under these circumstances? As a matter of fact it is probably true that they would commit more crimes if released upon discharge after completion of their definite sentences, for then they would have no restraining influence whatsoever. Their legal status would be that of men who had paid completely for their delinquencies and who were, therefore, not liable to check or restraint of any nature until such time as they again subjected themselves to the police power of the state by commission of new crimes.

The public attitude of deprecation of parole rests upon the misconception that it constitutes a remission of part of the sentence of an offender. This is by no means the case. Rather, parole is an added factor—an attempt to control, at least to some extent, the

* Paper read before Section K, American Association for the Advancement of Science, St. Louis, January 1936. The author is Sociologist and Actuary, Division of Pardons and Paroles, Illinois State Penitentiary, Joliet, Ill.—Ed.

actions of the delinquent not only while he is incarcerated but also after his release from imprisonment.

Pragmatically, then, the problem appears to be not whether to release—that is apparently fixed not only by law but by the absolute necessities of the case. The problem is rather when to release and how to release. As regards the how, there can hardly be any difference of opinion among people acquainted with the subject. Conditional release, as on parole, with its continuance of supervision and control of the convict is from every point of view preferable to absolute and unconditional release by discharge. But when to release is a question more difficult to solve. Into its solution must enter consideration of a great many different factors: the end or ends to be served by penal institutions and the means by which these ends can most effectively be accomplished.

But whatever be the ultimate ends conceived as desirable, it must certainly be of considerable advantage to the authorities with whom rests the decision in particular cases to have at their command some means of selecting those subjects who are extremely unlikely to recidivate and to distinguish them from the subjects who are very likely to commit new delinquencies. Not only is it desirable both from the point of view of economy and of interest in salvaging human material to release as early as is safely possible those men who are extremely likely to make a successful adjustment in free society, but also in the case of poor parole risks it is of the greatest importance to be aware that they are poor risks to the end that closer supervision may be maintained over them than over the individuals who do not require it. Any system of parole supervision which has but one policy and one set of practices for all parolees is, upon its face, inefficient. So long as individuals differ so greatly one from another, policies with regard to these individuals must, if they are to be effective, be capable of individualization so that they may be made to fit the needs of particular cases. The same amount of effort put forth in parole supervision may be trebly effective, if its direction is properly apportioned with regard to the necessities of individual cases.

The fundamental hypothesis of all scientific investigation is that the future will tend to be like the past—that laws validated by adequate experiments will continue to prove valid. In the physical sciences, where experimental control has been developed to a high degree of perfection, the scientist can have the greatest confidence

that phenomena will always continue to follow the same sequence which he has succeeded in verifying in a few, or even in one, carefully controlled experiment. In the social sciences we are unfortunately not in a position to conduct equally well controlled experiments. Social phenomena, in general, are highly complex, and the physical isolation of the variable to be studied is, in the nature of the case, impossible. This does not mean, however, that social science is impossible. It means, rather, that in this field we must develop other laboratory techniques—techniques which will be applicable to human behavior. These techniques have been found in the analytic procedures of modern correlational statistics. Where the physicist or chemist may depend upon one or a few experimental observations, the sociologist requires data on large groups of individuals. Given adequately large groups, however, and adequate data concerning the other variables inherent in a given situational complex, the sociologist can arrive at valid and accurate results quite as surely as can the physicist, altho he must employ a different methodology.

The prediction of certain types of human behavior is quite familiar to all of us. But it has been only very recently that analogous procedures have been attempted in predicting probable outcome on parole. The first definite study of the feasibility of such methods in parole prediction was that of Prof. Sam B. Warner in 1923.¹ The results of this extremely able and scholarly study were negative in so far as they showed that very few of the items of information available with respect to inmates of the Massachusetts Reformatory had an appreciable connection with outcome on parole and that no very penetrating and accurate prediction table could be constructed from the data available.

In the same year, Warner's findings were severely, if not altogether justifiably, criticized by Professor Hornell Hart.² Professor Hart's contention was that the material published by Professor Warner did constitute an adequate basis for prediction of outcome on parole, if handled in the proper manner statistically. In this article Hart did outline a definite method of constructing prediction tables.

The first attempt actually to construct a workable prediction table is that of Professor Ernest W. Burgess,³ published in 1928. The Burgess system, altho modified in a number of minor details,

¹ Sam B. Warner, "Factors Determining Parole from the Massachusetts Reformatory," *Jour. Crim. Law and Criminol.*, 14, August, 1923, 172-207.

² Hornell Hart, "Predicting Parole Success," *Ibid.*, November, 1923, 405-414.

³ Bruce, Harno, Burgess and Landesco, *Parole and the Indeterminate Sentence*, 1928.

is still the basic method in the field. His study, modified by more recent experience tables based on larger statistical samples, is used at all three Illinois institutions for prediction purposes. A part of my duties as Sociologist and Actuary at the Illinois State Penitentiary consists in analyzing all applicants for parole on the basis of the Burgess system and submitting to the Parole Board actuarial reports, based on past experience, as to the probability of success of each individual. My assistants at Menard and Pontiac prepare similar reports based upon experience tables applying specifically to their institutions.

The underlying hypotheses of the Burgess system have been employed, with more or less modification of detail, by Clark Tibbitts,⁴ George B. Vold,⁵ Elio Monachesi⁶ and Dr. C. C. Van Vechten.⁷ A somewhat more radical departure from the Burgess methodology is represented by the work of Drs. Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck.⁸ In addition to using only verified data in place of the institutional record material, the Gluecks have substituted for the many factors, each possessing unit weight, which are an integral part of the Burgess system, the use of a small number of factors exhibiting a relatively high degree of association with outcome. These factors are weighted in accordance with the actual violation rates found for the several categories employed.

Careful consideration of the findings of all the prediction studies which have appeared to date leads to the conclusion that there are four fundamental requisites for valid prediction factors in this type of study. These essential criteria may be defined as reliability, significance of association with outcome, orthogonality or freedom from inter-correlation, and stability of favorableness and unfavorableness. It is possible to develop a quantitative measure of the last-named requisite and to calculate the "indices of instability" of the three-hundred-odd categories which have been employed in parole prediction to date. By means of the concept of stability one may construct a prediction table which may be applied even in an institution

⁴ Clark Tibbitts, "Success or Failure on Parole Can Be Predicted," *Jour. of Crim. Law and Criminol.* 22, 11-50.

⁵ George B. Vold, *Prediction Methods and Parole*, Minneapolis, Sociological Press, 1931.

⁶ Elio D. Monachesi, *Prediction Factors in Probation*, Hanover, Sociological Press, 1932.

⁷ C. C. Van Vechten, *A Study of Success and Failure of 1000 Delinquents Committed to a Boys' Republic*, University of Chicago Press, 1935.

⁸ Sheldon and Eleanor T. Glueck, *500 Criminal Careers*, A. A. Knopf, 1930; *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents*, Harvard University Press, 1934; *500 Delinquent Women*, A. A. Knopf, 1934.

where there exists no experience table upon which to base prognoses.

The twenty-two factors employed in the original Burgess study constitute a fair sample of the items under which delinquents are classified in all the prediction studies. These factors are (1) nature of offense; (2) number of associates in committing offense for which convicted; (3) nationality of the inmate's father; (4) parental status, including broken homes; (5) marital status of the inmate; (6) type of criminal, as first offender, occasional offender, habitual offender, professional criminal; (7) social type, as ne'er-do-well, gangster, hobo; (8) county from which committed; (9) size of community; (10) type of neighborhood; (11) resident or transient in community when arrested; (12) statement of trial judge and prosecuting attorney with reference to recommendation for or against leniency; (13) whether or not commitment was upon acceptance of lesser pleas; (14) nature and length of sentence imposed; (15) months of sentence actually served before parole; (16) previous criminal record of the prisoner; (17) his previous work record; (18) his punishment record in the institution; (19) his age at time of parole; (20) his mental age according to psychiatric examination; (21) his personality type according to psychiatric examination; and (22) his psychiatric prognosis.

These factors, by the very nature of the case, fail in very large measure to meet the four criteria of valid prediction factors outlined above. In many of them the categories are so highly subjective that it is almost a matter of chance whether a given individual is classified in the same manner by two investigators or even by one investigator at two different times. Many of the categories employed manifest violation rates so near the mean rate for the entire group as to represent nothing more than the fluctuations of random sampling. A number of the factors are obviously very highly intercorrelated. Many of the categories are extremely unstable, both chronologically and geographically.

But these difficulties could, presumably, be to a large extent overcome by adoption of the afore-mentioned criteria in selecting prediction factors. A much more fundamental objection, however, is inherent in the attempt to base predictions upon factors of this nature. This consists in the fact that the very large majority of the Burgess factors are entirely static. If a delinquent, when sentenced to the penitentiary, is a single, white, American transient, committed from Cook county upon a plea of guilty to robbery in company with two associates, these facts about him are still true with

regard to him when he appears for hearing on application for parole. They are fixed and unalterable. A prognostic system based upon them, therefore, leaves no room for the possibility of that change in the personality and total outlook of an individual which we term "reformation."

Whether or not the penal institutions of this country do, in fact, "reform" is a debatable question. Certainly, however, our entire penal system is based in large measure upon a program of rehabilitation of the individual delinquent. If rehabilitation is not dependent upon the penal situation, it is difficult to conceive of a rationale upon which the present expensive reformatory and penitentiary system can be defended. For, if the purpose of penal institutions is punishment—if society incarcerates offenders because of a vindictive desire to retaliate—very much more drastic means of accomplishing this end could be devised. If, on the other hand, the aim is chiefly that of segregation and isolation of delinquents, the maximum terms included in most sentences cannot be defended. It would appear proper, indeed, upon this theory, to sentence all offenders for life.

But if the element of rehabilitation or reform is admitted, the change must occur sometime between commitment and release. It must depend, then, not upon static factors, which are from the outset fixed for all time; it must rest upon dynamic elements—factors which are subject to continual change. To judge the probability of successful adjustment of a paroled inmate upon such factors as his nationality, his age, his marital status, etc., is to exclude entirely any change which may take place in his ego after his incarceration. If changes occur at all, such predetermined criteria cannot serve as useful indices.

Another major difficulty inherent in factors of the Burgess type is that they are almost exclusively extrinsic to the individual. No attempt is made to classify the individual other than as a member of a group: an Italian, a third offender, a member of a broken family, etc. No effort is made to study those characteristics most specifically important: the attitudes of the individual. And yet, no matter what our individual opinions may be as to the causes of crime—whether we emphasize hereditary equipment or environmental conditioning—all of us would, I think, agree that the immediate causative elements are to be found in the sum total of the individual delinquent's attitudes. It is these which differentiate one subject from another; it is these which constitute his self and which determine his conduct.

In them must lie the ultimate explanation of criminal behavior. If we hope ever to be able to predict accurately the reactions of a given individual rather than the reactions of a whole group of individuals, we must study this very important psychological field.

But how can a study of attitudes be made practical in the field of parole prediction? The solution must be found to two major problems: first, what particular attitudes are important in the adjustment of the paroled prisoner to free society, and second, how can these attitudes be measured objectively?

The resolution of an individual's total attitude toward a socially desirable adjustment into its component elements is extremely important. Such a total attitude consists of specific attitudes on a variety of more limited subjects. Nor are these individual attitudes always entirely consistent with the supposed total attitude, although the individual may be totally unaware of the inherent ambivalence. I recall a case with which I came into contact recently, which exemplifies this point very well.

Johnnie Dunn was an inmate of the Joliet penitentiary, who had served one previous term in a reformatory and about five years on his current sentence. He was sure that he was entirely "cured." He had come to realize that he could not successfully outwit the law, and altho he had no particular moral scruples against criminal activities, he had become thoroughly convinced that continued crime was a losing proposition for him. Accordingly, he had made up his mind firmly to "quit the racket" and to earn an honest living upon his release. In this he was quite honest and sincere—so far as he knew consciously, he had really made up his mind to "make good." But the difficulty in Johnnie's case was that he was and is inordinately interested in fine clothes. He is, actually, an extremely "snappy dresser" and possessed of excellent taste. His interest in and curiosity about clothes is rather exceptional. One day shortly before his release he told me that he had heard that there was a tailor in Chicago who made suits to order and whose lowest price for a suit of clothes was \$125. He asked me whether I knew who this tailor might be, and, finding that I did, he asked me to give him his address. He made quite a point of this and was delighted at being able to secure the information he wanted. On another occasion, I was wearing a new hat. He complimented me on its appearance and asked me its price and where I had bought it. I told him that I had paid \$4 for the hat. He replied that he never paid less than \$10 for his hats and

went on to explain in detail just what shape and what color he liked best.

Now the point of this is that Johnnie was really and truly convinced that he intended to "go straight," and yet his attitude toward clothes was such as to be absolutely incompatible with his earnings from any honest line of work. This he did not realize at all; to him there was no apparent inconsistency between his inordinate craving for expensive clothes and his firm determination to make good. I may add that Johnnie was at liberty just two months before recidivating.

A misplaced attitude of loyalty may sometimes run counter to a proper total attitude. The individual has made up his mind never to break the law again. At the same time he feels that he is obligated to continue his friendship with his former group outside or with acquaintances he has made in the institution. To drop them would be disloyal, he feels. Upon his release he does, accordingly, renew his contacts. Sometimes a situation arises in which the other members of the group wish to undertake some affair, possibly criminal, which is not at all to the subject's liking. And yet he feels obligated, because of his distorted sense of loyalty, not to hold out alone against the others. Surely, loyalty in itself is a highly commendable trait, and yet it is perfectly evident that under circumstances such as those described it may be definitely inimical to the welfare of the individual and definitely inconsistent with the commendable total attitude toward delinquency.

But, if we grant that the important thing is the measurement of the specific individual attitudes which may be involved in success on parole rather than any abstract, general attitude toward honesty, how are we to determine what attitudes are pertinent? Difficult though this problem is, it proves upon examination not to be insoluble. Careful and intensive analysis of a sufficiently large number of actual cases, with a view to determining what specific attitudes have contributed in a given case toward success or failure on parole should give valuable clues with regard to the relative importance and the relative frequency of occurrence of the various component attitudes. Such a study was undertaken with reference to 150 individuals. Each of these cases was analyzed with a view to isolating those factors in each which appeared to have contributed to the determination of the final outcome. In all, forty-two unit factors were isolated.

There seems to be some reason to believe that the 42 factors identified are, in some sense, exhaustive. The basis of this belief is to be found in the rate of emergence of new factors as the study progressed. Thus, 27 factors had been listed by the time that the analysis of the sixth case had been completed; factors 28 to 31 emerged during study of the seventh case; factor 32 in the tenth case. When the twenty-fifth case had been analyzed, no less than 40 of the factors had been identified; so that but two new factors emerged during consideration of the last 125 cases. No new factors whatsoever appeared during study of the last 48 cases. From these considerations it appears probable that any new factors which might have been discovered had the study continued to a thousand cases, would necessarily have been in the nature of residuals. They could have little practical importance for the reason that either they are so intrinsically unimportant as to have escaped notice during intensive analysis of 150 cases, or they are so rare as not to have appeared in the entire sample of 150 cases. In either event they may safely be disregarded.

The significant thing about this list of 42 factors is that it contains but 14 elements which are dependent upon the factual history of the individual. No less than 28 factors, two-thirds of the entire list, are not factual but are based upon attitudes. Very strong support, then, is given to the *a priori* hypothesis that attitudes of the individual delinquent are very much more important as determinants of his conduct than are purely factual data connected with his past history.

In addition to the two examples—inordinate desire for clothes, and misdirected loyalty, quoted above—such typical attitudes as the following are to be found in the list. Little attention has been paid to the terminology employed, and the definitions are those which emerged during the study itself and appeared best to fit the concepts involved.

WHITE LIGHTS. "White lights" is a general term intended to cover a craving for the gay life of a city or small town: cabarets, dance halls, saloons, etc. It is a negative factor in the large number of cases in which it is felt that criminal activities were indulged in primarily to supply funds for a "fast" life.

SHARP PRACTICES. This implies a definite character trait: "to beat the other fellow on any kind of bargain, deal or business venture." While the inmate who is a prison "peddler" does not *per se* fall into this category, he is considered more likely to scheme illegally.

ARGUMENTATIVENESS. This factor was considered only when the individual persistently engaged in arguments; in other words, seemed to enjoy arguing. It was felt that such an individual would, sooner or later, strike difficulties on account of this trait. He might argue with his superiors and lose his job, or he might have an argument that would result in blows being struck and therefore get into trouble with the police.

LOVE OF COMFORT. This factor is employed only in cases where the individual's dependence upon the creature comforts of the home is extraordinarily great, and where it is believed that he may violate the law in order to secure or retain possession of them.

Many other examples might be quoted, but the foregoing are sufficient to illustrate the importance in the total probability of success on parole of specific attitudes on the part of the subject. Further, the procedure outlined makes possible the procuring of information on the matter of what attitudes of the individual delinquent must be investigated if we wish to build a prognostic device which will not be limited by static factual information.

One additional advantage of attitude tests over static prediction tables lies in their capacity for measuring the fluctuations of total parolability, which occur with the passage of time. It is a matter of common observation that the mental outlook of people in general is subject to change, not only from hour to hour and from day to day, but also in more gradual and far-reaching cycles, which may extend over months or years. Everyone is acquainted with some person who is more skeptical, less cocksure, less hot-headed or more patient today than he was five years ago. But what do we mean by such descriptions? The change is a more or less permanent one, and what has changed is some part or parts of that complex which we term the individual's attitude toward life.

Some changes of this sort may be traced more or less surely to definite experiences undergone by the individual: the loss of his mother, his failure in business, the disproving of some belief he had held. Others are less easily connected with specific events. They may be the result of a number of individually insignificant causes working together, or they may result from the whole general situation in such a way that specific causal relationships are impossible to establish.

The attitudes of inmates of penal institutions are subject to periodic fluctuations, also. In the very specialized environment of a prison, the ordinary vicissitudes of life are, indeed, likely to exert a

stronger influence upon the attitudes of the individual than is the case in ordinary free life where there exist distractions and, to a certain extent, compensations for nearly any event which may occur. The prisoner, however, has little in his immediate surroundings to distract him from any given train of thought. It is a fact, authenticated by the observations of many persons most intimately acquainted with penal institutions and their inhabitants, that comparatively unimportant matters are sufficient either to depress or to exhilarate men living in this environment. But such changes of outlook have a very important bearing on the probability of the individual's succeeding on parole.

Let us consider a hypothetical case. Bill's first reaction to conviction and sentence to prison is one of rebellion and revolt against authority. He feels that he was unfairly treated in being denied probation. Others, he says, who are guilty of far graver offenses, have been granted probation, but to him it was denied. This he attributes to his lack of money and influence—to the fact that he was not able to hire skilled counsel and that he lacked political prestige and friends who could secure consideration for him. To this situation he reacts sullenly and defiantly. He feels that he rather than society has been wronged and he vows that the next time he is arrested it will be for "something worth while." Gradually, this attitude wears off, and Bill thinks less of the past and more of the future. He becomes interested in automobile motors and feels sure that he can earn a fine living in this line of work. He thinks less about the past and his grievances than about the future and his hopes. He really works hard to improve himself, secures a job in the prison garage, takes a correspondence course in automotive engineering and really loses himself in his ambition. His attitude survives a refusal of parole by the parole board. He is resigned to the length of time he must serve and thinks only of how much more he can learn in the interim. Then, three months before Bill is to be released, his mother dies. Bill goes entirely to pieces, loses all interest in his work, stops planning for his future and reverts to his former attitude of rebellion and to ideas of persecution. He somehow holds society responsible for the death of his mother—feels that if he had been a free man he might have procured better treatment for her and prolonged her life. He is less articulate about it now than formerly, but he has an unpleasant look in his eye. He is no longer surly; rather, he is thoroughly disillusioned and embittered. The future may and probably will see a complete

reorientation of his outlook, but at the moment he is anything but a good risk on parole.

Such shifts in outlook are anything but unusual. Whether they be occasioned by some specific event, as in the case quoted, or result merely from the lapse of time and the maturing of the individual subject, they are the rule rather than the exception. In such cases as these there exists a definite optimum parole point from the viewpoint of success or failure on parole. Just before the death of his mother Bill was a good parole risk; immediately thereafter he became a poor risk. But such changes as these are changes of attitude; they affect the individual as an individual and not as a member of a group. The physical facts about the individual remain the same—his nationality, age, criminal record, and the like; it is only his personality, his attitudes, the most powerful determinants of his overt behavior, which change. And these determinants cannot be measured by means of a static scale. If we are to succeed in determining the optimum point of parolability we must, in some way, measure the attitudes involved in the situation rather than the fixed, external physical facts relating to the subject.

The attempt to measure the attitudes pertinent to adjustment on parole took the form of a "yes-no" questionnaire. A list of questions was composed, all answerable by "yes" or "no" and based upon the factors which had been determined to be pertinent. The procedure was to subdivide each factor as far as possible and then to formulate questions bearing on each of the subdivisions. This work continued to the exhaustion point—until it proved temporarily impossible to formulate a single additional pertinent question. The total list contained 1701 questions.

But a questionnaire, even so detailed and exhaustive a questionnaire as this, is of little value in the absence of some standard by which the responses can be evaluated. The establishment of such a norm presented one of the greatest technical difficulties in the present case. The matter is roughly analogous to the situation of a man who wants to build a house. One of the essential requirements is a yardstick or other measuring device. But suppose that a cosmic cataclysm had destroyed all measuring devices in the world. Suppose further that there lived in the vicinity some sixty men who had had years of experience as carpenters. If the builder were to request each of these sixty carpenters in turn to indicate his estimate of a length of one foot, it is likely that no single one of them would be

exactly accurate in his estimate. It is also extremely probable, however, that if the mean value of all sixty estimates were calculated, it would be found to differ very little from the true value of a foot.

A somewhat similar procedure was adopted in the present case. I selected a group of sixty-four inmates concerning each of whom a complete file of information was available and requested them to co-operate in this research, the nature of which I explained fully. The men in the group had all already appeared before the Parole Board and received their settings; so that the nature of their replies to the questionnaire could, they knew, have no bearing upon their chances of parole.

Further, the experimental subjects were given the assurance that their anonymity would be guarded. None of the information obtained was to be used for official purposes. Only inmates who were willing to accept this assurance without reservation were solicited to join in the undertaking. It was further explained to the sixty-four members of the "Truth Group," that if they began the experiment at all, they must stand ready to answer all the questions and answer them truthfully. The presence in the group of even one man who did not tell the truth, they were told, would vitiate the entire investigation.

Not every inmate who was approached with the request that he serve as an experimental subject consented. Some frankly stated that they were unwilling to commit themselves to answer questions truthfully, and that rather than fail to do so they preferred not to become members of the group. Others declined less politely. No effort was made to over-persuade any prospective subject, for it was felt that inclusion of men not really willing to co-operate might introduce an element of deceit.

With the Truth Group as finally constituted, a great many considerations combine to yield the conclusion that conscious deceit was decreased to an irreducible minimum. These considerations include the nature of the subjects, the circumstances under which the questionnaire was administered, the pledges of anonymity given the subjects, the actual responses made to certain "index questions," inserted in the questionnaire as an independent check of veracity, the internal consistency of the questionnaires when filled out and numerous casual conversations with individual Truth Group members after completion of the test at times when they were not on their guard.

The 100,000 replies of the Truth Group were considered to constitute an adequate norm for the situation in which the individuals answered truthfully and with full knowledge on the part of the subject that his answers will not be used to his detriment. There remains the problem of obtaining a measure of the deviation from this norm to be expected when the questionnaire is administered to unselected random groups in a routine manner and without any assurances to the subjects.

The same 1700 questions were, accordingly, administered to totally unselected groups of inmates, who believed that their answers to the questions would be used by me in making my report to the Parole Board. Another 100,000 replies were collected in this manner and the results compared with those of the Truth Group. In this manner it was possible to eliminate those questions which were likely to be lied to in the actual situation where the men believed that their answers would influence their chances for parole. Further, those questions which were ambiguous or which tended to provoke differing responses in groups of varying intelligence or social status were identified and discarded.

By the use of various statistical techniques it proved possible to select from the 1700 questions in the questionnaire, those which were most significant and would tend to give the desired information in abbreviated form. A total of 161 such questions were incorporated into a "short questionnaire," which was tested further by administration to other groups.

Unfortunately, no real criterion of validity is available until such time as a reasonably large number of the subjects tested by this method have been released on parole and have been at liberty for a period of three years—the usual period of parole in Illinois. After this amount of time has passed it will be possible to determine the degree of accuracy of prediction possible by use of the questionnaire. The questionnaire has already been administered to some 600 inmates of the Joliet Penitentiary appearing before the Parole Board for hearing and leaving the institution on parole, and it will from now on be administered routinely to all applicants for parole. The questionnaire is now being administered also at the Southern Illinois Penitentiary at Menard and the Illinois Reformatory at Pontiac.

In the interim, however, there does exist one standard of comparison for questionnaire scores. This is the grading of the same men on the Burgess scale. The correlation between questionnaire scores

and Burgess scores proved to be $+.67$ for the Truth Group and $+.50$ for the other group tested. These results show that while the two methods have much in common, the results differ sufficiently to make it eminently worth while to discover which of the two systems gives more nearly accurate predictions. Data are being accumulated on all current cases for the purpose of deciding this question ultimately.

It seems highly probable, then, that prediction scales based upon purely static factors must leave out of consideration much material of great importance to accurate prognostication. No matter how accurately such devices may predict the outcomes of whole groups, they do not sufficiently distinguish between individuals to make them as efficacious as possible in individual prediction. The attitudes of individual delinquents appear to be the additional determinants of outcome on parole. While the determination of the particular attitudes involved presents some difficulty, careful analysis leads to the isolation of the factors which appear to be involved in adjustment on parole. A questionnaire can be constructed in such a manner as to elicit the information desired on the pertinent attitudes. The outcome on parole of the individuals tested in this manner will furnish the measure of the validity of this procedure.

But whether this particular test is effective or not, the underlying hypothesis can hardly be questioned. If by any means whatsoever it is possible to determine the attitudes and the mental outlook of individual delinquents, we shall have a tool which will go directly to the root of the matter of success or failure on parole. For it is those elements which are peculiar to the individual, which make him a distinct person, which ultimately underlie and determine his overt conduct.

I have been challenged for the omission from the list of factors of certain general, extrinsic factors, such as parole community and world economic conditions. There can be no question that such factors are extremely important in determining the likelihood of an individual's succeeding on parole. But they are open to two objections. First, it is totally impossible to evaluate these factors accurately in advance. That we cannot foretell economic conditions is obvious; neither can we accurately foretell the environment in which the parolee will find himself. In most cases the job which the parolee takes on leaving the institution is secured only after he has been informed of his parole. But even if the parolee is required

to state in advance where he will work and where he will live, the first job and the first residence on parole are very frequently of extremely short duration. It would be folly to attempt to use information so unreliable as this for prediction purposes.

But even more fundamental is the fact that such general, extrinsic factors, while they unquestionably exercise great influence on parole outcome, affect all parolees, on the average, alike. An economic depression increases the general violation rate, but, on the whole, it leaves unaffected the *relative* probability of success of the various parolees. Our aim has been to isolate those intrinsic character traits of the individual which tend to make for success on parole under any circumstances whatever—those factors which help a man to face an unforeseen emergency just as surely as they increase his likelihood of success under normal conditions. In other words, we attempt to study the delinquent himself and to reduce to a score those inherent traits which are characteristic of just that individual in any environment whatsoever.

The questionnaire has been tried practically in a recent experiment in Cleveland, Ohio. Miss Leona Marie Esch, Director of the Cleveland Association for Criminal Justice, requested my co-operation in analyzing by use of the questionnaire two men convicted of robbery. These men had been thoroughly examined by the psychiatric clinic and were personally known to Miss Esch. The analysis of the questionnaires was declared by Miss Esch to be "challengingly accurate."

The field of attitude testing in general is still pioneer ground and its application to parole prediction has only begun. But it seems so evident that it is in the attitudes of the individual that we can best hope to find indications of his future behavior that it is my sincere belief that some such technique as that described must eventually be the means used for intelligent administration of parole and probation.

Roberto Michels—*In Memoriam*

Roberto Michels, born on January 9, 1876, in Cologne, Germany, died on May 2, 1936 in Rome. Thus came to a close a life whose course had run many years, and nevertheless retained youthfulness in spirit. It is this youthfulness, encountered in all of his writings as well as in all of his life-activities, that makes his death so tragic and difficult to bear. When death overtook him he had already bequeathed to posterity, because of his inexhaustible energy and fervor, a vast number of books, ideas, and teachings, but his end came at a time in life marked by the fullest development of creative power.

Roberto Michels, it may be said, was a sociologist by virtue of his temperament. His intuitive character made him a stranger to and an enemy of *homo æconomicus*. He never had faith in the economic sciences, and this lack of faith is well illustrated in his numerous writings. It is especially marked in his *Economia e felicità*, where he refuses to believe that the economic and spiritual welfare of a people are related. He points out that *homo æconomicus* is not only an abstraction but also an absurdity that in no way corresponds to reality.

Michels did not trade economics for sociology; he was always a sociologist. He believed it impossible to reduce the complexity of human phenomena to theories or systematization. He was neither an organismic nor a mechanistic interpreter of human conduct. If Roberto Michels had a theory regarding social phenomena it was that human behavior, especially in its collective manifestations, is derived from a multiplicity of factors. To consider this behavior from a predetermined point of view would result in particularism and categorical synthesis. This attitude of Michels was not based on scepticism, for scepticism had no place in his exuberant spirit. In fact, he was moved by his intuition and, to a degree, by his conscience, to concede to spiritual and idealistic factors an important place in his conceptual structure. This made him refuse to construct a reality in which the dominant place was occupied by an enigma of human relations. He was convinced that it is necessary to approach the study of social phenomena with a sense of modesty and understanding. In order to describe phenomena it is necessary to *feel* them. He was not interested in the evaluation of social phenomena but in understanding them.

Knowledge of Michels' life makes it understandable why he chose to work in those fields in which controversy prevailed. He was particularly interested in those zones in which sciences and doctrines meet and clash, revealing their inability to offer adequate explanations of phenomena.

If, on the whole, Michels believed it impossible to reduce social life to

systems, he did not let this belief stand in the way of creating generalizations. He expressed generalizations, however, pertaining only to those fields of social life that presented an unmistakable degree of constancy. In these fields he formulated principles and laws that were novel and fertile. His principle of the "destiny of political classes" and his law regarding the existence in all classes, no matter how democratic, of an elite, are examples of his generalizations. These are expressed and analyzed in his numerous writings. *La sociologia del partito politico nella democrazia moderna* (English, *The Law of Oligarchy in Politics*; German, *Soziologie des Parteiwesens*), and *Studies on Democracy and Authority*, (*Studi sulla democrazia e sull'autorità*), are profound analyses of the natural incapacity of masses to govern themselves. This incapacity is conducive to the formation of a ruling oligarchy not only in parties but also in democratic countries, a phenomenon that takes place even when the principles of democracy tend to obscure the effective work of the hierarchical principle.

"In hierarchical parties leadership becomes a tenet, a divine gift that reinforces the continuous election and re-election of the 'chosen few' by the masses. Even in democratic parties and countries that deny this tenet there exists a dictatorship of leaders, although formal democracy tries to hide this condition. The rapid turnover of leaders deceives the inexperienced regarding the true character of authority in democratic countries. It is not the masses that overthrow leaders but rather new leaders who take advantage of the masses who bring this about."¹

It is but a step from this continuous change that so inadequately hides the principle of hierarchical necessity to the study of social mobility. Out of this basic phenomenon Roberto Michels developed an original hypothesis which differs from Pareto's circulation of the aristocracy and from the more recent theory of Gini. Pareto held that the ruling class in a population is eliminated either by gradual replacement or by violence growing out of its attempt to retain the status quo in the face of social needs. Michels does not see a replacement of the old by the new in this process, but rather an amalgamation or fusion. A new class with new principles is not formed by this process as Pareto believed. The old class remains at the helm but it incorporates within itself new members and gives to them positions of leadership made possible by the extinction of some ruling families. This, according to Michels, is the manner in which the nobility of old Europe, by accepting and assimilating members from the political class created by science and wealth, has been able to maintain itself in power.

Pareto believed that the mobility of the aristocracy or ruling class was characterized by an ascending and descending current, in which the latter current was not inferior numerically to the former. Michels greatly attenuated the intensity of the descending current. In this Michels seems to be in agreement with Gini. This agreement is merely superficial, however,

¹ R. Michels, "Social mobility in general with special reference to post-war mobility." Communication to the XII International Congress of Sociology. Brussels, 1935. Edited by the Committee for the Study of Population Problems, Rome, 1936.

because Gini holds that the descending current largely contains individuals belonging to families biologically in the descending phase of evolution. For Michels this phenomenon has social and economic implications—so much so in fact, that he believes that there is a possibility that a part of these de-classed persons may successfully compete with others and thus regain their former positions.

There is a further difference between Michels and Gini in that their theories are developed from different premises. Gini, basing his theory on statistical data, sees biological and demographical reasons for social mobility, and goes so far as to express the belief that these biological and demographical factors are fundamental in dictating the form and evolution of populations. Michels sees mobility as fundamentally social. The mobility of ruling classes is the product of innumerable interrelated factors in which it may not be possible to indicate first or primary causes.

While believing that the most desirable way to commemorate the memory of Roberto Michels would be to elaborate his writings which are so intimately revealing of his true spirit, the limits set for me do not permit doing so. I can do no more than mention those phases of his life which attract me. Thus the essentially Italian quality of Roberto Michels fills us with pride and gratitude. He was one of those Germans who, because of feeling and intuition, are naturally attracted to Latinity. In this return to the Great Mother Rome they rediscover the true sources of their being. Roberto Michels was an Italian not only because of citizenship but because of feeling, thought and action. His scientific writings reveal a profound knowledge of and admiration for our political, social and economic writers, such as Machiavelli, Botero, Ortes, Pecchio, Filangeri, Genovesi, Mazzini, Pareto and many others. He dedicated to our social and political problems many valuable scientific contributions, as well as entire volumes in which he pleaded our cause with vigor and passion.

His last illness overtook him in Greece. The people of the United States will remember that in 1927, on the invitation of the Department of Political Science of the University of Chicago, he gave a course in political sociology and a course in economics. He also lectured during the same year at the Political Institute at Williamstown. The memory of Roberto Michels, we hope, will long survive in the United States and in the rest of the world.

DINO CAMAVITTO

University of Rome
July 31, 1936.

Official Reports *and* Proceedings

THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE SOCIETY

The next meeting of the Society will be held at the Congress Hotel in Chicago, December 28, 29 and 30. The following tentative arrangement of general and sectional programs is being planned to center upon the main topic, "The Applications of Sociological Theory," which has been chosen by the Executive Committee as the theme of these meetings.

MONDAY, DECEMBER 28

- 8:00- 9:00 A.M. Registration
- 9:00-10:00 A.M. Business Meeting for reports of representatives of the Society.
- 10:00-12:00 A.M. Division on Human Ecology. Clifford Shaw, Institute for Juvenile Research, Chairman.
Section on Rural Sociology. Lowry Nelson, Utah Agricultural Experiment Station, Chairman.
Joint Session of the Section on Social Statistics and the American Statistical Association. George A. Lundberg, Bennington College, Chairman.
- 1:00- 3:00 P.M. Section on the Family. M. C. Elmer, University of Pittsburgh, Chairman.
Section on Criminology. George B. Vold, University of Minnesota, Chairman.
Section on Educational Sociology. E. George Payne, New York University, Chairman.
- 3:00- 5:00 P.M. Section on the Community, C. Luther Fry, University of Rochester, Chairman.
Section on the Sociology of Religion. E. E. Eubank, University of Cincinnati, Chairman.
Joint Session, Section on Sociology and Social Work and the American Association for Labor Legislation. Neva R. Dear-dorff, Welfare Council of New York, Chairman.
Section on Political Sociology, Newell L. Sims, Oberlin College, Chairman.
- 5:00- 6:00 P.M. Meeting of the Executive Committee
- 8:00-10:00 P.M. General Meeting of the Society. Dr. Arthur Morgan, Chairman of the Board of the Tennessee Valley Authority, is the principal speaker.
Joint Session of the Section on Social Statistics and the American Statistical Association. George A. Lundberg, Bennington College, Chairman.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 29

- 9:00-10:00 A.M. Business Meeting of the Society
10:00-12:00 A.M. Division on Social Biology. Warren S. Thompson, Miami University, Chairman.
Division on Sociology and Psychiatry. Joseph K. Folsom, Vassar College, Chairman.
Division on Social Research. George A. Lundberg, Bennington College, Chairman.
12:30- 3:00 P.M. Joint Luncheon Meeting of the Section on Rural Sociology and the American Farm Economic Association. Lowry Nelson, Utah Agricultural Experiment Station, Chairman.
1:00- 3:00 P.M. Section on the Family. M. C. Elmer, University of Pittsburgh, Chairman.
Section on Sociology and Social Work. Neva R. Deardorff, Welfare Council of New York, Chairman.
2:30- 5:00 P.M. Joint Session of the American Statistical Association and the Section on Social Statistics. George A. Lundberg, Bennington College, Chairman.
3:00- 5:00 P.M. Division on Social Psychology. Read Bain, Miami University, Chairman.
5:00- 6:00 P.M. Meeting of the Executive Committee
8:00-10:00 P.M. Joint Session for Presidential Addresses.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 30

- 9:00-10:00 A.M. Annual Business Meeting of the American Sociological Society
Election of Officers.
10:00-12:00 A.M. Division on Social Theory. Floyd House, University of Virginia, Chairman.
Section on Rural Sociology. Lowry Nelson, Utah Agricultural Experiment Station, Chairman.
12:45- 3:00 P.M. Luncheon Meeting of the Section on the Sociology of Religion. E. E. Eubank, University of Cincinnati, Chairman.
1:00- 3:00 P.M. Section on the Community. C. Luther Fry, University of Rochester, Chairman.
Section on Educational Sociology. E. George Payne, New York University, Chairman.
Division of Sociology and Psychiatry. Joseph K. Folsom, Vassar College, Chairman.
3:00- 5:00 P.M. Section on Criminology. George B. Vold, University of Minnesota, Chairman.
Section on Political Sociology. Newell L. Sims, Oberlin College, Chairman.
5:00- 6:00 P.M. Meeting of the New Executive Committee.
6:30 P.M. Annual Dinner of the American Sociological Society.

For the inclusion of other special meetings in the final printed program, please address the Secretary concerning time and place.

Committee on Local Arrangements. Thomas D. Eliot, Northwestern University, Chairman, A. G. Barry, Martin H. Bickham, Anton T. Boisen, Michael M. Davis, Maurice H. Krout, Ferris F. Laune, Murry H. Leiffer,

Frank Loomis, C. H. Z. Mayer, Joseph L. Moss, Ben L. Reitman, Samuel A. Stouffer, Mary Wood-Simons.

Committee on Exhibits. Maurice H. Krout, Chicago City Junior Colleges, Chairman; James H. S. Bossard, University of Pennsylvania; E. George Payne, New York University; and T. D. Eliot, Northwestern University.

Committee on Regional Societies. E. T. Krueger, Vanderbilt University, Chairman; L. G. Brown, Chairman, Program Committee Midwest States; Jerome Davis, President, Eastern Sociological Society, Yale University; Wilson Gee, President, Southern Sociological Society, University of Virginia; W. E. Gettys, Sociological Section, Southwestern Social Science Association, University of Texas; A. A. Johnston, President, Ohio Sociological Society, College of Wooster, Wooster, Ohio; F. E. LaViolette, Society for Social Research, University of Chicago; C. N. Reynolds, President, Pacific Sociological Society, Stanford University; H. B. Woolston, University of Washington; Donald Young, Social Science Research Council; Kimball Young, University of Wisconsin.

Request from Committee on Exhibits. One of the features of the 1936 annual meeting to be held by the American Sociological Society in Chicago is an exhibit of materials representing recent and generally accepted sociological research. The aim is to demonstrate advances in sociological knowledge and research and to supply those in the teaching field with visual material for classroom use.

Since the committee is operating under a limited budget, it will be unable to reach all those engaged in productive research or having materials of this type in their possession. The members of the Society are therefore requested to write at once, giving (a) the nature of their materials, (b) the general division to which the materials belong, (c) the form, i.e., whether graphs, maps, charts, photographs, objects, etc., and (d) the dimensions and amount of material available.

Members of the Society, and those engaged in fields marginal to sociology, who have *slides* or *films* suitable for presentation at a special session to be devoted to research and instructional materials are also asked to write to the chairman of the committee on exhibits. Suggestions are welcome. Communications should be addressed to Maurice H. Krout, Chairman, Committee on Exhibits, 4316 Lexington Street, Chicago, Illinois.

Persons *and* Positions

Ph.D.; married; experience in teaching survey courses in social studies, prison work, extension classes, Americanization of immigrants, and adult education. Two books; articles published in leading American and foreign periodicals. Desires change.

M.A. in Sociology, all resident requirements completed for the Ph.D., and thesis far advanced. Married; two sons; has had some business experience and considerable experience as a public speaker. Teaching includes one year in a college abroad; now completing the ninth consecutive year as college teacher in sociology. Desires change.

M.A. University of Wisconsin 1935, thesis for Ph.D. Columbia practically completed; native American, married; teaching experience in Turkey, Syria and United States; special work in student guidance; numerous references. Holder of fellowship for research in Turkey, 1936-37. Seeks teaching or administrative position for 1937-38 and thereafter.

M.A.; author of several texts; experience in dealing with high school seniors in large city system; now seeks college position where contact with freshmen would render training valuable. Especially desirous of work relating to the social sciences. Wishes position for this year.

Ph.D. Michigan, three years foreign travel, study, teaching. Special interests; introductory course, family, social anthropology, educational sociology. Married, two children. Now field representative National Youth Administration.

Ph.D. in sociology; previous training and research in biology. Post-doctoral work in clinical psychology. Extensive travel. Executive secretary and institute of family relations work. Four books; college Professor. Desires teaching, research, or service.

B.S. Rutgers with high honors, 1930; A.M. in Sociology, New York University, 1935. Experience includes public school teaching, adult education, and research. Single and willing to work anywhere. Seeks teaching position for this year, or part-time teaching with opportunity for advanced study.

CURRENT ITEMS

American Council of Learned Societies: Grants in Aid of Research. The American Council of Learned Societies is able to offer a limited number of small grants, ordinarily not exceeding \$300, to individual scholars to assist them in carrying on definite projects of research, already commenced, in the humanistic sciences: philosophy, philology, literature and linguistics, art and musicology, archaeology, and cultural and intellectual history. Applicants must possess the doctorate or its equivalent, must be citizens or permanent residents of the United States or Canada, and must be in personal need of the assistance for which they apply and unable to secure it from other sources. Grants are not awarded for the fulfillment of requirements for any academic degree.

Applications must be made in duplicate on special forms which will be supplied on request, and must be filed before January 15, 1937. For further information and for application forms, address the Secretary for Fellowships and Grants, American Council of Learned Societies, 907 Fifteenth Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

Institutes of International Affairs. Of some interest as suggestive of the trend of opinion and public interest in this country is the rapid growth in recent years of institutes of international relations held during the summer months in various colleges and universities. Between the middle of May and the first of August such gatherings were held at the following institutions: Bethal College, Newton, Kans., Duke University, Durham, N.C., Earlham College, Richmond, Ind., Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa, Institute of Pacific Relations, Yosemite National Park, Cal., Mills College, Oakland, Cal., Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill., Reed College, Portland, Ore., Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Penn., University of Maine, Orono, Me., University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass., Whittier College, Whittier, Cal.

The Marxist Quarterly. Announcement is made of the imminent appearance of *The Marxist Quarterly*. The announcement states: "This will be a learned journal appearing quarterly, with particular reference to the various social science disciplines but not to the exclusion of the natural sciences where the materials are relevant. The first issue will be published during the autumn of 1936."

The Journal is addressed to professional students and "to the ideologically minded sections of the labor movement." It will publish articles setting forth theoretical expositions and amplifications of Marxist principles and application of such principles to the various social science fields. It will have departments devoted to chronicles and communications, book reviews, and notes on the activities of the learned societies.

The editors are: James Burnham, Lewis Corey, Managing Editor, Louis M. Hacker, Francis A. Henson, Will Herberg, Sidney Hook, Corliss Lamont, George Novack, Meyer Schapiro, Sterling D. Spero, Bertram D. Wolfe.

It is edited at 3986, 47th Street, Long Island City, N. Y. Subscription rate, \$2.00 per year.

Parent Education. The Fifth Biennial Conference of the National Council of Parent Education will be held in Chicago, November 11-14. The sessions will bring together persons interested in various aspects of education for family life, marriage and parenthood. Among the topics to be considered are: teaching, medicine and social work in relation to family counselling and problems of marriage; parent education in the adult education programs of the Extension Service, the WPA, and similar activities. The role of such agencies as the Parent-Teacher Association, the church, the fraternal organizations, etc., adult concern for their offspring's interests in marriage and home-making; the preparation of readable and reliable subject matter for various groups; the conduct of educational relationships between the school and parents and between parents and other educational activities; the relation of education for family living to contemporary trends in family life. From four to five sessions each on the discussion group plan will be devoted to such topics as adult discussion group leadership, the mental hygiene problems of college courses on marriage and the family, and the training and supervision of lay leaders. Those interested should communicate with the Director, National Council of Parent Education, 60 East 42nd Street, New York City.

Social Science Pre-Doctoral Fellowships for Graduate Study 1936-37. The Social Science Research Council has announced the award of eight pre-doctoral fellowships for graduate study and seven re-appointments at the same level. The fellowships provide one thousand dollars, tuition charges and travelling expense for a round trip between the student's home and the institution selected. The fellowships are designed to aid exceptionally promising students of the social sciences to obtain research training through pre-doctoral graduate study. Fellows are required to devote their full time to graduate study in some institution other than that in which they received their undergraduate training.

The fellowships will be offered again for the academic year 1937-38. The closing date for the receipt of applications on blanks to be secured from the Fellowship Secretary is March 15, 1937. Inquiries should be addressed to the Social Science Research Council, 230 Park Avenue, New York City. Each candidate must submit a letter from the chairman of the department in which he has pursued his major undergraduate study, in support of his application, before blanks will be sent to him.

The list of awards, institution of learning and field of specialization covering 1936-37 appointees is as follows: Wallace E. Davies, History, Harvard University; Milton Derber, Economics, University of Wisconsin; John B. Farnsworth, Political Science, Harvard University; Joseph H. Greenberg, Anthropology, Northwestern University; Charles F. Hockett,

Anthropology, Yale University; Albert Koch, Economics, Columbia University; Joseph S. Ransmeier, Economics, Columbia University; George H. Watson, Political Science, University of Illinois.

Re-appointees: Rollin F. Bennett, Economics, Columbia University; Irvin L. Child, Psychology, Yale University; John D. Gaffey, Economics, Columbia University; Sara Gamm, Economics, University of Chicago; C. Lowell Harriss, History, Columbia University; Michael L. Hoffman, Economics, University of Chicago; Paul L. Samuelson, Economics, Harvard University.

Stanford University. Dr. George Lundberg gave courses on Social Research and Applied Sociology during the summer quarter.

University of Georgia. Mr. B. D. Tillett, who was instructor in Sociology during the past school year, has been appointed Associate Professor in the Department of Rural Organization and Markets in the University of Georgia.

University of Maryland. Dr. Carl S. Joselyn, formerly of the Department of Sociology of Harvard University, has been appointed Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland.

Dr. John E. Jacobi, a graduate of New York University, and for the past three years Professor of Economics and Sociology at Union County Junior College, has been appointed instructor in Sociology at the University of Maryland.

University of Minnesota. Dr. Clifford Kirkpatrick is on leave of absence for the year, having received a Guggenheim Fellowship for study of the family and status of woman in Germany. Professor Mabel A. Elliott of the University of Kansas is in residence teaching courses in Social Interaction, Social Psychology, the Family, and Educational Sociology during the year. Dr. Joseph Schneider, formerly of the University of California, has been appointed Instructor in Sociology and will teach courses in social theory during the year. Mrs. Alice Leahy Shea, who was on the staff of the Catholic University of America last year, has returned to the University of Minnesota as Associate Professor of Sociology and Social Work and is in charge of the training for children's work in the graduate course in social work. Miss Helen U. Phillips, formerly Assistant Director of the Neighborhood House, St. Paul, has been appointed Lecturer in Social Work and Supervisor of field training in group work.

Wayne University. The undergraduate curriculum in social work of Wayne University has been expanded to include graduate instruction leading to a Certificate in Social Work and Master of Social Work degree. The graduate school curriculum is being established to meet the requirements of the American Association of Schools of Social Work.

Dr. Lent D. Upson, Director of the Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research and Professor of Government at Wayne University, has been appointed head of the Department of Sociology and Director of the School of Public Affairs and Social Work.

Mrs. Florence Booth has been appointed Assistant Professor of Social Work and Supervisor of Student Training. Dr. Courtlandt C. Van Vechten has been appointed instructor in Sociology.

Mr. Kurt Peiser, Director of the Jewish Welfare Federation, Detroit, Dr. Don W. Gudakunst, Deputy Commissioner of Health and Director of School Health Service, Detroit Department of Health, Mr. Herman Jacobs, Executive Director of the Jewish Community Center, Detroit, Miss Nina Ridenour, Chief Psychologist, the Children's Center of the Children's Fund of Michigan, and Mr. Victor C. Swearingen of Clark, Klein, Ferris, and Cook, Attys., have been added to the existing staff as Lecturers in Social Work.

Yale Divinity School. Professor Jerome Davis, Stark professor of Philanthropy at the Yale Divinity School, was recently elected president of the American Federation of Teachers at the Philadelphia meeting in August.

National Conference on Educational Broadcasting.¹ Educational broadcasting will be the subject of a national conference in Washington, D.C., on December 10, 11, and 12, 1936, sponsored by eighteen national organizations in co-operation with the Federal Office of Education and the Communications Commission; it will serve as a clearing house for information on the latest technical and professional developments in the educational use of radio. All organizations interested in radio as a social force are invited to participate. The Executive Secretary of the Conference is C. S. Marsh, 744 Jackson Place, Washington, D.C.

Necrology. Word has been received at the Editorial Office of the death of Clarmal Budde Rowley, July 5, 1936, at Wilton, California. She obtained the degrees of A.B. from Stanford University in 1910, and of A.M. from the University of Wisconsin in 1923. She was a life member of the American Sociological Society.

Request. The following request has been received: "I would be very much obliged to you if you could kindly find me some one among your numerous members who would be willing to send me regularly your *Review* after he has been through the same. The fact that these would be so useful to us over here has made me bold to thus request you. Hoping you will generously excuse me for thus bothering you with my request.

Your sincerely,

K. Deviah S. J.,
St. Mary's College,
Kurseong, D. H. Ry.,
India."

¹ Late item, inserted in page-proof.—Ed.

Periodical Literature

FRENCH JOURNALS

ÉMILE BENOÎT-SMULLYAN

Harvard University

- Archives de philosophie du droit et de sociologie juridique* (fourth year, nos. 3-4, 1934).—L. Le Fur: La démocratie et la crise de l'État [Democracy and the crisis of the state], 7-49.—C. Guy-Grand: Démocratie, liberté et souveraineté [Democracy, liberty, and sovereignty], 50-57.—J. Bréthe de la Gressaye: La Représentation professionnelle et corporative [Professional and corporative representations], 58-98.—M. Prélôt: Les principes du gouvernement fasciste [Principles of Fascist government], 99-115.—Max. Leroy: La crise du concept d'avenir et l'art de gouverner [The crisis in the concept of the future, and the art of governing.—The weakening belief that the future is completely determined or predictable in the long run], 116-128.—H. Sinzheimer: L'État et la société à notre époque [The state and society in our era], 129-140.—P. Scholten: L'autorité de l'État [The authority of the state], 141-155.—H. J. Laski: Le tournant de la démocratie [The turning point of democracy], 156-168.—Dr. K. Wilk: La Doctrine politique du national-socialisme: Carl Schmitt. Exposé et critique de ses idées [The political doctrine of National Socialism: Carl Schmitt. Exposition and criticism of his ideas], 169-196.—P. Léon: Rousseau et les fondements de l'État moderne [Rousseau and the foundation of the modern state], 197-238.—O. Kirchheimer: Remarques sur la théorie de la souveraineté nationale en Allemagne et en France [Remarks on the theory of national sovereignty in Germany and in France], 239-254.
- Revue Internationale de Sociologie* (44, 3-4, March-April, 1936), Edited by Émile Lasbax.—G.-L. Duprat: Esquisse d'un traité de sociologie (fin) [Sketch of a treatise on sociology (end)], 137-208.—Henryck Karnecki: Le Retour des formes de la vie sociale [The recurrence of the forms of social life], 209-213.—André Joussain: L'Histoire comparée des évolutions sociales [The comparative history of social evolutions], 215-225.—(44, May-June, 1936).—Institut international de sociologie, XIII^e congrès international (Paris 1937), Program des séances [International Institute of Sociology, Program of conferences].—E. Dekany (Budapest): Une forme élémentaire de la vie sociale: le public [An elementary form of the social life: the public], 263-277.—André Joussain: Les Réactions des masses: leur esprit simpliste [The reactions of masses: their simplicist spirit], 279-285.
- Revue Philosophique* (61, 5-6, May-June, 1936).—M. Halbwachs: La Methodologie de Fr. Simiand: Un empirisme rationaliste [The methodology of Fr. Simiand: A rationalistic empiricism], 281-319.—G. del Vecchio: La Crise de la science du droit [The crisis of the science of law], 320-337.—A. Rey: Logique, mathématique, et participation à la fin du V^e Siècle hellénique [Logic, mathematics, and participation at the end of the fifth century of Hellenism].—L. Gernet: P. M. Schuhl. Essai sur la formation de la pensée grecque [A critical review of P. M. Schuhl's Essay on the formation of Greek thought], 338-371.

GERMAN JOURNALS

HANNA MEUTER

Cologne, Germany

- Archiv für Bevölkerungswissenschaft (Volkskunde) und Bevölkerungspolitik* (6, 3, May 1936).—Friedrich Keiter: Das "Einzugsgebiet" der Wiener Oberschicht von 1928 [The "occupied area" of the Viennese upper class of 1928], 153-157.

- Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* (43, 3, and 44, 1, May and July 1936).—Torsten W. Gardlung: Die neueste Entwicklung in der amerikanischen Soziologie [Latest developments in American sociology], 620-642.—Hans Freyer: Ferdinand Tönnies und seine Stellung in der deutschen Soziologie [Tönnies and his position in German sociology], 1-9.—B. B. Wallace u. H. V. V. Fay: Die jüngste Handelspolitik der Vereinigten Staaten [Recent Trade Policies of the United States], 10-83.
- Archiv für mathematische Wirtschafts- und Sozialforschung* (2, 2, 1936).—Friedrich Böhm: Grundfragen der angewandten Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung und der theoretischen Statistik, insbesondere das Problem der reinen Gruppen (II) [Fundamental questions of applied probability theory and theoretical statistics, with special reference to the problem of pure groups], 69-97.
- Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik* (143, 6, and 144, 1, Juni und Juli 1936).—Eraldo Fossati: Untersuchungen über den Produktionsprozess in der Korporativen Wirtschaft [Research into the process of production in the corporative economy], 641-664.—R. Wilbrandt: Erneuerung der Kaufkraft [Rejuvenation of purchasing power], 1-37.—Bernhard Pfister: Englische und deutsche Arbeitsmarktstatistik [English and German labor statistics], 38-46.—Albin Oberschall: Die soziale Struktur der Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei [The social structure of the German element in Czechoslovakia], 75-95.
- Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft* (60, 3, Juni 1936).—Paul Menzer: Die Kategorie der Ganzheit [The category of the whole], 1-18.—Herbert v. Beckerath: Die Vereinigten Staaten und der "New Deal," [The United States and the New Deal], 19-45.—Ernst Günther: Die "gerechte" Arbeitszeit als Ergebnis des Zusammenwirkens von Arbeitsdruck, Bedarfsdruck, und Ergiebigkeit der Arbeit ["Just" hours of labor as resultant of the interaction of the irksomeness of labor, the pressure of demand, and the yield of labor], 63-107.
- Die Tat* (28, 4, Juli 1936).—Ernst Wilh. Eschmann: Weltpolitik nach dem Mittelmeerkonflikt [World politics after the Mediterranean conflict], 241-261.
- Ständisches Leben* (6, 2, April-Juni 1936).—E. Badoglio: Kapitalismus und Ständeordnung [Capitalism and the "estate order"], 63-80.—Georg Eschenburg: Die Potenzenlehre Schellings, I. Teil, 2. Hälfte, [Schelling's doctrine of potencies], 81-115.
- Vierteljahrshefte zur Konjunkturforschung* (11, 1, Teil A, N.F., 1936).—Ernst Wagemann: Das staatswirtschaftliche Prinzip [The principle of state economics], 5-14.
- Volk im Werden* (4, 6 and 7, Juni und Juli 1936).—Hans J. Beyer: Tradition und Revolution in der deutschen Erziehung [Tradition and revolution in German education], 280-289.—Volk und Wissenschaft (—Sonderheft zum 550j. Universitätsjub. Heidelberg) [Folk and science], 370-390.
- Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft* (96, 3, Mai 1936).—Ernst Rudolf Huber: Die Rechtsstellung des Volksgenossen. Erläutert am Beispiel der Eigentumsordnung [The legal position of "folk member": exemplified by property statutes], 438-474.—Hans Thieme: Staat, Forschung und Erfinder [State, research and inventor], 511-524.—Wilhelm Andreae: Gegenstand und Verfahren der Gesellschaftslehre [Object and method of sociology], 525-567.
- Zeitschrift für öffentliche Wirtschaft* (3, 6, Juli 1936).—E. Stoeckle: Die deutschen Gemeinden als Ideenträger öffentlicher Wirtschaft [German communities as exponents of the idea of public economics], 187-188.
- Deutsche Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftskunde* (1, 2, 1936).—Erwin Wiskemann: Die Wirtschaftskunde in der neuen Wirtschaftswissenschaft [Descriptive economics in recent economic science], 164-177.¹

¹ Dr. Meuter calls attention to the fact that many brief translations of titles in current German periodical literature are bound to be inaccurate because they do not do justice to the peculiar coloring imparted the original by the prevailing National Socialist ideology. Those who wish to get at the real "inwardness" of much of current German research must first steep themselves in the appropriate *Weltanschauung*. A good example is the term *Wehrwirtschaft*. No really adequate English translation for this can be found: "militarist economy," "defensive economy," "preparedness economy," etc., all fail to give an adequate idea of the content of the concept.

BOOK REVIEWS

HOWARD BECKER*

Assistant to the Editor

Southern Regions of the United States. By HOWARD W. ODUM. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1936. Pp. xi+664, including extensive bibliography, numerous maps, charts, tables, and index. \$4.00.

The relative independence and distinctiveness which characterized the economy and culture of the South, as well as other sections of our land for a century or more, are fast passing, and in the new order of economic and political development are giving way to a complementary interrelationship among regions that is fast integrating our national life into a completeness and unity never before achieved. While the several sections of our country retain in some measure their distinctive and individualistic characters and aspects, the differences between them are constantly losing their significance, and their bonds are growing constantly stronger.

This book by Howard W. Odum, almost monographic in size and content, undertakes to evaluate and interpret the characteristics and cultural development of the South from the national integral point of view rather than from the detached sectional point of view. The life and activities of the region are considered as a factor in the life and activities of the nation, not apart from them. Sectionalism is minimized, relegated to the minor significance to which it has been reduced by the unifying effects of industry and political expediency of the last quarter-century; regionalism, as one of the phenomena of a necessary totalitarian nationalism in the best sense, is emphasized, accorded the prominence it deserves. The change in point of view is fraught not only with political and economic significance, but with cultural and social implications of major rank. It is the point of view that makes possible national planning.

The book is divided into three distinct parts: Part I presents the composite picture of the South as a region, in twenty brief divisions that discuss all the attributes of the region and its people, its several subregions, its States, and some of its relationships with neighboring sections; Part II which comprises ten chapters aggregating almost four hundred pages, is devoted to a detailed analysis of the regional development of the soil and other resources, the industries, and the culture of the folk of the South; and Part III, about fifty pages in extent, includes the bibliography and list of source materials, acknowledgements and plan of study, the lists and index of maps, charts, and tables, and the general index, those necessary and vital impedimenta that a monographic book such as this must carry.

It is in Chapter IV of Part II that tendency to exaggeration in effect is somewhat in evidence in the phraseology, which neglects comparative values in appraising some of the advantages and resources accruing to the South. "Superabundance of nature's endowment," in the words of the author, constitutes one of the two major pictures of the natural resources, as contrasted with the other, "uses and misuses which have been and are being made of it" (superabundance of nature's endowment). "Natural wealth of the first order" is the characterization of the South. To anyone not a Southerner these terms savor of exaggeration.

It is true, as the author so emphatically claims, that abundance of water is the life-giving essential of any environment; but abundance of water leaches the soils of their fertility, their plant foods, without which the soils of the South, or any other region, can not yield "superabundantly." The author compares the "wealth" of the well-watered South with the "poverty" of the semi-arid West, but a Westerner could just as properly compare the "wealth" of the fertile soil of the High Plains with the "poverty" of the leached soils of the South. Regions of equatorial rainfall like the Congo Basin, with their leached soils, are not one whit more productive or intrinsically "wealthy" than the incredibly fertile soils of the Russian Steppes with their deficiency and untrustworthiness of rainfall. The author ascribes the financial or economic lacks of the South rather to inefficient or defective utilization of its resources than to lack. Probably both are responsible in considerable measure; but the best technique applicable to a leached soil cannot overcome the handicap that relative infertility imposes, even with superabundant rainfall.

Yet the South is blessed, after all, with great measure and variety of resources, and will inevitably achieve a higher standard of living and economic adequacy than it has thus far attained when such disadvantages as accrue to the region are compensated by better planning and production.

All parts of the book are extremely valuable,—in fact, indispensable—to the student and the planner; but it is Part II that is particularly pertinent and serviceable in this period of transitions, readjustments, and planning, more or less without adequate fundamental information, for the security and prosperity of our folk of the future.

It is a notable book for our time. It is well organized, well written, and well presented. It represents scholarly research, national loyalty, and broad humanity. Its physical make-up—type, paper, and binding—are excellent. It should find a place in every library, on every reference shelf.

W. ELMER EKBLAW

Clark University

A Controlled Experiment on Rural Hygiene in Syria. By STUART C. DODD. Publications of the American University of Beirut, Social Science Series, No. 7, 1934. Pp. 336.

This technical study is an important contribution to quantitative sociology. The scientific reader will find Part I, dealing with the construction

of scales to measure rural hygiene, and Part IV, a theory of social forces, an interesting and stimulating treatment. Students of local culture and of medical social work will find Part II, on hygienic status, and Part III, hygienic progress, realistic analyses of seven semi-feudal villages.

In this study, "Hygiene . . . means all the knowledge, practices and environmental conditions which are under the control of the family and which tend to increase health" (p. xii). To measure progress in hygiene it was necessary to measure change in hygiene in the direction desired by the groups undergoing it (p. 209). The first problem was to select an experimental group, the village of Jib Ramli composed of 40 families that received instruction in hygiene from an itinerant clinic of the Near East Foundation from 1931 to 1933 (p. 224). Next, the hygiene of this village was compared with the hygiene of a control group of 40 families in three Arab villages without hygiene instruction. Finally, it was necessary to construct a scale of hygiene that would be a reliable and valid instrument to measure change in hygienic status during the period (Part I). The experimental group was equated with the control group on nine significant attributes as constants: geographic, demographic, historical, economic, religious, domestic, educational, recreational, and sanitary conditions. Therefore any measured hygienic change would probably be due to the one main factor allowed to vary, namely, hygienic instruction. Clearly the instrument devised to measure hygienic change was of utmost importance.

The chief contribution of this study is in the construction of the hygiene scale. A preliminary list of 270 questions was scored on a 1000-point scale with the assistance of nine competent judges who allocated weights. From this list a shorter Form B, of 77 significant questions, was derived (p. 57). Sources of error were examined and shown not to exist as between samples, different informants in one family, different interviewers, and different scorers. Reliability coefficients of $+0.91$ on informants and $+0.94$ on interviewers were found. Validity coefficients were found of $+0.76$ with indices of mortality, -0.53 with mobility, $+0.65$ with longevity, and $+0.81$ with income. Thus standardized, the scale was used to measure the hygiene of each group in 1931 and again in 1933. Differences between the first and second scores measured the change in each group, and comparison of these differences would show the change due to the clinic. The excess gain of the experimental group was not significant. Dodd attributes this to imperfect isolation and hence diffusion of the new hygienic culture patterns from the experimental group to the control group. But may not imperfections in the control factors be an explanation?

As a demonstration of scientific procedure in experimentation by control group technique, this study is not surpassed by any research in the field of sociological literature. It is a brilliant demonstration of experimental method in sociological research.

Dodd's measurements lead to the formulation of a theory of social forces (Part IV) defined in terms of the operations performed. The merit of operationalism is that it provides a definition of social concepts which may be verified by other competent students who follow the same series of

operations. Concepts are thus defined not by words about words about words, but by steps in systematic procedure, each subject to reproduction, checking, and verification. The study also illustrates the misunderstood fact that refined statistical methods have valid use in constructing tools of observation, however limited their use in the analysis of unmeasured social phenomena may be.

F. STUART CHAPIN

University of Minnesota

Young Ward's Diary. By LESTER F. WARD. Ed. by Bernhard J. Stern. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1935. Pp. xi+321. \$3.00.

The curiosity about the formative factors in the life and scientific career of Lester F. Ward has in part been satisfied by the discovery of this diary, covering portions of the years 1860 to 1870. Originally written in French, partly as an exercise and perhaps for the purpose of secrecy, and translated by Mrs. Elizabeth N. Nichols, it sets forth, in a marvellously frank and direct manner, just those things the researcher and student would care most to know. It covers three very distinct periods of Ward's life: (1) Two years as a laborer, school teacher, and student at and near Towanda, Pennsylvania; (2) nearly three years in the Union Army, in northern Virginia and on sick leave; (3) five years in Washington searching for a position with the government, working in the immigration, labor and statistics departments, and as a student in Columbian University.

Through all these years, from the age of nineteen to twenty-nine, Ward was always, first and last, a student. Almost every page in the book, literally, records his student interests and work. His preoccupation at first was with the languages—Latin, Greek, French, German, Spanish, and many more as time went by. Then came mathematics, history, botany, and all the sciences. His student years at Columbian and his work in medicine, law, and science are detailed in the latter part of the book. But perhaps the most interesting part of the diary is the purely personal side—the accounts of Ward as a day laborer, as a lover (one of the most ardent of lovers he certainly was, and his accounts verge closely upon satiety for the reader), as a debater, as a soldier, as a government employee, and as a householder. In all of these relationships he was intensely human, tireless, enthusiastic, and nearly always self-confident. He affords one of the best examples in our history of a poor boy who became great because of strong ambition, ceaseless effort, and wise choices between immediate and long-time pleasures. Not that Ward avoided the lighter and pleasanter side of life. He was never averse to social enjoyment, but he knew when he had enough and he understood relative values. It was this well-balanced judgment which kept him always apart from dissipation and dawdling.

Although Ward the sociologist does not appear in these ten years, it is very significant to note how many of the ideas which later appeared in the *Applied Sociology* were germinating in this early period, finding expression

particularly in the numerous debates and essays of his school days, in which, for example, such questions as those of progress, patriotism, education, and native *versus* acquired ability were discussed. On the whole, however, it is the period of foundation laying. He has not yet found his vocation in life. He is mastering the whole field of knowledge, but it is clear that he is feeling his way toward a sociological insight into the affairs of men. His work, especially that with statistics, brought him closely into contact with Alexander Delmar, also a government employee, and some other investigations lead us to believe that it was from Delmar that he received his Social Science orientation, which soon after became sociology. But even Ward does not at this period have insight into what is going to develop in him during the eighteen-seventies. It is also the period of his life with "Lizzie," than whom there never was better helpmeet and companion, if we can believe his own record—and why not believe it? Through all these years his preoccupation with money—money—is constant and overwhelming. It is not a miserly interest, but a perpetual struggle for the means wherewith to live, learn, and grow. Economic interpretationists should not slight this diary.

Dr. Stern has rendered a valuable service in bringing this document to light. It is, however, regrettable that he did not document more generously his own observations on the diary and his connecting explanatory remarks. Reading the diary while resident in Washington in the summer of 1936, we have found it interesting to trace somewhat Ward's changes of residence here, and to contrast what the city must have been in 1865-1870 with what it is now.

L. L. AND J. S. BERNARD

Washington University

Asylum. By WILLIAM SEABROOK. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1935. Pp. xiii+263. \$2.00.

Man the Unknown. By ALEXIS CARREL. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1935. Pp. xv+346. \$3.50.

Why Keep Them Alive? By PAUL DEKRUIF in collaboration with Rhea DeKruif. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1936. Pp. 293. \$3.00.

The Next Hundred Years: The Unfinished Business of Science. By C. C. FURNAS. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, for Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, Maryland, 1936. Pp. xiv+434. \$3.00.

These books are reviewed together because they all deal with man's struggle to make adequate adjustments to his wilderness world. All are skillfully written by men well known in their respective fields; all are worthy examples of the printing art and all except the first are well indexed, the second and fourth exceptionally so, each with over two thousand items.

Dr. Carrel calls for audacity, always audacity, of which he has plenty. Perhaps the reviewer has too much, at least for the comfort of Carrel's ego, because he has listed the books in order of importance to scientific students of human behavior—best last. The standard, simply the reaction of the reviewer's mind to the factual content of the books and the reviewer's judgement of the soundness of each author's interpretation of his data. Of course this is largely subjective, but book-reviewing is like that.

Seabrook entered a New York state hospital because he was alcoholic. He says his story is not fiction but all "straight fact". One cannot question this, of course, but it is permissible to recall that the author is a literary man of the romantic hard-boiled type who has reported many things as fact which cultural anthropologists seriously doubt. His alcoholism was diagnosed as an escape-mechanism from an ego-compulsion to achieve literary fame combined with the gnawing fear that he was "not good enough." His world wandering, rationalized into the quest for literary fodder, was a manifestation of the same thing. When he finally gained some literary notice and enough financial security so he could settle down to serious writing, with no further excuse to run away, he found that all he could do was drink himself to death. This may be a correct diagnosis, but it may also be significant that the psychoanalytic theory that most alcoholism is due to homosexuality is not mentioned. It is argued, correctly, I think, that no alcoholic is cured if he has to be a "teetotaler" after the "cure."

The picture of the hospital is good but one cannot escape the feeling that there is a good deal of literary distortion in the descriptions of both staff and patients. If the author is really cured of his personality deficiencies, perhaps he will now be able to write something "good enough." However, I do not think *Asylum* is it; it is still too Seabrookish, too much like his other books.

Carrel's book is interesting but sadly disappointing. Like other famous physical and biological scientists, Carrel attempts to write about man, the human, without knowing anything about the social sciences. The thin veneer of his biological science scales off into pathetic shreds and patches, exposing the naked hopes and fears and wish-thinking of the man on the street. The Carrel-Dakin Solution is a great boon to mankind, but the Carrel solution of societal problems is mostly pure poppycock, naive speculation, opinionated guess, biological determinism mingled with medieval-minded mysticism, a kind of research-foundation Fascism and superior-manism which sneers at democracy, once again sells mankind down the river of obscurantism and gives aid and comfort to all who are sure there are mysterious spiritistic powers in the universe—because radio is a scientific fact!

My notes contain fifty-eight separate items which would merit negative criticism if space allowed it. This does not exhaust the list by any means. In the preface we are told that everything in the book is a simple statement of facts about man which have been revealed by scientific observation. Here are some random samples of these alleged "scientific facts":

Man is degenerating and the industrial civilization which has caused it must be overthrown; the physical universe is simple but man is complex; natural selection no longer plays its part; if Lavoisier or some other "real scientist" had studied consciousness we probably would not be where we are today; it is nonsense to try to measure social phenomena; men of genius are not tall (Carrel is short); levitation, divine healing, clairvoyance, telepathy, spiritism, and miracles are facts; white men are the hardiest of all races, have superior brains, and a natural immunity to fatigue and fear; in general, athletes are not very intelligent; the religious sense must be ascetic; mystics and poets may reach the ultimate truth; humid, warm climates are fatal to white men; human beings are abstractions, only individuals are real; diseases are not entities but love and hate are realities; only those trained in clinical medicine are competent to study "metapsychics;" everywhere the weak are preferred to the strong; social classes are biologically determined, proletarians and peasants are hereditarily weak; eugenics will enable us to preserve the strong and produce geniuses, now much needed; we cannot judge men, but we should use euthanasia on certain classes; medicine should absorb all the other sciences.

So this pitiable hodge-podge runs on and on. Carrel says his friends persuaded him to write the book; then we must conclude that they did something which will add nothing to the fame of their friend. It is a sad and disappointing thing to see a great surgeon and good biologist so egotistically reveal the nakedness of his soul. When he writes about his specialty, as in the fine chapter on "Adaptive Functions," one must bow in admiration, but when he deals with other matters one also must bow his head—in sorrow.

He says other scientists will probably think his ideas about "metapsychics" are "puerile or insane." He is probably right, and most social scientists will think the same thing about much of his social philosophy. Certainly "there are more things in heaven and earth . . .", but equally certain, there is no present scientific evidence for levitation, telepathy, and spiritism; and still more certainly, there are better methods of exploring the unknown than by clairvoyance, poetry, mysticism, asceticism, and primitive animism.

Carrel deserves no Nobel Prize for this book. It will do incalculable harm for many years to the achievement of a scientific attitude toward social phenomena.

The other two books are sound and valuable contributions and therefore can be mentioned briefly. DeKruif writes with his usual vigor, knowledge and respect for facts, but he has suddenly experienced something akin to a religious conversion. He has realized emotionally what all of us learned in our first course in public health—that millions are sick and die merely because we prefer to spend millions for battleships, chewing gum, and cosmetics rather than for public health; that even with the present wasteful, inefficient, exploitive organization of medicine, people could and probably would keep themselves alive if they had *decent wages and a fair degree of economic security*.

So DeKruif proceeds to show why they die—not because we do not know enough, but because we will not, or cannot, spend enough—and this “enough” is really very little in most cases. The high officials of the AMA who denounce the Cost of Medical Care Majority Report, a few scores of thousands of profit-seeking doctors, all millionaires and politicians should be compelled to read this book once a week for ten years. But the book is not merely a tirade, it is full of concrete cases of how it can be done, and to some slight degree is being done in places like Detroit and Cincinnati, and for babies that happen to come in fours and fives.

Furnas' book is one of the best “popularizing” efforts I have read. He tries to tell what science may do for us when we find out what we do not know, which he vividly shows to be much more than we do know, but, unlike Carrel, he doesn't think mysticism will help us. He debunks eugenics, gives a scientific discussion of life, disease, food, death, insects, synthetics and solvents, what's new in the nucleus, the future of energy, labor saving machines, light, transportation, farming, communication, weather, invention, and Social Consequences. In this latter section, he shows that an able chemist can also be a socially intelligent being; he doesn't want chemistry to absorb all the other sciences; he states that no man should receive a college degree without some academic contact with sociology and economics. The chapters on “The Life of Assurance” and “Leisure Without Lethargy” are worthy of any first-rate sociologist. When chemical engineers begin to write like Mr. Furnas I suppose we should take heart in spite of the occasional Dr. Carrels.

READ BAIN

Miami University

The Method of Sociology. By FLORIAN ZNANIECKI. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1934. Pp. 338.

The work reviewed has one unquestionable value: its author sees the fundamental epistemological problems involved a study of social and cultural phenomena, and tries to meet them squarely. In this sense the book is indeed a treatise on *methodological principles* of sociology and not a mere superficial discussion of so-called “*techniques* of social investigation.” In handling the important methodological problems Znaniecki displays a great deal of expertness, concentrated thought, and independent judgment. For all these reasons, the work is a valuable contribution to sociology and deserves to be studied carefully.

Its main deficiencies are two: first, the author leaves undeveloped and somewhat vague what appears to me the most fundamental conception of his theory; second, starting on a right road, he does not go along that road as far and as consistently as he should go. The most important principle of Znaniecki's methodology is that of the “closed system.” So far as I can grasp its meaning, it is a sound principle unavoidable in a study of social and cultural phenomena. Unfortunately, the author does not define clearly what he means by it. In his work he styles as “closed systems” everything

beginning with the vastest cultures, and ending with the smallest cultural trait, like a letter of an alphabet or a note in a musical score (see for instance pp. 14 ff., 76 ff., 101 ff.). Thus practically everything becomes a "closed system." Under such an unlimited and indiscriminate extension of the concept, it loses any definite meaning, and all the superstructure of Znaniecki's construction built upon it becomes shaky. If he had defined it better and limited its meaning, the concept of a "system" would have served much better and would have made the construction of the author more valid than is the case. (In passing, I must note that Znaniecki wrongly ascribes to me the denial of the scientific necessity of the principle of "circumscribing" and "closed system." On the contrary, as is shown in my forthcoming work, the principle of integration—somewhat similar to Znaniecki's "closed system"—is one of the leading principles of social study and has always appeared to me to be such.)

As to the second shortcoming, it resides in the fact that the author does not go as far as is necessary along the road of building sociology as a discipline with its own frame of reference quite independent of and fundamentally different from the principles of the natural sciences. He rightly stresses the difference between the natural and the social sciences. But when he tries to carry on a delineation of sociology as such an independent discipline, he falls short of the goal. What he factually builds is a sociology patterned along the line of the natural sciences. These remain for him the supreme pattern for imitation, the supreme judge and authority. All his factual discussion is permeated by this attitude. As a result, his analysis is marked by hesitation and frequently by self-contradiction. For instance, he rightly pleads for referential principles of sociology independent from those of the natural sciences. But when he attempts to develop such principles, as in the case of "non-spatial extension" (pp. 75 ff.)—or "social space," as I style it—he falls back upon the spatial principles of the natural sciences. The same inconsistency is shown in his discussion of sociological realism, conceptualism, and nominalism (pp. 52 ff.); sociological "psychologism" and "phenomenologism" in the Husserlian sense (pp. 40 ff., 104 ff.); the problem of continuity and identity of social and cultural systems (pp. 79 ff.); and, finally, the problem of sociology as a science (pp. 104 ff.).

Everywhere the author stops halfway in the "purgatory" between the "paradise" of sociology as a "natural," "inductive" and "empirical" discipline, and the "inferno" of sociology as a logico-philosophical "speculative" discipline. The result is often unsatisfactory. This is particularly noticeable in Znaniecki's definition of sociology. The four fields which, according to the author, are the fields of sociology as an independent science hardly compose a logically united system in which one field demands the others. They are cut rather mechanically, in a somewhat incidental way. Now that the new work of the author is published (*Social Actions*, N. Y., 1936) in which one of the four fields is supposedly studied sociologically *in extenso*, this conclusion becomes still more valid. *Social Actions* may be a good treatise in psychology, education, and what not, but it is not "pure sociology" in the least. That this has occurred is quite comprehensible:

the "halfway position" leads usually to such results. To repeat, Znaniecki's work is to be welcomed for its departure from imitation of the natural sciences and for its thoughtful discussion of fundamental sociological problems. But it is regrettable that he did not follow this road to the very end.

In spite of the above shortcomings, the work is refreshing, and stands far above many recent publications in the field of "the techniques of social investigation" wrongly identified with the methods of social study.

PITIRIM A. SOROKIN

Harvard University

Alma Mater, The Gothic Age of the American College. By HENRY SEIDEL CANBY. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1936. Pp. xiii + 259. \$2.50.

This is the sequel to "The Age of Confidence" and is intended as an easy picture and interpretation of a phase of American institutional life. Based on the personal observations and experiences of the author as an undergraduate at Yale in the eighteen-nineties, it is now enriched by the perspective he has gained through nearly forty years of interpretative study of American society. It may be called properly an essay in descriptive sociology, based on the general observational method, with some use of the historical. Each of the ten interestingly written chapters takes up a section of the life of the college and its town at the stage of their development when Canby was an undergraduate.

The town and its people he paints impressionistically and vividly, and I think truly. To the town the college was an economic asset—its college—and a nuisance. The college was just then outgrowing the town and asserting its independence. It already had a life of its own. It was in fact a big fraternity; nay, it was two fraternities—one for the students and another for the faculty, the latter ruled over by stiff dowagers who dispensed strict rules for social climbing as self-protective as the laws of the Old Men among the Australian blackfellows.

Education, too, was undergoing a great change. From being classical and formal—mental training stuff—it was being transformed, gradually, into an interpretation of modern life. Education was coming to be looked upon as a means to adjustment instead of as a process of polishing and painting—and always of mental training. The college itself was growing into a university—thanks to the aid of the numerous shekels now beginning to flow in from loyal and prosperous alumni—and professional and graduate schools threatened to challenge the social supremacy of the college. The faculty were beginning to awaken from their isolated sleep of centuries and to come out into the open day of a modern world very different from the protected one they had been brought up in. Some of them, like "Billy" Sumner, mixed a strong personal interest in the students with a sincere effort to introduce them to the real problems of their age. Teaching threatened to rise from a dumb drivel out of a textbook, with a mere pretense at formal scholarship,

to the level of an earnest interpretation of the modern world. Even philology made way for emotion and realistic intellectual analysis. A curriculum that had been primarily an escape from reality, in league with a college life equally an escape from the hard knocks of a dynamic world, was beginning slowly to develop toward a challenge—in fact, toward a double challenge: to the student to buckle on his armor, and to an old social order outside that must now undergo the onslaught of increasing thousands of young men turned loose with ideals for battle-axes and bereft of their impeding long garments of tradition which formerly had enshrouded them.

The alumni in a sense owned the college, at least during commencement time, when they returned to it hilariously and yet trustingly, as the fabled schizophrenic seeks to return to the mother's womb. But most of these alumni were no schizophrenics; they were stout men of battle in a turgid world of getting and having. Yet they loved at such times to drop their struggles and come back to the sheltering arms of Alma Mater. Such an occasion was the wily president's opportunity, and then and there he reaped a golden harvest for the sake of the new university which he described to them in terms of golden eulogy.

Although this was indeed an age of transition in the American college, the author would not have us suppose that it was formless and void. The college of his day—this protected state within a state, where newer and better ideals were born—made, he assures us, stout hearts and strong minds; and from these has come in the main the world as we know it. Alack that it is no better! For my part, I like his picture somewhat better than his interpretation, but both are brilliant and readable and good.

L. L. BERNARD

Washington University

Umschichtungen in den herrschenden Klassen nach dem Kriege. By ROBERT MICHELS. Stuttgart, Berlin: W. Kohlhammer Verlag. 1934. Pp. vi+134. RM 6.80.

This study by the well-known sociologist who—a German by birth and training—taught in Switzerland and Italy for thirty years, shows all the characteristics of this prolific writer. (An *In Memoriam* for Michels, by Prof. Dino Camavitto, appears elsewhere in this issue.) Michels had a special ability to pick up burning problems in modern economics and political science. This holds true of his studies on the psychology of the anti-capitalistic mass movements, on the history of Socialism and Fascism in Italy, on patriotism, on eugenics, and last but not least, of his work on political parties in which he developed the thesis of oligarchic tendencies even within the socialistic and democratic parties.

His latest work centers upon the most urgent problems of social mobility in our changing society. His book is based upon the doctrine of the permanent existence of a ruling class in every social and political structure. It

makes its task the examination of the economic, intellectual, and political elites and their interrelations, with special emphasis on changes and upheavals in the recent war and post-war periods. The enumeration of the discussed topics alone is proof of the compass of his investigation. He deals with the theory of class structure and the circulation of elites, with the strange fluctuation of the economic upper stratum and the changes in the social origin of leading personalities, university professors and students, with the influence of women's emancipation and the claim to power of modern youth, with the Bolshevistic attempt to build up a classless society, and with general tendencies in post-war times. His statements are substantiated by ample quotations, especially from German, French, and Italian literature. This fact makes this book, like the author's earlier studies, a mine of source material, just as his critical remarks on statistical methods are most stimulating for further studies.

That this book is nevertheless disappointing can be explained only partly by the fact of Michel's radical change in his political convictions, from Socialism to Fascism. It sometimes colors his judgments; it even betrays him into using short-circuits in his analysis of the complex problems of social stratification. The real defect of his work, however, seems to arise chiefly from the failure to analyse strictly his abundant materials and to reach a conclusive synthesis—a fate which Robert Michels shares with many disciples of his great master Max Weber, who himself combined comprehensive knowledge with an astonishing faculty of systematization.

It may have been too ambitious to deal with a topic of such wide scope in a small volume. Even central problems, such as the influence of the war on the post-war society, and the rise of Fascism, are touched on but slightly. As an introductory study in this field, however, Michels' work deserves the special attention of American social and political scientists.

SIGMUND NEUMANN

Wesleyan University

World Immigration. By MAURICE R. DAVIE. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936. Pp. x+588. \$3.75.

Human Migration. By DONALD R. TAFT. New York: Ronald Press, 1936. Pp. xxvi+590. \$4.00.

Some five or six years ago, an eminent sociologist predicted that the writing of a textbook dealing with immigration problems would be a hazardous undertaking for any author, since the subject was becoming increasingly one of historical rather than of current interest. At a graduate school (other than the one represented by this teacher) the requirement that students take a course in immigration problems was being waived since there was only passing interest in the problem. These statements were made in face of the fact that this country is still largely alien in its recent ancestry and still offers the best laboratory in the world for the study of ethnic contacts and assimilation. The recrudescence of race prejudice and

nationalism was unforeseen—at least as a movement having its repercussion here and awakening widespread interest in peoples and folk groups.

Within the last three years there have appeared no less than six splendid books which are sociologically sound in their approach and which augur a new standardization of teaching in this field. Even standardization and the use of textbooks are to be welcomed when they definitely replace ill-conceived “information” and bad handling of a problem. The treatment of race and ethnic relations falls into this category. Together, these two books serve well to guide students in this field, as well as teachers who come unprepared, as so many of them do, into the field of college teaching in general, and in the area of ethnic relations in particular. For those who have been teaching in this field without adequate texts, these books will make unnecessary the cumbersome accumulation of files, notes, references to the extensive original sources upon which these authors, and all courses in this field, have necessarily drawn.

Both authors borrow gratefully from Fairchild's *Immigration*, for many years the outstanding text on the subject, and refer to the more recent texts by Guy Brown and Donald Young. In his carefully annotated bibliography Professor Davie counts these among the best. Both authors treat the problem as one of world immigration or human migration in general. (This particular approach was suggested, I believe, some ten or fifteen years ago by a national research committee which laid the plan for a series of studies in human migration.) But both books deal primarily with immigration to the United States and with the problems arising from that vast migration. The book by Davie is encyclopedic in its factual detail; it contains valuable tables, charts, maps, some reproduced in their original form, others brought up to date and edited. Professor Davie begins his volume by analyzing the facts of immigration during the Colonial period, follows the familiar sequence of events, discusses adequately the history of immigration and of immigration policy, the problems of immigrant adjustment, Americanization, naturalization and assimilation. He includes a chapter on migration to the British Dominions, and another on migration to Latin-American countries.

Professor Taft begins by discussing immigration in the light of population problems; he discusses the distribution of mankind, the uneven distribution of economic and of cultural opportunity, the relation of these to migration, the significance of social contacts and other sociological problems which arise out of migration, and the redistribution of population. The text by Professor Taft is more nearly a discursive treatment of the subject. The facts which are obviously at the author's disposal are incidental to a series of questions intended to stimulate the student to inquire into the problem. We are grateful for the fact that the stereotyped categories of old and new immigration appear only casually, and then not until the book is well on its way. The book justifies its sub-title, “A Study of International Movements,” by the inclusion of chapters dealing with Chinese migration in general, with Polish migration to France; it includes a description of international agencies and methods of controlling immigra-

tion. The table of contents indicates an exceedingly well thought-out and most interesting approach. The material is there, the author shows familiarity with the numerous agencies which deal with the realistic problems of adjustment. His best effort is impeded by a conscientious attempt to keep the book on a student plane.

Both volumes throw light on the development of sociological thought during the past decade. Much water has passed under the bridge since sociologists began to think through and to offer courses in race relations. The vocabulary and the conclusions are distinctly those of the 'thirties. Though both books could readily be used for sophomores, a few sociological tools are necessary for facile reading. Davie's book is the weightier one; it is a complete reference work on the subject with extensive and carefully annotated bibliographies suitable for the more mature student as well as for the undergraduate.

Factually correct, inclusive, replete with information, references, and careful bibliographies, these two texts release those other sociologists who are interested in ethnic relations for new adventures and new approaches—for the study of sociological processes which are of vital moment to our society.

BESSIE BLOOM WESSEL

Connecticut College

Alien Americans. By B. SCHRIEKE. New York: Viking Press, 1936.
Pp. xi+208. \$2.50.

Dr. Schrieke, while in Java in 1933, was invited by the Board of Trustees of the Julius Rosenwald Fund to come to this country to make a study "of Negro life and education." This choice, he tells us, was deliberate: "Although the problems the Board wished me to study were entirely foreign to me, since I had never visited the United States nor had I ever met an American Negro, the Board regarded these handicaps as an advantage, as a guarantee of unbiased opinion" (p. vii).

One regrets that Dr. Schrieke has not utilized the opportunities offered to him. He has turned them to a disadvantage by becoming definitely prejudiced, a state of mind which he acquired by reading widely but not well. In many cases he missed the best and most representative works, if one is to judge from the opinions he expresses and from the inadequate bibliography of six pages. He accepts, for instance, "the already existing opinion about (the immigrant's) inherent tendencies to squalor, crime, and vice" (p. 76). It is true that the immigrant of the pre-war days had "to seek refuge in the socially disorganized districts, the congested slums, the sordid haunts of deterioration and demoralization," characterized by "venereal diseases, juvenile delinquency, and crime spread." But the author has obviously failed to read the standard works on this problem which discard any such "inherent tendencies" of the immigrant. Such assumptions belong to the older field of psychology and not to our modern sociological research. Does the author know what groups are most responsible for crime

in America? A study of the nativity of 3,000 male offenders now in custody in the state prisons and reformatories of New Jersey yields the following picture: native-born of native parents . . . 21.2 per cent; native-born of foreign parents . . . 36.2 per cent; foreign-born . . . 14.3 per cent; and Negro . . . 28.3 per cent.

As indicated above, the author's introduction states that he was invited to study "Negro life and education." But only two chapters (V-VI) are definitely devoted to that problem. The rest cover the problems of the Chinese and Japanese in California, Mexicans and Indians, America and the alien, Filipino immigration, and the problems of prejudice and progress. By trying to cover so much, the author has weakened, if not denied, his whole thesis. He describes his term "alien" as follows: "The primary attitude displayed by an ordered society towards the alien is one of distinct animosity, of contempt" (p. 70). He quite obviously exaggerates some of the social processes pertaining to our racial and immigrant relations. The Negro, the Indian, and the members of the "older" immigration are, sociologically speaking, more or less an integral part of American culture (if one may use this term), and the "newer" immigration is rapidly becoming so. Our culture is not actually a specific "American" culture, but an amalgamation of heterogeneous cultures of these groups—termed "aliens" by the author. It is true that some Americans may have the "primary attitude of contempt" for our "alien" groups. This is expressed in our immigration policies, in the Americanization movement, in the modern Ku Klux Klan. But if this "contempt" is magnified in the case of some of our racial and immigrant groups, that does not mean that we do not have today a number of groups which have been propounding "cultural pluralism." One hears of Professor James Weldon Johnson, a Negro scholar, being appointed to the faculty of New York University. Shall we deny that such "aliens" as Dr. Hrdlička, Professor Pupin, Professor Paul R. Radosavljevitch, Josef Steinmetz, Meyer Guggenheim, Joseph Pulitzer, Helene Modjeska, Joseph Urban, Walter Damrosch, and others, whether living or dead, were and are not a part of American culture, toward whom there is no attitude of "distinct animosity, of contempt?" We simply cannot agree with Dr. Schrieke's concept that "American society—by a universal lack of natural, spontaneous participation on terms of unconscious fellowship in the manifold activities of a common social life—seems to constitute a loose agglomeration, a mere symbiosis, of many diverse, deeply entrenched, incompatible, and mutually exclusive nationalities separated from each other by the virtually insuperable barriers of an intense particularism" (p. 87). We can grant to Dr. Schrieke that his statement might and does apply to the immigrant of a low cultural, economic and social status and the Chinese, Japanese and Mexican immigrant. But it does not apply to all minority groups of America, and thus the author is guilty of gross exaggerations and generalizations, which cast a naive shadow around his writing which otherwise and in many respects—especially the portions dealing with the Negro—is clear. The volume contains a multitude of inconsistencies—of the type which are the result of trying to fit a perception of preconceived conclusions into a narrow pattern.

The book is also badly organized. Chapter I, for instance, is entitled "The Chinese in California," and devotes eight full pages to Indian wars. The chapter on the Filipinos is placed in the appendix, seemingly for no specific reason.

It is true that the author has excellent descriptive powers and has used them well. But the book is full of pitfalls for the unwary and the uninformed. While the author reveals enough on the positive side of the ledger to create an impression of fairness, he omits much that may reasonably be set up against his conclusions. Readable as are his pages, one is annoyed by the frequent oversimplification and the tendency to obscure the forest through making even the shrubs and undergrowth look like trees. The total effect of such a book is bound to be confusing.

All in all, the author has missed the opportunity of giving us a real contribution. He had a chance to read most of the literature on the subject; he had long conversations with the authorities on this problem in this country. All doors appear to have opened to him; every facility seems to have been at his disposal. In the end, he has been overcome by the mass and intricacy of his own material.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

New York University

The Sociology of Population. By BENOY KUMAR SARKAR. Calcutta: N. M. Ray-Chowdhury and Co., 1936. Pp. viii+139. Rupees 3.

In this book, which bears the sub-title, "A Study in Societal Relativities," Professor Sarkar, whose literary output has been voluminous during the last two decades, has presented an elaboration of materials contained in his presidential address to the Sociological Section of the First Indian Population Conference (Lucknow, February 3-4, 1936) which was entitled, "Open Questions and Reconstructions in the Sociology of Population."

After having stated on the title page that the book is written with special reference to optimum, standard of living, and progress, the author opens with a short discussion of schools of sociology. Sociologies, from Comte to Durkheim, are untenable today. The "system" of Duprat is most acceptable among contemporary offerings, and "anthropology (history) is the key or the foundation, politics the goal, and psychology the very being, of sociology." Pages five to thirteen, only, are devoted specifically to a discussion of the sociology of population. The rest of the book deals with population in India.

The inclusion of population problems in systematic sociology is championed on the ground that "population is a complex legion of *soziale Beziehungen* and *soziale Gebilde*" (p. 6). Urbanization and colonization are the results of "population movements": natural, including births, deaths, and growths; and artificial, such as emigration, immigration etc. These "are social relations or social processes." Villages, cities, states, etc. can be studied as social forms. The "controversies in population sociology" which are

reviewed are for the most part no longer regarded as controversial in Euro-American works. It is enough to say that Sarkar's conclusions are consonant with prevalent contemporary scholarly expression on the eugenic treatment of class and caste problems, differential fertility, and economic, religious, political, and other forms of determinisms.

The rest of the book is devoted to a presentation of conclusions about population growth and density in relation to standard of living and "progress," with specific reference to Indian data, and more particularly to the facts as they appear to emerge from a study of the province of Bengal. While stating that "progress is relative" he argues for general progress independent of race and place, as the "new" races replace the "old." With reference to India he concludes that: the "optimum" is an elastic category, being essentially a question of standard of living and efficiency; the standard of living in India is improving; over-population is relative and should be studied in connection with single regions and specific classes; India does not face a general food shortage, but rather needs to be concerned about the surplus and over-production; India is being industrialized slowly but surely, having reached the stage of industrialization achieved in the United States a century ago; the Indian diet is not less efficient than European diets; limitation of population growth is not necessarily a factor in prosperity; the "old" races are supplanted in the circulation of the elites; a class system comparable to that found in the industrialized and commercialized countries of the West is arising in India; the Bengali religion is affecting India much as did the leaders in the philosophy of pan-Germanism during the period from Herder to Humboldt; "neither the poor nor the 'young' (or the unknown) can be postulated to be dysgenic *en masse*;" and the possibilities of "progress" are assured for *mankind* even if the "old" races may decline.

One gets the impression, from the extent and tone of the relatively over-long disquisition on the significance of the Bengali religion of world-conquest as it relates to the rise of a depressed people, that the author is rationalizing under the scourge of an inferiority complex. It is regrettable that this otherwise readable and informative little book is marred by special pleading and a literary style which, in the section dealing with religion, is anything but scientific (*e.g.*, p. 122).

There are six charts showing birth and death rates and growth curves for India and for seven nations, all European except Japan. The work is copiously documented and has adequate name and subject indexes. It may not be hypercritical to point out an apparent neglect to copy-edit the manuscript. Several sentences are structurally inept and phrases employed in the original paper, appropriate only to the occasion of its reading, have not been deleted.

The Sociology of Population has value for Occidental readers who are interested in the population, economic, and sociological data the author has assembled for India and Bengal. The sections on industrialization and the changing classes are significant contributions.

D. B. ROGERS

University of Pittsburgh

Education and the Social Conflict. By HOWARD DAVID LANGFORD.
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936. Pp. xxviii + 210. \$1.75.

In keeping with its aims "to promote scholarship in all fields related to the education of teachers and concerned with the advancement of public and higher education," Kappa Delta Pi grants a biennial research award to that study which is considered by judges to be the best report on a specified topic. The volume under review won such an award for its report on the problem: "What Educational Program Will Best Meet the Needs of Our Developing Social and Economic Situation?"

Dr. Langford sees three major tasks of modern education: (1) "transmitting information and skills . . . , subject-matter selected as representing the most valuable experience of the race" (p. 12); (2) "the problem of securing the rounded development of the . . . individual" (p. 2); (3) "the problem of releasing the human forces destined to sweep away the present inequitable system of social machinery and to build a new social system, designed to serve the essential human interests of all . . . , the problem of helping the masses to create for themselves a more human, a more educative social order" (p. 14). Obviously he takes in much more territory than is usually allotted to the field of educational tasks! It is to the "third problem" that the author devotes his major attention. He considers the Seven Cardinal Principles of Education one by one, and aims to show that their realization is thwarted by our capitalist culture. He also devotes careful attention to a recent significant volume (Kilpatrick *et al.*, *The Educational Frontier*. New York: Appleton-Century, 1933), and accuses the authors of occasional confused thinking in their expressed hopes for bringing about "an abundant cultural development" without disturbing those forces which he sees as inevitably inconsistent with such abundant life.

Alfred Lawrence Hall-Quest, general editor of Kappa Delta Pi Research Publications, gives an able summary and comment in an extensive foreword. However, in his studied efforts to balance the author's point of view, he makes a few questionable statements, as in his efforts to explain away the distinction between laborers and capitalists in the United States (p. xvi); and in his observation that "the author inveighs against 'democracy' and Fascism" (p. xvii). This reviewer must report that the author admittedly sounds an alarm against *Fascism*, and against all other forces which he (the author) considers to be reactionary and opposed to the interests of the masses of the people for whom he believes the school should operate. But one searches in vain for invectives against *democracy*, which the author describes as both a goal and a method (p. 95):

It (democracy) may mean equal opportunity for all to use and to enjoy the good things life, material and cultural, that is, democracy as a goal. Or it may mean equal opportunity for all to participate in working toward this goal, that is, democracy as a method.

He devotes many pages throughout to the need for an ever-wider democracy for the masses of people, and to a discussion of the well-known limitations now existing on democracy.

As to the value of this volume for the sociologist and the educator, one can highly commend its stimulating analysis, however much one may disagree with the author's positions on controversial points. The reviewer cannot improve upon the statement of the editor (p. x):

The present volume is a scholarly exposition of a widely known social philosophy (*i.e.*, radicalism). The educational implications of this philosophy, however, may not be clearly understood by educators and teachers whose many duties afford but little time for the study of social theory. It is vitally important that everyone devoted to the welfare of American education understand how social theory does affect the purpose, content, and method of the school, and how a radical social philosophy, in particular, seeks to harness the educational forces of the nation in behalf of a radical reconstruction of the social order.

ELLEN JENSEN NEWMAN

Washington, D. C.

Experimental Pedagogy. By W. A. LAY. Translated by Adolf Weil and E. K. Schwartz. With an introduction by Paul Rankov RADOSAVLJEVICH. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1936. Pp. x+371. \$2.25.

The contributions of Dr. Lay to experimental pedagogy is unique, and hence we must greet the first English translation of this small book. In a nutshell, the "experimental education" of Lay tends to lead to *Weltpädagogik* (world-wide education) or *Gesamtpädagogik* (whole or complete, universal education); thus modern pedagogy is a *bio-communal* education, that is, a science of education which sees the individual and his human associations, from beginning to end, as members of a bio-community (*Lebensgemeinschaft*), and it extends through value-conforming activity of the spiritual life, interrelating nature and society in order that both may naturally perfect one another and that the life of spirit may dominate the life of nature.

We can see the sociological approach of Lay by summarizing his principles (according to Radosavljevich): (1) Do not test, but teach properly; (2) do not remedy or correct, but prevent; (3) do not consider the child as the center of the curriculum, but the human being; (4) provide first for proper stimuli (impressions) so that the responses (reactions, expressions) may be brought about through insight (mental assimilation, intellection); (5) teach rather than judge; (6) inspire and arouse curiosity rather than have the pupils perspire by stringing credits minus education; (7) work is representation and representation is expression, an outer act which together with mental assimilation (insight) and observation (impression) forms a psychogenetic unity.

It seems to the reviewer, however, that the introduction by Dr. Radosavljevich is more valuable than the translation of Lay's work. This introduction of 125 pages really surveys the whole field of experimental education and evaluates critically numerous American and foreign contributions to this field. The erudition of this Serb-American scholar is little short of astounding; not only works published in minor European countries but

also in Asia and South America are noticed. It is, indeed, a contribution based on wide research, which corrects many minor errors of other writers and presents a clear and straightforward picture of its subject. It is true that it is a presentation only for the specialist in the field of experimental education; it is packed with names of people and of books, and with facts, and it has to be read slowly and carefully to get its full meaning. But it has its own peculiar vigor, and it is certainly the most exhaustive and authoritative presentation of the subject, so close to the field of educational sociology, that has appeared in English—or in any other language known to the present reviewer, for that matter.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

New York University

Elements of Social Psychology. By HERBERT GURNEE. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1936. Pp. xi+467. \$2.50.

Social psychology, as every sociologist knows, was first developed by the social science people as a means of interpreting social processes with the aid of psychology. For a long time the psychologists shied away from it, preferring to develop their subject in the direction of biology rather than toward sociology. While several texts with the sociological slant were appearing, only two social psychologies from the psychological viewpoint—those by McDougall and Allport—won any noteworthy recognition. But now that the psychologists have gained administrative control of social psychology in many universities—mainly because “social” is an adjective and “psychology” is a noun—the psychologists themselves have begun, under publisher stimulus, to produce a considerable number of texts. The title at the head of this review belongs to the exhibit, and may be counted among the better of those with the psychological emphasis.

This text illustrates quite well the preference of the psychologists for the biological over the sociological interpretation. That is, of course, a matter of their training. Many psychologists have not yet gone west of the Hudson, *i.e.*, they have not discovered sociology. Gurnee gives many anonymous evidences of having made excursions into this land, but he has left almost no landmarks to show where he has been. In chapters xi to xiv, inclusive, he crowds together many observations and generalizations regarding group behavior, crowds, leadership, social misconduct, art standards and appreciation, and religious phenomena. These are but fragmentary, however, in comparison with his treatment of the individual, his learning processes, motivations, motions, temperaments, personality traits, language, suggestion, and social attitudes. There is a very good chapter on methods usable in social psychology, but there is no marked connection between this chapter and the rest of the book. He defines the field of social psychology as the study of adjustment behavior, as do the behavioristic sociologists. The chapter on learning is excellent. He treats motivation like a denatured instinctivist, which I think he is, having been formerly a student of McDougall, to whom he often refers, but mainly without point. He fights shy

of the term instinct, but is careful not to commit himself. The chapters on emotion and temperament are moderately good, that on language better, and those on suggestion and social attitudes rather mediocre.

The book as a whole lacks "grasp" or breadth of vision and is much better in details than in its general outlook upon the field. This is perhaps a general criticism to be applied to social psychologies written from the individual psychology point of view. They have not learned to see psycho-social processes very well. The two Allports, Binet, Freud, Katz, May, McDougall, and Thurstone are most frequently cited. Even Bergson, LeBon, Tarde, and Trotter come in for mention in the text. But Faris, Folsom, Krueger, Reckless, Brown, Bernard, Ross, and Young do not appear in the index. Yet there is very definite evidence that material and viewpoint from some of these writers have been used. Such omissions are, however, the general rule among psychological writers of social psychologies. I formerly believed that they were due to a sort of intellectual and laboratory snobbishness on the part of the psychologists—and in some cases they may be—but I now believe that they are usually the result of an inadequate knowledge of the whole field of social psychology. Whereas the sociological writers on social psychology will usually treat the individual as well as the collective aspects of the subject, and meticulously give credit to psychologists and to social scientists alike, the average psychologist is frequently so uncertain of the relative merits of the social scientists that he is afraid to risk citing any of them. Consequently he merely uses their material and says nothing about it. In the final chapter on religious activity the author's lack of familiarity with the social science field is made particularly manifest. He treats religion almost wholly as a subjective and mystical phenomenon, whereas the trend since Durkheim is predominantly toward the social and collective emphasis.

L. L. BERNARD

Washington University

The Natural History of Mind. By A. D. RITCHIE. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1936. Pp. viii+286. \$4.50.

This book is the outcome of the Tarner lectures delivered at Trinity College, Cambridge. The psychologist, who remembers that in 1925 C. D. Broad's book on the mind had the same origin, should not grumble that twice within a fairly short time two men have been selected to speak on a psychological subject neither of whom is a professional psychologist, the first being a philosopher, the second a chemical physiologist. Rather should they be interested in finding out how their problems present themselves to men in related fields, and if my impression is at all representative, they will find Ritchie's contribution very valuable. For this author, far from being dogmatic, keeps the open mind of the scientist without losing his sense of proportion with regard to what science without philosophy can do. And so he attacks a number of important psychological problems which will

sooner or later crop up in any scientific system that goes deep enough, and more particularly in any scientific endeavour to understand living beings. The author is a man of broad knowledge and culture, well acquainted with ancient and modern philosophy and familiar with the main tendencies, if not the details, of modern psychology. His judgments are always well balanced though often expressed with a delightful terseness; and even where the reviewer cannot agree he finds the author's arguments worthy of consideration. He possesses the art of treating a vast material in a comparatively small space without ever becoming either obscure or trivial. Such condensation makes a short summary well-nigh impossible. Hence a very brief outline of the book's plan is all the reviewer can give.

Of the eight chapters only the three last deal with specific psychological problems, the first five providing the framework. The first and introductory one discusses such general problems as matter and mind, and vitalism and mechanism; the second gives an interesting theory of causation, which, though it is very suggestive, nobody will expect to be final. The three next chapters, masterpieces of exposition, deal with subjects close to the author's own work: *Living and Lifeless*, *The Nervous System*, and *The Function of the Brain*. These chapters will be of special value to those who consider a good psychological foundation essential for their work, because these chapters show the inadequacy of that kind of physiology on which behaviorism and kindred psychological systems were built. Of the three psychological chapters the first asks: *What Does Psychology Study?* and gives the answer: *The human individual in all its richness*. And since the object of physiology is considered to be the whole organism as a unit, there is in the author's view no fundamental difference between physiology and psychology, all appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. The next chapter deals with *Sensation, Perception, and Cognition*. "What comes first is not cognition but the germ out of which cognition and all the other processes and their objects develop" (p. 189). Much might be said about the details of this long and interesting chapter, which perhaps does not always do full justice to the more recent developments in this field of psychology. The same is true of the last chapter, *Emotion and Thought*, where the function of symbolization, which indeed has often not received sufficient attention by the psychologists, is given a unique position by the author who says that the process of symbolization and generalization "is perhaps *the* creative intellectual faculty" (p. 271), a view which the reviewer is not inclined to accept.

References to problems of philosophy and scientific method are scattered throughout the book; there are also passages about the social aspect of behavior. The existence of a group mind is vigorously denied, but the book ends with the following sentences: "Is it not nearer the truth to say that the individual minds live, in part at least, where the group mind would live if there were such a thing? They are not only the separate bodies they animate but the social relations they maintain, the science, art, literature and all the other symbols and instruments that make up civilized life—as far as we are civilized."

One of the most significant characteristics of the book is its deep concern with the concepts of value and freedom. Psychology cannot afford to neglect values, and must therefore keep in intimate contact with philosophy. As to freedom, it "always means activity, spontaneity, or internal determination as opposed to passivity, inertness or external determination" (p. 34); but "it is important to remember that freedom has no connection with indetermination nor with our ignorance of how determination comes about and it is not incompatible with prediction" (p. 35).

Anyone interested in fundamental psychological problems will enjoy reading this frank and fearless book and will lay it down with the conviction that it has something to say.

KURT KOFFKA

Smith College

Social Case Recording. By GORDON HAMILTON. New York: Columbia University Press, 1936. Pp. vii + 190. \$2.50.

One does not get a very clear idea either of the major case-recording problems or of their possible solution from this book. There are brief descriptions of present practices in various fields, some reference to trends and some statements about preferred techniques, but little factual material is presented to support the author's judgments. No doubt they are based upon intensive study of actual agency data, but I should like to know how she arrives at her generalizations. She does not tell us how many records were studied, how they were analyzed, what kinds of and how many agencies are represented, and other pertinent facts which would help us to evaluate her conclusions. If such a study were done carefully, one should be able to formulate some standards of "best practice" for various types of agencies.

When there are two types of practice, such as "unit" and "assembled" records, we should like to know which is most prevalent in the various fields, the merits and demerits of each, and which seems to be best. The same is true of such problems as patient and family focus; research, teaching and practice; chronological, narrative, summary, and verbatim records; factual, diagnostic and treatment records, etc. If such factual material were presented, and concrete recommendations made, critics could analyze the facts and inferences (conclusions) derived therefrom and social workers could test the proposed standards (really hypotheses) in actual practice.

Many excerpts from case records are given to illustrate various types of recording. Suppose the author should select 100 examples of "Diagnostic Statements" and 100 "Treatment Evaluation Summaries," eliminate all verbal clues which might identify them, shuffle thoroughly and then have them classified by five trained, experienced social workers. What would be the result? What would be the result if Diagnostic Discussion, Transfer Summary, Closing Summary, Streamline Summary, and Relationship Treatment were included—100 of each? Perhaps to my inexperienced eye all Chinese look alike, but I cannot escape the impression that many of

these records have merely been given a name, that they could equally well be classified in several of the above categories.

Perhaps the book seems confused, inconclusive, and generally unsatisfactory because case recording "is like that." Case work and case recording are arts, fine arts; but few social workers are fine artists. Case records are getting to be like the Ptolemaic and Freudian Systems. They are so bulky, so wordy, so complicated and confused that it is becoming increasingly difficult either to write, read, or understand them. They cost two dollars a page—almost all sheer waste. One is appalled at the terrible and terrifying tomes of chit-chat, obvious triviality, half-baked guesses and pseudo-scientific verbiage existing and accumulating in the files of thousands of agencies. Social workers are so busy writing this stuff that they have no time nor energy left for doing social work, granted that they are capable of doing it—which many of them obviously are not. Many of them might learn something by actual experience, however, if they did not have to do so much case recording and blank-filling-out. It is almost as if the doctor had to "record" each pulse count, each pill prescribed.

Miss Hamilton recognizes this and wisely points out the folly of the "complete" record, the verbatim report, etc. (which are never what they purport to be). Good case recording must be selective, condensed, lucid. Only capable workers can write such records.

Some records must be kept, but they should be largely factual, I believe. They should be diagnostic or treatmental, only in case of conference, transfer and closing; always, they should be very skeletal. If one is capable of doing good social work, one does not need reams of writing about the case; if one is not capable, or has no time, which is one of the greatest causes of poor social work at present, then reams of writing will not help. (These remarks do not apply to research and teaching records, of course.) This is the impression I get from Hamilton's book, but I think she should have made it stronger and plainer. "More and better social work and fewer words—especially written," would be a good slogan for all societers.

On the whole, the book should be read by all social workers, but it is neither a handbook nor a theoretical formulation. There is grave need for a better study of this important subject. A competent bibliography and index are included.

READ BAIN

Miami University

Social Psychology. By ELLIS FREEMAN. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1936. Pp. xii+491. \$2.50.

After a long verbal struggle there are signs that psychologists and sociologists are beginning to present a united front to social psychology. Bear witness to psychologist Ellis Freeman's text on *Social Psychology*, whose main theme could have been composed quite as readily by a sociologist as by a psychologist.

The cultural and social interactional factors in the patterning of behavior are set forth in a convincing way for the student. The points of view of

social anthropology, sociology, and *Gestalt* psychology are welded together very effectively.

Much attention is devoted to the importance of social or group values which give meaning, shape, and direction to human action. Perhaps too much emphasis is put on the role of values in shaping behavior, thereby exposing the author to the risk of oversimplification.

The excellent textual analysis is frequently marred by poorly chosen chapter headings and sub-headings, which reflect a somewhat dubious conceptual overlay. The development of race prejudice, sex irregularities and religious cultism are considered to represent "inferior adjustments socially fostered." The very pertinent analysis in chapter three does not square with its legend—"Individual Psychology, the Frame of Reference for Social Psychology."

Likewise the material in Part III, which really represents applications of the main theme to the economic and social order, suffers from being squeezed into "The Psychology of Some Fundamental Social Values," and could have been made more effective by different treatment and a more thorough acquaintance with sociological writings and researches. Like Allport, Freeman feels compelled to demolish once again the "group mind fallacy," which was relegated to the scrap heap of bad analogies long ago by American sociologists.

WALTER C. RECKLESS

Vanderbilt University

Social Psychology. By RICHARD T. LAPIERRE and PAUL R. FARNSWORTH. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1936. Pp. xii+504. \$4.50.

This work meets my notion of what a social psychology should be, better than any other that has appeared in recent years. Of the three texts in this field which have already seen the light in the first six months of 1936, I consider this to be by far the best. Its unusual excellence is, I think, due to a number of causes, not the least of which is the fact that it pursues a perfectly logical pattern of development. It traces, first, the growth of personality from its biological foundations in the individual organism through its symbolic acquisitions and extensions. Next, it follows with an analysis of the personality in cross section and in its various forms and aspects. It ends, finally, with a functional account of the social situation out of which personality develops. This is essentially the general pattern I adopted in my own text in 1926 and on the whole the plan pursued by Kimball Young in his text in 1930. The use of this approach by the present authors confirms me in my belief that it is the best possible method of attacking the problem of presentation to the student.

The excellence of the authors' approach is matched by the thoroughness and insight with which they have done their work. They have mastered the field of research in social psychology more completely than most of the other writers in the subject, and it is very gratifying to see that they know

what the sociologists as well as the psychologists have done in the science. Perhaps the fact that the book has been written by a sociologist and a psychologist (both of Stanford University) accounts for this happy combination of results from both fields, as well as for the well-balanced mode of treatment they have adopted. They are also highly to be commended for the fact that they have not allowed themselves to be motivated by any narrow sectarian partisanship in the citation of authorities, which (as I have pointed out elsewhere in this journal) sometimes estops the psychologist from recognizing the academic existence of his brother, the poor sociologist. Finally, the book is to be commended for its frankly behaviorist, objective approach to the subject under discussion. It is a scientific work, not a metaphysical apology for a point of view. It is as far away from the old metaphysics and Scotch apologetics and Christian evidences sort of thing as it well could be, without at the same time taking up the cudgels for any mere ism or new unilateral point of view. Social psychology is the study of social adjustment behavior, is the guiding text, and the contents justify the prediction. It is, in my opinion, also a very practical handbook for the class room.

L. L. BERNARD

Washington University

Healing: Pagan and Christian. By G. G. DAWSON. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1935. Pp. ix+322.

"This work is an attempt to consider, in a comprehensive manner, the whole realm of the therapeutic art, as the restoration of perfect soundness to the individual by the avenues of the body, mind and spirit" (preface). Dawson does not consider body, mind, and spirit as separate "departments" of the individual, but as three hierarchically organized levels or planes of Nature, essentially united in the human being. In sickness, therefore, the individual "reacts as an entity to his affliction." And it is erroneous to argue "that as bodily healing is the healing of the body, mental healing should mean the healing of the mind, and spiritual healing ought to refer to the healing of the spirit." This opinion has been "a great loss to the healing art." It must be realized that "the body cannot be adequately treated by physical means alone, nor the mind and spirit by purely mental and spiritual therapeutics."

This emphasis upon the essential unity of the human being and upon disease as a particular state of that unity rather than an entity *per se* is completely in line with most recent ideas in medicine, psychology, psychiatry, and biology. Dawson scrutinizes the history of these ideas and of corresponding healing methods, as they emerge from primitive daimonism and magic, and differentiate, slowly and through much confusion, in the civilizations of Sumerians, Babylonians, Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Jews, the Christian Church, the Renaissance period, and

modern science. There is no reference to the old civilizations of the Far East and to the North European (Slavic, Germanic, Celtic) races—which, in fact, do not occur in Dawson's survey until the Renaissance period. The analysis of the primitive mind is too exclusively determined by the somewhat intellectualistic and individualistic interpretation of Tylor and Frazer, and would have gained from a consideration of such anthropologists as Lévy-Bruhl, Wundt, Preuss, Baldwin, Thurnwald, and others.

On the basis of the above-mentioned concept of sickness, Dawson defines healing as "a method of putting the patient in the right relationship with himself, his fellow men, and his God." Physical healing is healing through material agents; mental healing "appeals simply to psychological laws, without material healing agents, and without any definite God-ward reference." Spiritual healing, as most perfectly demonstrated by Christ, is no magic and no wonder-work, has also nothing to do with Christian Science's erroneous denial of sickness, but "is a name reserved for devotional and sacramental methods . . . which make a direct reference to supernatural beings." While pagan spiritual healing refers to supernatural beings as extra-natural and capriciously interfering with the laws of Nature—Christian spiritual healing refers to the loving power of God, which is imminent in Nature, and to the God-ward trend imminent in human beings. It is redemption and salvation, the most complete and most intense harmonization of the suffering "whichever one of his levels contains the root of his malady." By definition, it is clearly distinguished from psychotherapy; as to its methods and psychological effects, however, Dawson has hardly succeeded in demonstrating this distinction convincingly, particularly in the light of such interpretations of psychotherapy as given by Hadfield, Prinzhorn, Allers, Jung, and others. The rich historical materials, the highly suggestive interpretations, and the *ethos* of the author make the book a valuable contribution to the problem of a synthetic approach to personality and therapy.

WALTER BECK

Boston University

System der Allgemeinen Soziologie als Lehre von den sozialen Prozessen und den sozialen Gebilden der Menschen (Beziehungslehre).

By LEOPOLD VON WIESE. Zweite, neubearbeitete Auflage. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1933. Pp. xvi+671. Paper, RM 24; linen RM 27.

Betriebsführung und Betriebsleben in der Industrie. Zur Sociologie und Sozialpsychologie des modernen Grossbetriebs in der Industrie. By GOETZ BRIEFS. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1934. Pp. x+145. RM 7.50.

Der persönliche Umgang zwischen Führung und Arbeiterschaft im deutschen industriellen Grossbetrieb (vom Standpunkt der Füh-

rung aus gesehen). By ERICH SOMMERFELD. In: Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik. 181 Band. Probleme der sozialen Werkspolitik. Herausgegeben von Goetz Briefs. Zweiter Teil. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1935. Pp. vii+147. RM 4.80.

Versuch über das Wesen der Gesellschaft. By WERNER ZIEGENFUSS. Leipzig: Hans Buske, 1935. Pp. 126. RM 3.

Die Unmöglichkeit der Geisteswissenschaft. By JULIUS KRAFT. Leipzig: Hans Buske. 1934. Pp. 132. RM 4.05.

Gemeinschaft und Einzelmensch. Eine sozialmetaphysische Untersuchung. By EBERHARD WELBY O. P. Bearbeitet nach den Grundsätzen des Hl. Thomas von Aquin. 2. Auflage. Salzburg-Leipzig: Anton Pustet, 1935. Pp. 458.

Contemporary American Institutions. A Sociological Analysis. By F. STUART CHAPIN. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1935. Pp. xvii+423. \$2.75.

Before discussing the second edition of Wiese's *Allgemeine Soziologie*, the book occupying first place in the above list, it seems advisable to devote some attention to Howard Becker's *Systematic Sociology* (1932), for it represents for Americans the effective version of Wiese's first edition as contained in the *Beziehungslehre* (1924) and the *Gebildelehre* (1929). Becker's ambition went farther, however, than simply to translate, for Wiese's line of thought as well as his method could not, by a mere translation, be made as impressive as Becker wished to make it. The matter was one of principle, *i.e.*, to demonstrate to American sociologists—whose attitude toward any systematic theory was, in general, one of distrust and repudiation—how fruitful and necessary exact method was to sociology. For this enterprise Wiese's two books, forming together a system of general sociology, offered the most convincing material. But it only could prove to be effective if it was not merely translated, but transposed, transplanted. Consequently much editing was done, in numerous places American sources were used instead of the German, and quotations from the American were copiously supplied. Moreover, many sections entirely from Becker's pen were inserted (see especially Ch. xxv, §2, "Individuation and population movement," and Ch. xlv, §7, "The development and interaction of the ecclesia, the sect, the denomination, and the cult as illustrative of the dilemma of the church"). The result was a genuine transmutation which made all the original value of Wiese's theory serviceable to the English-speaking world and added Becker's indispensable contribution. (It should be noted, however, that this contribution is sharply limited by the immediate task of "transmutation." Wiese and Becker should not be regarded simply as German and American exponents, respectively, of exactly the same basic theory, for Becker says

in the preface [p. x], "There has been a consistent attempt to refrain from injection of my own point of view." We must therefore examine the writings published under Becker's name alone to gain an idea of what his own point of view may be. This, however, is not our problem at present.)

Even if we disregard the "amplification and adaptation," and concern ourselves only with translation, the least of Becker's tasks, this too was achieved with marked success. Especially successful appears the solution of the specific philological problems. The translation of a sociological term certainly offers the same if not greater difficulties as does that of a poetic phrase. The problem of language and sociology becomes apparent in its entire difficulty to anybody who tries to find equivalent terms for social relationships which exist in an essentially different form or which do not exist at all in the society where the other language is spoken. Take for instance the German words: *Gemeinschaft*, *Geisteswissenschaft*, *Betrieb*, to say nothing of the idiomatic verbal symbols of which the "Frame of reference for the systematics of action patterns" is full (p. 717 *op. cit.*). In this regard Becker really achieved something outstanding.

But the full significance of his achievements became really patent through the second edition of Wiese's *System der Allgemeinen Sociologie* (1933). For not only does Wiese quote with appreciation Becker's *opus*, he also adopts from his own interpreter different important features of presentation, the original author thus becoming an imitator, although in a minor and praiseworthy way. *Few writers can evidence so much objectivity*; Becker is indeed fortunate in having collaborated with a man so devoid of "the paranoia of authorship."

This second, comprehensive edition of Wiese's system is a definite improvement on the first, and should be studied by *all* interested in recent systematic sociology, but it offers no vital alterations. They are not of crucial importance to the system as such, and include partly omissions and partly additions. There has been dropped, first of all, the lengthy tabular classification of social relations, not because it could not stand a scientific test, but in order to make the presentation easier and to avoid the impression of systematic fixation. The principle itself has been retained in the book. There has been also omitted all that is "confessional, subjective." But there has been added besides a valuable historical introduction, an enlarged discussion of the plurality patterns (Becker's novel rendering of *Gebilde*) in the chapter on "State, class, and bourgeois society" (ch. vi, pp. 574 ff.). Added, above all, has been an appendix of three chapters dealing with "Applications and outlooks on related sciences" (pp. 610 ff.). This part undertakes to prove how unjustified is the reproach of formalism against systematic sociology, and to what degree the *Beziehungslehre* has been applied, especially in the study of the crowd, the group, and in analysis of rural plurality patterns. Very instructive and helpful are also the indications in regard to possibilities of application of the *Beziehungslehre* in related sciences, such as law, theory of organization (administration, social welfare, etc.), pedagogy and, especially, the sociology of economics.

Of interest in this connection is Goetz Briefs' booklet, *Betriebsführung*

und Betriebsleben in der Industrie (Management and coöperation in industry). Wiese regards the series of publications edited by the *Institut für Betriebssoziologie und soziale Betriebslehre an der Technischen Hochschule zu Berlin*, of which Briefs was the head, as marking the beginning of an application of systematic sociology to the sociology of industry. Briefs' present book is a conscious attempt to apply methods of systematic sociology to the analysis of the industrial organization (*Betrieb*). Consequently he starts with a definition of the specific sociological conception of industry. To him industry means "purposeful coöperation of human beings, spatially fixed and subject to temporal norms, with a technical equipment," being at the same time, "a point of intersection of those social processes and plurality patterns which originate out of the coöperation of human beings by means of the technical equipment, out of the organized working process, and under the spatial-temporal unity of the workroom." These processes and plurality patterns are conditioned by the "social environment" in which the specific workroom exists, but they also react upon this environment. "Prestige and social rank prevailing 'outside' influence prestige and ranking within the industry," but on the other hand ranking in the industry is "the starting point of certain types of prestige and ranking outside of the workroom. Take as an instance the social importance of the *Generaldirektor*." This basic explanation is of course nothing else but the application of Wiese's formula of social process: $P = A \times S$ (see Becker, *op. cit.* p. 73) to a plurality pattern, "industry" (*Betrieb*). But it becomes particularly useful through the clear insight into the functionality and reciprocal conditioning of the relation between situation (S) and the specific interrelated attitudes constituting the plurality pattern termed "the industry" (A). The use of this formula adds systematic clarity to all other arguments of the book as well. The basic attitude of the worker in the modern industry is shown in a very straightforward manner as being conditioned by the relation of the worker to property and work which is characterized as "alienation" (*Verfremdung*), *i.e.*, the worker has property neither in regard to the means nor to the results of production, and is also deficient in his personal relation to his work and workroom. The dominating conditions are here hierarchy, dependence (which is reciprocal, as the worker needs the factory and the factory cannot do without workers) and distance, all of them phases of processes of domination and submission. Besides these processes there exist processes of affiliation, *i.e.*, the relationships among the workers in and outside the factory which, combined with the attitude of the employer, decide the sociological status of the industry (*Betrieb*).

But besides the clarifying definition of the problems and the thorough observation and analysis of the social processes characteristic of the "social space" of the factory, Briefs wants to give more. He feels the necessity of indicating the way to overcome all the essential disadvantages caused by the afore-mentioned "alienation" of the worker. Here, unfortunately, he does not follow the interests of exact science as much as the demands of the political power which rules the Germany of our day (see chapter on *Der National-Sozialismus und das Problem der sozialen Betriebsverhält-*

nisse). And that makes this part of his argument much less valuable if not completely unacceptable.

To the same degree, unfortunately, the political attitude of the author spoils the book next listed, Erich Sommerfeld's *Der persönliche Umgang zwischen Führung und Arbeiterschaft im deutschen industriellen Grossbetrieb* (The personal relationship between management and men in German large industrial enterprises). This study is intended as an analysis of the situation from the standpoint of the management. It is of interest to us only because it uses for this purpose the methods of systematic sociology, thus giving proof of the increasing application of this system to sociological research. But the booklet is intended to be above all a kind of a handbook for the factory manager, and follows in this regard so exclusively the directions of the actually ruling powers as to be of no value outside the borders of Germany.

We are guided to another territory of science by Werner Ziegenfuss' *Versuch über das Wesen der Gesellschaft* (Essay on the basic nature of society) which although small in size is nevertheless quite significant. The author undertakes nothing short of the formulation of a new basic scheme of the social, with the purpose of throwing light on its basic nature. This, as he maintains, is the only way to clarify the essence of sociology. This starting-point is of course open to question, but the booklet offers more than starting point, for it presents a new systematic outline of the social field. According to Ziegenfuss the social appears in five dimensions and may be placed in four groups of categories. The first dimension is the individual within the "net of relationships" extending between the "closed existence of Nature as such" on the one hand and "Mind" (*Geist*) on the other. The second dimension is characterized by the addition of "social time," signified by "fatality" and "rhythm." In the third there are found the "complex basic plurality patterns." In the fourth we find the "societal structure as a totality"; the fifth, finally, is "human society as a whole in all its changes." The two first categories, are factual and functional, *i.e.*, they correspond to basic forms of the social that build up the structure of society. The factual ones are relationship, group, plurality pattern, whereas the functional ones are action, transition, formation. The last two are categories of modality (society, community, power), and of structure (individuality, personality, totality). These groups of categories are antinomic within themselves, but only the factual and the functional are antinomic as groups. They continually interpenetrate each other, and form the "basic nature" of society. The book is somewhat obscure, but in its systematic portion it is of interest to the sociologist. Whether or not it contributes anything of importance is a relevant question, but that cannot be answered in this short review.

The demand for methodological clarity seems to be the *raison d'être* of another book, that of Julius Kraft: *Die Unmöglichkeit der Geisteswissenschaft* (The impossibility of *Geisteswissenschaft*). It attacks the confusion that has been caused by so-called *Geisteswissenschaft* in German science and proves its logical and factual impossibility. For us the chapter on the

social sciences is of special interest here. It shows methodological clarity and, if not completely new, at least correct definitions. Kraft distinguishes three factors in each social phenomenon ("interindividual phenomenon"): the psychical; the physiological qualities of the participating individuals; and the physical data of their natural milieu. But we have already encountered this in more exact statement in Wiese's book. More interesting is the emphasis Kraft puts on the "mathematicality" of sociology, a principle that has been given special attention by Chapin (see below). Other points (particularly on politics) are clear, but too sketchily stated to cause more thorough examination.

Eberhard Welty's book *Gemeinschaft und Einzelmensch* (Community and individual) presents a peculiar but rather strange attempt to bring Catholic dogma into line with science. It is avowedly based on the doctrines of Thomas Aquinas, and is a "social-metaphysical" research. The book thus classifies itself and it would seem superfluous to speak of it here if it were not for the fact that Welty bases his systematic argument on Wiese's theory (pp. 36 ff., 41 ff., etc.) But when he finally has to choose between exact science and Catholic dogma, he suddenly distinguishes between the "fictive" character of Wiese's and the "real" value of his own Thomistic definition of interhuman relations. As might be expected, it all boils down to epistemology, and Welty casts Wiese aside with this exclamation: "The idea always precedes the transient things of this world." By means of which, in spite of all the sociology, we again arrive in the flourishing Middle Ages.

Much more in accord with Wiese's theory (although probably owing little to his direct influence) is F. Stuart Chapin's penetrating analysis, splendidly conceived and executed with precision, *Contemporary American Institutions*. As "social institutions," utilizing and enlarging the conception of plurality pattern, Chapin defines: "an organized pattern of the attitudes and behaviors of the members of a group that stands out as a configuration against the field of culture. It consists of segments of individuals' behaviors organized into a system, and not of whole individuals or groups. It consists chiefly of customs and traditions, but in some cases material cultural traits are tied into the configuration through the process of conditioning." The social institutions he divides into "nucleated" and "symbolic diffused" institutions. Within the "nucleated institutions," such as church, family, economic, educational and political institutions, he distinguishes four type parts of the structure patterns: (1) attitude and conventionalized behavior patterns of individuals; (2) symbolic culture traits; (3) utilitarian or material culture traits; and (4) a code of language-symbols in which the relations among the three other type parts are described and preserved. In the "symbolic diffused institutions," such as art, mythology, language, ethics, law, and the like, the core trait of property and the identification with a specific locus through property are less pronounced. In the present book Chapin deals exclusively with "nucleated institutions." He analyzes first the political institutions of the local community, which consist

of the local government, the quasi-legal pattern of the party system, and the extra-legal pattern of the invisible government (patronage, bribes, graft, vice, spoils, rackets, crime, and blackmail). Further, the business, the family, the school, the Protestant church, social welfare agencies, and finally, the social institutions of the New Deal as an "example of leadership and planning in a machine age," are analyzed. The method used (given comprehensively in Part V of the book) is thoroughly systematic, and is founded in a most successful manner upon a graphic demonstration which proves to be extraordinarily elucidating and which makes the book an excellent medium of instruction. Of outstanding theoretical importance are, on the other hand, the above-mentioned efforts to examine social relations with regard to measurability and to state their basic characteristics in mathematical terms. Here Chapin takes a road which systematic sociology will doubtless have to follow on its way toward becoming an exact science.

HEINRICH INFELD

New York, N. Y.

Heredity and the Ascent of Man. By C. C. HURST. New York: Macmillan; Cambridge, England: University Press, 1935. Pp. ix + 138. \$1.50.

This little book by the author of *The Mechanism of Creative Evolution* (1932) and *Experiments in Genetics* (1925) represents in brief, clear, readable fashion for the general reader the story of genetics as it bears on the origin, evolution and ascent of man. There is a very interesting exposition of the principles of genetics as found in the lower animal and plant worlds, only incidental reference being made to man. The author discusses "how evolution progresses," "the nature and value of sex," particularly in making genetical analyses, and treats at some length the experimental creation of new species by irradiation. All this seems to me indispensable background material for the undergraduate student of human society. The author has creative imagination enough to see that the new light recently thrown on the mechanisms of inheritance opens up remarkable possibilities for control, certainly over the lower animals and plants, and quite possibly also, in the distant future, over man's reproduction.

Dr. Hurst is frankly concerned with the differential rates of reproduction now characteristic of most Western civilizations, and avows a fear that if it is not checked, it is "bound to endanger the safety of civilization" (p. 120). "Unfortunately," he adds, "the majority of our leaders and rulers are still obsessed by the mistaken notions of the nineteenth century that an extension of education and culture will solve this problem." Most American sociologists will probably dissent from Dr. Hurst's views on this subject. But I believe Hurst is right, in the main, and the majority of American sociologists simply uninformed on the subject. American sociologists are so obsessed with the all-pervading and all-inclusive social influence of social conditioning as to be themselves a problem in social conditioning.

Hurst does not deal much with man. And the discussion of the human bearings of his subject is the briefest and least competent portion of the book. Some portions of the concluding remarks are, indeed, so highly imaginative as to weaken his case; for many will quite rightly dismiss this portion of the book as fantastic. But it would be a pity if such a circumstance led the reader to fail to appreciate its substantial merits, as a popular exposition.

NORMAN E. HIMES

Colgate University

Political Handbook of the World: Parliaments, Parties and Press. By Council on Foreign Relations. New York: Harper and Bros., 1936. Pp. 207. \$2.50.

This is the 1936 edition of a work that has already proven worth while to social scientists. Some seventy-five countries are presented in alphabetical order with information on area, population, ruling government as of January 1, 1936, legislative organ where it has survived the spread of dictatorship, listing of parties with brief and characteristic programs, concluding with a list of publications arranged under political affiliations or interests, where they exist, the proprietor and editor. In this world of pressure-groups and social control, where names are little less than symbols of local and temporary allegiance (the party name of Socialist, for example), this volume fulfills a needed place in aiding self-orientation. In a few isolated instances the handbook gives data on the relative popular strength of the parties in terms of recent elections and, in the case of newspapers, their estimated circulation. But this is not generally found, although presumably such information was just as conveniently available to the editor as the other types of data included in the handbook. But, on the whole, the job of compressing much valuable information on world-orientation into a little over two hundred pages has been exceedingly well done, and thus commends itself to any social scientist interested in the world outside his own order of time and place.

CLIFFORD J. HYNNING

University of Chicago

Elements of Statistics with Applications to Economic Data, By HAROLD T. DAVIS and W. F. C. NELSON. Bloomington, Ind.: Principia Press, Inc., 1935. Pp. xii+424. \$4.00.

Stimulated by the success of the natural scientists, economists and sociologists have worked intensively in the last three decades in the attempt to apply mathematical analysis to their respective fields with equal success. In the preface of the book under review the authors state: "In 1932 the Social Science Research Council appointed a committee to define the place of collegiate mathematics in the social sciences. The report of this committee urged that students of the social sciences be prepared for the study of statistics by a six to nine-semester hour course covering logarithms, graphs, interpolation, equations and forms of important curves, proba-

bility, elements of differential and integral calculus, and curve fitting. The report also suggested that 'illustrations from the social sciences should be used freely, and the concepts and processes should be presented in such a manner as to make clear their application in the social sciences.'"

In the preparation of this book, according to the authors, these recommendations were kept in mind. In order to give the student historical orientation they have included in the first chapter a short outline of the mathematical origin of statistics, beginning with the middle of the 17th century. In addition, Appendix I contains biographical notes on mathematical economists such as Cournot, W. Stanley Jevons, Walras, Pareto, and Edgeworth. The above-mentioned material represents a highly desirable addition to an introductory text on statistics. The value of the first chapter would have been still further increased had the authors seen fit to include a short survey of the development of logic. It is a fact that practically all of the recent introductions to elementary statistics are guilty of this omission, James G. Smith's and P. S. Florence's volumes¹ being noteworthy exceptions. The inclusion of a short outline of the development of the philosophy of scientific method in textbooks captures the imagination and interest of the student, prepares him for the interpretative side of his computations, and assists him in what the German describes adequately by the word *Einführung*.

Elements of Statistics is primarily a volume to be used by students as an introductory textbook, and hence a review must consider in the first place clearness of style, logical sequence of the chapters, and graded presentation of subject-matter.

The twelve sections of the first chapter advance too rapidly to be sufficiently absorbed by the student. For example, item 8 on page 14, entitled "The Classification of Statistical Data," gave the authors an opportunity to present to the student examples of elementary methods of tabulation and classification, leading gradually to tabulations showing distributions broken down into specified class intervals.

The substitution of the term "classmark" for the term "midpoint class interval" is not a happy one; the majority of textbooks rightly use the latter term. The authors state, on page 16, "By classmark or number is meant a value (generally the arithmetic mean of the class limits) which serves to designate the class." On page 18 the figures under the caption classmarks given in the first table represent the midpoints of the class intervals, but on page 22 the authors state, "As a preliminary simplification the original class marks are replaced by a new set composed of the numbers 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, etc." In the table shown on page 23 these numbers are still called classmarks although here the numbers 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 cease to be arithmetic means of class limits! To the student this must be very confusing. The reviewer believes that whenever frequency distribution tables are presented the actual class interval should be shown in a respective column, and in addition a separate column should show the "midpoint class interval." Similarly, when frequency distributions are presented graphically the actual numerical value of the class intervals should be shown in full. Yule, Jones, Czuber, Mills, Chaddock, and others have adopted this type of notation.

The histogram Figure 2 on page 22, based upon the table shown at the top of page 18, implies that half of the first bar of the histogram is located on the negative side, beyond the zero point. Inasmuch as there are no negative commercial paper rates this type of presentation is faulty; by the same token, the cumulative curve

¹ *Elementary Statistics, An Introduction to the Principles of Scientific Methods*. By James G. Smith. New York: Henry Holt and Company. Pp. vii+517.

The Statistical Method in Economics and Political Science. By P. S. Florence. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. Pp. xxiv+521.

Figure 3 on page 24 should have been started on the negative side of the x scale. The vertical scale in this diagram should have been designated by a caption. *These are first principles.* The student should learn at an early stage that a graph must be self-explanatory and should carry title, period covered, source of data, and correct legends including important notes relating to the subject matter.

On page 46 of Chapter II entitled: "The Graphic Analysis of Data: Elementary Curve Fitting," a graph showing the price of pig iron is shown. Instead of showing the value of x , designated by the authors as "classmark," it is preferable to show the respective years, 1900-1910. The omission of the zero on the vertical scale is not customary, but if insisted upon should be definitely marked by a respective notation. This chapter also shows signs of an unduly accelerated pace. The introduction of the Skew Normal Probability Curve seems uncalled for at this point, even for the purpose of computing a curve.

In Chapter III, entitled "Methods of Averaging," six types of averages are explained. The definition of the quadratic mean on page 73 is given thus: "It may be defined as the square root of the arithmetic mean of the squares of the *class marks*" (italics the reviewer's). The definition is defective due to the inclusion of the term "classmark," which in itself must be defined. Professor Gavett, in his *A First Course in Statistical Method*, defines the quadratic mean as: "The square root of the arithmetic mean of the squares of a set of numbers." The latter definition is simple and straightforward. The discussion of the median should have included a chart showing the method of computing it graphically from the cumulative frequency curve, because this method is frequently used in all types of reports. The explanation of the bimodal frequency distribution on page 87, first four lines, should have been expanded. At this point the student should be made more specifically aware of the fact that a bimodal distribution often indicates the non-homogeneous nature of the series upon which the distribution is based. This is not properly brought out by the last sentence in the first paragraph. For a good description of this type of distribution see David Brunt, *The Combination of Observations*, page 47, example 6.

Chapter IV and V, entitled "Index Numbers" and "The Analysis of Time Series" respectively, comprise together only 45 pages. Both chapters will require considerable collateral reading on the part of the student in order to understand the mathematical basis, because the sequence of the actual steps of computations are only scantily shown. The reviewer considers the detailed development of computing steps one of the most important pedagogic factors in teaching the subject of statistical technique, no matter how dull it may appear to the scholarly mind.

The text of Chapters VI, VII, and VIII are devoted to the theory of probability, leading in the customary way from the theoretical aspect of permutations and combinations to the binomial frequency distribution up to the normal frequency curve.

Chapter IX, entitled "Curve Fitting," contains considerable detail of computation in algebraic as well as numerical form. A valuable simplification of curve fitting for the case of linear and parabolic trends has been accomplished by including tables IX and X, showing coefficients for fitting a straight line and a parabola respectively to data.²

Chapters X and XI are devoted to the exposition of the elements of correlation. On page 249, however, it would have been better to omit the inadequate definition: "In other words, correlation is the mathematical theory of drawing conclusions,"

² It is interesting to note that Davis and Nelson arrived at the method of coefficients to simplify curve fitting. In 1932 the reviewer, engaged in statistical research work in the U.S. Department of Commerce, computed identical coefficients for linear trends.

and substitute the one given at the beginning of Chapter XI, which reads: "Simple correlation is a measurement of the amount of co-variation between two series, and may indicate the degree to which one element affects another, or the degree to which the two are affected by common causes."

In the 24 pages of the concluding chapter "Types of Statistical Series" are dealt with, the text representing an extension of Chapters VI, VII and VIII. Discussed here are kurtosis, the Lexis ratio and the Charlier coefficient of disturbancy, and the Poisson-Bortkewitsch "Law of small numbers." The balance of the volume includes appendices I, II, and III, entitled "Biographical Notes on Early Mathematical Economists," "Logarithms," and "The Use of Tables" respectively. Ten tables for aid in computation, answers to problems, and an index of names and subjects conclude the volume. The book format is 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ " \times 9 $\frac{1}{4}$ ", the type face large, and it is clearly printed on excellent paper.

Elements of Statistics represents in many respects a book prepared with scholarly care. Its usefulness as a text, however, will depend largely on the intelligent guidance of the instructor as well as on the mathematical background of the student.

R. VON HUHN

Washington, D. C.

The Symbols of Government. By THURMAN W. ARNOLD. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935. Pp. 278. \$2.50.

The State in Theory and Practice. By HAROLD J. LASKI. New York: Viking Press, 1935. Pp. 299. \$3.00.

Der Staat: Seine geistigen Grundlagen, seine Entstehung und Entwicklung. By KURT SCHILLING. München: Ernst Reinhardt, 1935. Pp. 323. RM 7.80.

This is an encounter with three authors of different nationality and vastly different preoccupation, each endeavouring to formulate his conception of the theory and practice of the puzzling process of government: a lawyer who is a liberal American progressive, a political scientist who is an English socialist, and a German philosopher who embraces the National Socialist state for this reason: "If a government finds only confidence and believes in confidence, it naturally must side with one who seeks for truth among the people, just as he, too, must side with such a government."¹

Different as their approaches are bound to be, all three have written tracts on our time, of varying degrees of detachment and realism. Arnold, professor of law at Yale, in a series of witty and sometimes penetrating essays, surveys significant aspects of the American governmental scene, although he occasionally wants us to believe that he is dealing with "Western civilization." His analysis and discussion glaringly reflect the dilemma of the liberal lawyer on facing the New Deal's legal débacle. His discussions of jurisprudence, the judicial process, economics and law, and the like are held together by the central notion that the ceremonies and theories of social institutions may be conveniently described as "symbolic thinking and conduct which condition the behavior of men in groups." The human mind seems to need the certitude of acting "on principle" and therefore persistently generates such large, hazy and contradictory notions. This leads to the habitual deadlock and confusion in social affairs. Clever manipulators exploit the situation by twisting the

¹ Schilling, *Der Staat*, p. 16.

available symbols to their own ends, thus directing social forces into channels remote from the public interest. This psychology of disillusionment induces Arnold to extol the merits of dictatorial insane asylum management for an insane world, until, finally, with unexpected somersault, he disavows the method of despair and reestablishes the intrinsic worth of such unifying values as the law, since they permit the operation of contradictory ideals without the sacrifice of human dignity. Here is a fresh handling of an old problem, especially suggestive for the legal process, marred only by an occasional flight into regions where the author's wit clouds his understanding,² and by the palpable incongruity of a psychological-"anthropological" method for the purpose of social evaluation.

The American's dilemma is at bottom also the Englishman's and yet, what difference of perspective! Laski, in his masterful diagnosis of contemporary statecraft and its theory, gives not only the ripest formulation of his own political philosophy, but at the same time as solid an essay on Marxian politics as can be found in Anglo-American literature. This solidity is achieved by an elastic and sophisticated application of the materialistic interpretation of history, from which the crucial problems of the modern world spring into bold relief. With this volume, Mr. Laski's pilgrimage from a liberal pluralism to a definitely Marxist monism seems to be attained. There still remains the rejection of the merely absorptive state, of the idealist school and its implications. But gone is the belief in a pluralist state, shattered by the experience of the post-war world. For him the cleavage of classes can only be overcome by the exercise of the state's power on behalf of the exploited, and yet his political ethic—which has rightly been identified as a Protestant ethic—with its emphatic affirmation of individual judgment and the rights essential for its protection, does not allow him to delight in revolutionary logic. Fundamental change can probably only be achieved by force; yet the tokens of the times and a post-Marxian appraisal of the class-structure suggest that such attempts might be fatal and open the door to Fascism, for the historical opportunity is rare: "It therefore becomes essential for any party which is seeking to transform the economic foundations of society to maintain as long as it can a constitutional order which permits it openly to recruit its strength."³ The author's mood reflects the revolutionary dilemma of reconciling the enduring values of the past with the quest for security.

To Schilling's suggestive and original scheme of a philosophy of state, I cannot hope to do justice here. Suffice it to say that he makes the ambitious if not wholly successful attempt to build up a political theory on the basis of a teleological philosophy of life. The necessity for communal planning—i.e. the genesis of the state—is found to be part of the life-plan of the species which proceeds to create new variations of communal existence in accordance with new historical "tasks." In the light of such tasks, the division of powers, fundamental rights, and the "predictability" of law cannot but appear as "constitutional abuses"⁴ when planning is an ingredient of constitutions. Such philosophical logic lends itself admirably to the task of the authoritarian and totalitarian state, although in the course of his dissertation (despite the cited declaration of faith) the author indulges in several refreshing and significant heresies. His work is worth pondering.

WOLFGANG H. KRAUS

Harvard University

² Arnold, *The Symbols of Government*, Ch. I. on The Social Sciences.

³ Laski, *The State in Theory and Practice*, p. 288.

⁴ Schilling, *op. cit.*, pp. 135 ff.

Building America. By ELIAS RACHIE. Minneapolis: Building America Co., 1936. Pp. 320. \$2.00.

Roots of America: A Travelogue of American Personalities. By CHARLES MORROW WILSON. New York: Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1936. Pp. xii+316. \$3.00.

Mr. Rachie wants to organize the 120,000 election precincts into discussion clubs, modern versions of the old town meeting, to discuss public affairs, restore true religion and the virtues of the fathers. *Building America* is a sort of handbook for such clubs. It contains the ideals, a plan of action and an outline of what every citizen should know, mostly selections from the Bible. While many people will dismiss Mr. Rachie's proposal as a religious, utopian dream, it should be pointed out that his Christianity is strictly undenominational and his gospel is the Social Gospel, his Kingdom of God is on this earth.

His seventeen concrete, immediate proposals for Building America indicate the trend of his mind: The 120,000 local clubs; thirty hour week; take all mothers of minors out of industry; withdraw 150,000,000 acres of marginal land; homestead loans for about six million families; planned, decentralized industry; simplification of government; coordinated transportation; reduction of interest rates; Federal banking; graduated income and inheritance taxes; unemployment insurance; conservation; reintroduce Bible into personal, home and civic life (daily Bible reading in schools); purify home life; emphasize individual character building.

It would be easy to attack Mr. Rachie for over-simplification, for the vagueness of his proposals, for his ignorance of elementary social science, but most good citizens would probably subscribe to the general features of his vision. If he takes it too seriously, however, he will probably die a disappointed and disillusioned man.

Roots of America is a very readable book, illustrated with 33 fine Resettlement Administration (mostly) photographs. Mr. Wilson presents sixteen types of folk-Americans: farmers of New England, Missouri, Taos, and the corn belt; auctioneer; storekeeper; horse wrangler; hotelkeeper; country newspaperman; Ozark isolated community types; timberman; signpainter; sheep and cattle herders; politician; and a number of roadside types. He claims there is a basic similarity in the attitudes and ideals of Americans in all sections.

They are quite different from the people whom Meckenesque urban writers have called "yokels"—*Americanus Boobiensis*. Wilson finds them conservative, but not blind to the reality of change; fundamentally capitalistic, but not profit-minded to the exclusion of a deep loyalty to the sacredness of personality—they are not mercenary nor materialistic; they believe in the solid virtues of honest work for a decent living; they are individualists, but not egoists; they are not gullible; they have enduring beliefs and appetites, are opinionated, even prejudiced, if you like, but they are men of commonsense, fair dealing, and fearless championship of what they believe to be right. He sees no chance for Marxism or Fascism ever to displace the basic democracy of America.

While Wilson has a good deal of sentiment, he is not sentimental. He admits his is a partial picture. It is somewhat too rosy, but it is also much closer to reality than the caricature of the Smart Boys who sneerfully tell us the great mass of rural Americans are semi-morons. The men whom Wilson has reported are probably more articulate than most men in their callings, but such people are generally able to express their ideas and feelings fairly lucidly and often in very colorful language. Perhaps it is wishful thinking, but I believe the great mass of Americans, both rural

and urban, are sound, honest, fair, patient, generous, decent, friendly folk, primarily characterized by what Cooley calls primary ideals. At times, one marvels at their capacity to stand and withstand exploitation, waste, inefficiency, ill-will, stupidity, and propaganda of all sorts; they seem to be able to "take it" to a greater extent than seems humanly possible. But there is latent fire in those masses; fundamentally they are still revolutionary democrats; they may demand and effectuate far-reaching changes in our social order almost overnight—and do it in the name of the Fathers and by means of the Constitution. Wilson's book bolsters this belief. It is a refreshing relief from the literature of cynicism, despair, and defeat with which our disillusioned *literati* have been bombarding us in recent years. *Roots of America* is close to the earth, the source of all national wealth; it is a small glimpse at the folkmind of America, the vital stuff of all culture. Perhaps he has reacted somewhat too far from what he calls "Smart Alec writing," but we probably need a little overcorrection of this kind.

No index.

READ BAIN

Miami University

Christianity and the Social Revolution. Ed. by JOHN LEWIS *et al.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936. Pp. 526. \$3.00.

There is one unifying thread which runs through practically the whole of this stimulating symposium. As Lewis states in the Preface: "It challenges the traditional attitude of Christianity towards the question of radical social change . . . (and) the orthodox attitude of Communism to Religion." It contains eighteen articles by fourteen men, plus an able introduction by Charles Raven. Most of the writers are English, others are from Russia, "the Continent," or America (Reinhold Niebuhr).

There is no doubt about the fact that people become nervous when their settled opinions seem to be threatened. This certainly is true of countless men and women who call themselves Christian and who fear that their whole way of life is being challenged with increasing effectiveness by a new set of social forces called Communism. People do not welcome social change unless it occurs along the line already laid down in accordance with their own life patterns. It is because they have been made to feel uncomfortable and uncertain that they have reacted so violently to the idea of Communism.

Many an author in recent years has presented Christianity and Communism as the two live options now before mankind, has proceeded to show that they are in basic conflict, and that the intelligent citizen will of course choose Christianity. The writers in this symposium are not so cocksure, however, although most of them are Christian. They see much in common between the teachings of Jesus and early Christian history and Communism (Noel). They see that the Church has again and again become a protector of property and power (Pascal).

Christianity, they find, has lost much of its virility. If it is to continue as a vital force it will do well to discover the values and motives which account for the crusading spirit in Communism. As Auden states (p. 50): "A truth is not tested until, oppressed and illegal, it still shows irresistible signs of growth." And Communism has grown in spite of opposition. The English writers insist that the Church must therefore take Communism seriously, following the example of J. M. Ludlow who, in 1849, saw the developing Socialism of the Parisian workers and returned to England to inspire Maurice and others, and with them to establish the Christian

Socialist movement which revitalized religion and gave it at one and the same time influence in society and appeal for the workingmen.

John Lewis agrees with the Communists that Christianity has been conventionalized and much of its preaching has become vacuous. Mentioning the work of certain "advanced" ministers, he pointedly remarks: "There is an atmosphere about this preaching which suggests that it is meant to secure the maximum amount of moral enthusiasm with the minimum amount of serious action" (p. 101). And Gilbert Binyon chimes in: "It is well recognized that at the time of Constantine 'the world' got into the Church and has never since been got out of it. If the world is indifferent to the Church, it is because the Church is so little different from the world" (p. 120). This, of course, has been the bitter criticism of the Communists: religion deals with vague abstractions of goodness and brotherhood which are not concretized in behavior in the market-place. Religion, Ivan Levitsky (one of the Communist contributors) claims, talks about beautiful ideals but serves as a protective shield for reactionary forces: "The future will see a consolidation of all religious forces against Communism. A 'united front' of religion and reaction" (p. 295). Most of the writers are determined that religion shall not be used as a cloak for reaction. They see in the religion of Jesus (not the religion about Jesus) an influence which, when boldly applied, can transform social as well as individual life, even though they themselves frankly recognize the reactionary character of much of organized Christianity.

MURRAY H. LEIFFER

Garrett Biblical Institute

Cherokee Messenger. By ALTHEA BASS. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1936. Pp. 348. \$3.00.

This volume is a story of the life and work of Samuel Austin Worcester, missionary to the Cherokee Indians.

After having been educated at Andover Theological Seminary and called to preach, Worcester, a member of the eighth generation in a consecutive line of ministers, left his native state, Vermont, for work in the offices of the American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions until such time as they should send him to "India or Palestine or the Sandwich Islands . . . but he did not question the goodness of God . . . in sending him, instead, to the American aborigines." Leaving Boston in August, 1825, at the age of 27, with his newly wedded wife, he drove by horse and buggy to the Brainerd Mission in the land of the Cherokee in Northern Georgia, where he labored as missionary, builder, translator, publisher, accountant and preacher, until the State of Georgia under the Presidency of Andrew Jackson, the "Indian Fighter," and a State governor of similar spirit, forced the Indians to a treaty which took their land and drove them westward beyond the Mississippi. Worcester consistently opposed the attempts to move the Indians out, and even went to prison because he remained at the mission after having been commanded by the Governor of Georgia to leave the territory occupied by the Cherokees.

The Worcesters moved westward to the new land of the Cherokee in the valley of the Arkansas River, where they labored for the rest of their lives. At the time of Samuel's death in April, 1859, two of his daughters were teaching school among the Indians. During his lifetime he had translated and printed in the Cherokee language portions of the Scriptures and hymnbooks, and had published a Cherokee grammar, an almanac, tracts, temperance works, and school books. He lived to see two seminaries established by the Cherokees.

The book is effectively written. It is built about the correspondence of Samuel

Worcester, most of the materials having been obtained from the manuscript collection of the American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions now housed in the Andover-Harvard Library at Cambridge.

In addition to being an interesting biography, it shows in an intimate way some of the problems of the Indian in becoming reacculturated, in being deprived of his homeland and driven westward, and in adapting himself to a new land. It also touches on slavery, which was an issue among the Indians, since some of them had adopted the ways of their white neighbors of the Old South, acquired slaves and the aristocratic patterns.

This volume is one of two commemorating the Centennial of Printing and Publishing in Oklahoma.

PAUL H. LANDIS

The State College of Washington

American Foundations, A Study of their Role in the Child Welfare Movement.

By HAROLD C. COFFMAN. New York: Association Press, 1936. Pp. 213. Price \$3.00.

For a number of years, the reviewer of this book has insisted that expenditures for social welfare purposes have become an integral part of public finance, and that accurate data on the amounts and purposes of moneys spent for such purposes should be gathered regularly and systematically.

This book is an excellent step in this direction. Confined to one particular field—the foundation, and more specifically to its role in the child welfare movement—the data presented, showing that the 75 foundations and community trust funds coöperating in the study made grants for social welfare purposes to the amount of almost a half billion dollars during the decade, 1921–1930, not only cover a definite part of this chapter of public finance, but offer ample evidence on the importance of an “institutional development which is relatively new, culturally influential, and distinctly American.”

The results of Dr. Coffman's study, made possible by a grant from the Mrs. Leonard Elmhirst Committee, are presented in five parts. Part one describes the nature, scope, and method of the inquiry; part two analyzes the foundations as a type, their purposes, personnel, organization and trends; part three does the same for the community trust funds; part four reviews the child welfare organizations which received aid from these sources; and the final part evaluates the significance of foundation support for child welfare work.

Commenting on the findings, one is tempted, after being shown that the trustees of these foundations are successful representatives of the established order, to ask: What else should they be? What else would they be in any other order of society? (Refer to Jerome Davis' data on the personnel dominating Soviet institutions.) Also, on page 30, the author says, in speaking of the typical trustee: “The chances are that he is a member of several clubs which make an effort to protect the American standards and culture of the nineteenth century.” No evidence whatever is presented in support of this statement—the one glaring instance of apparent bias. A significant omission is a similar analysis of the executive directors and advisers of the foundations, many of whom conceivably exert considerable weight in decisions on the allotment of funds. Who are they? What are their clubs and attitudes toward the established order?

These comments, while considered pertinent, are not to be interpreted as deductions from Dr. Coffman's painstaking work. He has done a fine job, on a project

of very great importance. The results of his inquiry are well organized and well presented. The book is a useful volume, and a valuable one, for students in several different fields.

JAMES H. S. BOSSARD

University of Pennsylvania

Central Australia. By C. T. MADIGAN. London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Melford, 1935. Pp. 258. \$5.00.

This work is one primarily of geographical and geological exploration. Being dedicated to "Old-Timers," it does give casual glimpses of the white pioneer settler in Australia. The reader who expects to find in it a discussion of the aborigines or seeks primarily anthropological data will be disappointed. The author feels that the natives are already "being done to death." In the last chapter only does he deal with the aborigines, and here he states his solution to the problem of the native and the half-caste—"These problems solve themselves in the best way." He ventures the opinion that the explorer Eyre in his journals has written the fairest thing about the natives.

The sociologist who has the patience to wade through the large amount of detailed description of travel courses, topographical and geological features, finds occasional references to the pioneer which are revealing of conditions in Central Australia. The graphic pictures of drought, dying livestock, and desolation remind one of the most seriously affected parts of the western fringe of the Great Plains in the United States.

One feels in the early part of the book somewhat the spirit of British conquest and gets a conception of the extent to which expense has been contracted in a futile attempt to make the central part of the continent habitable. As a book of exploration and travel it is well done, the author having a faculty not only for describing his travels, but also for adding personal detail which lends interest.

PAUL H. LANDIS

The State College of Washington

Some Origins of the Modern Economic World. By E. A. J. JOHNSON. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936. Pp. vi+163. \$1.35.

Pioneers of American Economic Thought in the Nineteenth Century. By ERNEST TEILHAC. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936. Pp. xi +187. \$2.50. Translated by E. A. J. Johnson.

No one can legitimately profess to have a clear understanding of modern economic institutions and trends without seeing them in light of their evolutionary development. Professor Johnson, apparently sensing the need for such an approach in the teaching of economics to beginning college students, has written a little book which, because of its clarity and effectiveness of organization, should be welcomed both by teachers and lay readers.

The author frankly admits that the book is not an economic history in the conventional textbook sense. Rather he selects, quite arbitrarily but nevertheless wisely, certain periods of the past and then proceeds to describe the economic institutions and changes characteristic of those times. Beginning with an analysis of late-medieval institutions in England, he passes on to a consideration of the beginnings of capitalism around 1700. From this point of vantage he jumps to 1800

to discuss the origin and development of scientific technology and the formulation of capitalist theory. Finally he considers the diffusion of the pattern of industrialism from its English zone of origin, and the monetary policies incident to the rise of imperialism in the modern world. "The method employed," to use the words of the author, "is simply to advance arbitrarily to a selected date and then retrace the path as far as necessary to provide adequate historical description of each new element."

The second author, a professor of political economy at Beirut, Syria, has done something more than summarize the economic theories of three American writers, Daniel Raymond, Henry C. Carey, and Henry George. His task has been not only to present the salient features of the writings of these men but also to show the relationships between American and European economic thought. His book becomes therefore almost as much an analysis of the theories of J. B. Say, Friedrich List, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus, and Frédéric Bastiat as of Raymond, Carey, and George. This method, it must be admitted, is effective. Yet his interpretation would have been more convincing had he given adequate attention to the social and economic conditions which formed the background of these theories. In a few instances the author has made some references to these conditions, but on the whole his descriptions of economic backgrounds have been sketchy. The chapter on the formulation of capitalist theory in Professor Johnson's book is certainly more realistic in this respect.

NOEL P. GIST

University of Kansas

The Young Child in the Home: A Survey of Three Thousand American Families, Report of the Committee on the Infant and Preschool Child, John E. Anderson, Ph. D., Chairman, White House Conference on Child Health and Protection. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1936. Pp. xxi+415. \$3.00.

Research on the preschool child has made enormous advances in the last two or three decades; yet until now certain very elementary information has been lacking. We did not know how many hours the *average* American preschool child sleeps, what he eats, how he is punished, what his fears are, how often he is bathed.

The present book is the report of a very successful attempt to answer such questions. It is based on interviews which secured data on 3779 children in 2758 white families and on 313 children in 202 Negro families. Only families having a child between the ages of one and five were selected, since the study was primarily concerned with preschool children. Incidental information was gathered about infants and older children, however, when they were present in such families.

It is hard to summarize the results of this study for the purposes of a book review. The very object of the research causes the results to be rather miscellaneous. The value of the study lies in the fact that it has made available a large number of very valuable but somewhat unrelated data, such as the following: spinach is refused by more children than any other food; rural children sleep somewhat less at night than do urban children; there are no striking differences in the play of Negro and white children; spanking is used more freely at age four than at any other age; ten and twelve year old children bathe three times as frequently in summer as in winter.

The validity of a study like this will depend very largely on the goodness of the sampling. The Committee made a very serious and intelligent effort to control the factors of geographical distribution in the country, size of community, and socio-

economic status. The data given in the appendix show that this effort did not succeed fully. In general, there was a tendency to overweight the higher socio-economic groups. The highest socio-economic class received about four times its proper representation, while the lowest class received less than half of its due share. In interpreting the data of the study these facts should be kept in mind.

PAUL HANLY FURFEY

Catholic University of America

Laws of Marriage and Divorce. By FRANKLYN HUDGINGS. New York: New Century Co., 1935.

This little volume has been much needed, so rapidly have the older compilations of marriage and divorce laws become outdated. The book includes the laws of a few foreign countries, but it has no tabulation and no index, a serious fault. Already it is of course somewhat out-of-date, the facts of the new grounds for divorce and annulment of marriage in Hawaii having been apparently too recently passed, as also the new marriage certification law of Connecticut.

The advocate of Federal marriage and divorce laws will find in this book plenty of material to prove the lamentable chaos in inter-state comity, but also very strong evidence against making marriage and divorce laws Federal. The present District of Columbia legislation is a fair test of what we might expect in Federal legislation and it turns out to be one of the poorest codes in the whole list.

On the whole, progress since the last important compilations, those of May, 1929, Richmond and Hall, 1929, and Vernier, 1931 (which *do* have tabulation and indices) is very slow. Apparently it seldom occurs to a state legislature to examine studiously the whole marriage and divorce code. Instead, little patches are applied at infrequent intervals, with an ill-balanced result.

The reasoning seems at times puzzling. Thus as to impotence, there are the following variants: "impotent," "naturally impotent," "incurably impotent," "if existing at time of marriage," "even though arising after marriage," "at time of marriage and continuing," and "if suit is brought not later than two years after date of marriage."

The degree of cruelty called for seems medieval in the case of Missouri, which specifies "cruelty endangering life," and where "habitual drunkenness must have started after marriage."

Useful as this book is, it is merely a compilation, and does not make obsolete the general discussions introducing each topic to be found in Vernier's excellent *American Family Law* (1931).

ROSWELL H. JOHNSON

Institute of Family Relations
Los Angeles

Revolutionary Turkey. By H. MALIK EVRENOL. Ankara: Librairie Hachette, 1936 (Distributed by Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, Paris). Pp. 145.

After a brief exposition of the interpretation of history on which Turkey's nationalism is based—that *all* civilization is traceable to ancient Turkish origins—the author describes how the program of the People's (*the only*) Party, its propaganda, the schools system, developments in the creative arts and the economic organization of the country conform to the ideal thus engendered and nurtured. Although

his numerous works in applied sociology, judged by American scientific standards, are the best in modern Turkish, this, Bay Evrenol's first book in English, is valuable chiefly as an excellent specimen of the currently dominant Turkish mentality.

DONALD E. WEBSTER

SSRC Fellow in Turkey

Progress and Power. By CARL BECKER. Stanford University, California: Stanford University Press, 1936. Pp. x+102. \$1.50.

Since this little book is made up of three West Memorial Foundation lectures, it is published without documentation. This is further warranted since, as a "diagrammatic projection of human history," the factual bases of the essay are quite familiar. Feeling that there may still be some merit in the concept of progress, but aware of its difficulties, Professor Becker seeks to avoid the dilemma by examining, not the goal *toward* which, but the direction, speed, and distance *along* which mankind has moved since his emergence from the apes. Although this involves some hazard of mistaking what has been as thereby having been good, in some slight measure, such facts can speak for themselves. In these terms, mankind has moved a long way since *Pithecanthropus*, chiefly in the direction of the expansion of the universe to which he responds, his increasing power of control over that universe, and a somewhat more irregular increase in the rationality of his adjustments. Although subject to some fluctuation, this movement has been, in general, an accelerating one. It has, among whatever else, been at the hands of two interacting factors, intelligence and "power"; *i.e.*, the power of control over the natural universe which has come from tools, techniques, machines, and improved ways of knowing and doing. This power has both resulted from, and interacted upon, the effective intelligence of man. The disparity in the rate at which mankind has progressed in the control of the non-human world and in his control of himself and his social and economic order has given rise to a critical situation, as well as to an over-rejection of the progress concept. But it is possible that change in the so-called material culture may reach a diminishing rate or an upper limit; that knowledge and control of the social and personal may increase; and that a considerable period of relatively harmonious adjustment may be achieved before the burning out of the sun writes *finis* to the human adventure. The book is vividly and charmingly written. A reading of it is bound to be refreshing, stimulating, and provocative.

JAMES W. WOODARD

Temple University

Education and Organized Interests in America. By BRUCE RAUP. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1936. Pp. 238. \$2.50.

Beginning with a discussion of the role of the public utilities in their campaign to control opinion, and especially that opinion formed in the classroom, Professor Raup goes on to a consideration of the various organized interests in their efforts to influence American thinking in regard to nationalism, religion, war, government, economic relations, and social change. The positions of the various organized interests, and the pressure groups which represent them, are set forth by means of extended quotations from their declarations, both published and unpublished. Each controversial issue in contemporary American life is the focal point for a clash of opinion, and very frequently the classroom receives the full impact of that clash. Professor Raup has taken these issues one at a time, choosing to present

the cluster of conflicting interests and opinions in logical rather than natural form. When, for instance, the views of the Daughters of the American Revolution concerning teachers' oaths are thrown into dramatic relief against those of the American Civil Liberties Union, a realization of the significance of conflict is heightened. As a matter of fact, the work is replete with the drama of group conflict, much of it being implicit simply in the arrangement of materials.

Out of the struggle of interests there emerges what Professor Raup has seen fit to call a "consensus." It is nothing more or less than a new synthesis developed out of a clash of group psychologies. The consensus is the cultural product of the interaction between two or more dynamic group interests in society. It is the function of the teacher, Professor Raup contends, to engage actively in the process of achieving a consensus—always in the interest of the "larger good." Rather than favoring the cause of one group over another, the teacher should serve as a conscious agent of selection within the cultural matrix. The school cannot be neutral: as an integral part of society, it must participate actively and instrumentally "in the process whereby a civilization and a culture are continually remade." A life-long experience in education will find the individual becoming acquainted with the common culture while learning to assist in its transformation. Education is here conceived as a force as dynamic as society itself.

Education and Organized Interests in America is based on the studies of the Commission on the Social Studies of the American Historical Association, in the making of which Professor Raup played no small part. Besides an adequate index, the book contains a list of the eighty-eight organized interests serving as the subjects of investigation. There is also presented a series of charts indicating in condensed form the attitudes of the various pressure groups on controversial issues of the day, as well as the systematized response of a sample of the "school public"—teachers, administrators, board members, and community leaders—to a comprehensive questionnaire treating current opinion. The discussion accompanying these charts is most relevant in view of the role of the educator in stimulating consensus. The related parts of the work constitute something of a useful inventory of established attitudes.

Professor Raup and his assistants have done a courageous and pioneering piece of work in a field that has long demanded the attention of the educator as well as the sociologist. If the book under consideration has a weakness it is in its lack of focus. There is such a thing as documenting a thesis to the point of concealing its meaning. Indeed, extensive quotation from the expressions of organized interests makes for a rather weighty handbook of social control. But at the present stage such a handbook proves a genuine and necessary contribution, and one that can hardly be overlooked in future studies of conflicting interests and their opinions.

J. C. HUTCHINSON, JR.

Rutgers University

Wealth and Culture. By EDUARD C. LINDEMAN. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1936. Pp. 135. \$3.00.

In this brief book is contained a curt and critical analysis of philanthropic foundations. Professor Lindeman has entirely discarded the "sweetness and light" approach to philanthropy. He believes that foundations ranked among the ten major influences shaping the quality of American life during the 1920's, so he sets about studying and interpreting a cross section of foundations and trust funds, one hundred in number.

The foundations are here interpreted as results of certain forces operating in our capitalistic society, namely: the accumulation of huge fortunes which could not possibly be used in consumption, however conspicuous and wasteful, by the possessors; the beginning of a "guilt feeling" in the wealthy; and the enthusiastic acceptance of the principles of organization.

Foundations influence our culture chiefly in a conservative direction. In the one hundred foundations studied, education, health, social welfare, and administration make up over 93 per cent of all expenditures. Only two foundations were discovered which were oriented in the direction of social change. One liquidated itself by giving to radical organizations; the other is trying to formulate a cultural index, giving a diminishing value to conventional education, relief and individual philanthropy, and an increasing value to creative arts, experimental learning, cultural and international interaction, social planning and legislation, freedom and justice, and application of science to human affairs, giving weight to their contributions accordingly.

The nature of the typical trustee of these institutions shows why such forward-looking policies are so rare. The typical trustee would be well past middle age, of secure economic status, belonging to "best" clubs and churches, with little background of science (only 2 out of 400 were social scientists), and living in the Northeastern states. According to Lindeman, beneficiaries of grants are inevitably affected by these conservative institutions. This may be generally true, but one wonders in such cases as Louis Adamic's trip to Jugo-Slavia on a Guggenheim fellowship.

It becomes obvious that the foundation is not a real means of redistributing wealth to the public. This type of philanthropy contributed only about five per cent of the total budget of charitable enterprises in the country; and the estimated total for the ten year period is only \$1,346,500,000. Only six per cent of New Yorkers whose wills were probated bequeathed any part of their wealth to others than friends and relatives.

This is the initial report of extensive research Lindeman is supervising on the general subject of philanthropic funds. Its limitations are also partly explained by the fact that a majority of the foundations approached refused to co-operate in making facts available. Its readability is augmented by the generous use of striking pictographs, and for those interested in details there is included an extensive appendix on the expenditures of the foundations studied.

SELDEN C. MENEFEE

University of Washington

Anti-Semitism Yesterday and Tomorrow. By LEE J. LEVINGER. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936. Pp. xvi+334. \$2.50.

Rabbi Levinger emphasizes anti-Semitism not as an isolated evil, but rather as one phase only of a larger and more inclusive problem, that of minorities. This, in the judgment of the reviewer, is the only possible approach.

The book is divided into three parts. Part I is a historical survey of anti-Semitism throughout the ages. The persecution of the Jews has been much the same in every country and period. The history extends from the Pharaohs to the Nuremberg decrees of September, 1935. Part II, an analytical study of anti-Semitism, studies religious and economic causes, the myth of a world conspiracy, the race theory and fallacy, and the Marxian and Freudian theories of environment. Part III is a sociological picture of the relations of majority and minority groups, bringing out

the causes, results, and possible remedies of anti-Semitism as a part of the wider issues.

The book makes no sociological or scholarly pretensions, yet it has sociological merit and significance. Although written by a rabbi, it is totally free from hate. The author may not be an inspired writer, but he is an honest one and, within limits, an exceptional craftsman. His conclusions are sound: "The causes of anti-Semitism are deep-rooted in the social system. The remedy is not a ready or a quick one. It involves vast changes of opinion in many millions of people. It involves also changes in the economic and international situations which bring the climaxes of hatred and persecution. It must be a long-term program . . ." (p. 300). All in all, this is a brave and honest book. It was needed.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

New York University

Relation Between Morality and Intellect. By CLARA F. CHASELL. New York: Teachers College Contributions to Education, No. 607, 1935. Pp. xviii + 556. \$4.50.

Public Intelligence. By SEBA ELDRIDGE. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Humanistic Studies, April, 1935. Pp. 101. \$1.00.

Doctor Chassell's monograph is a compendium of evidence contributed by psychology, criminology and sociology upon the relation of morality and intellect. She has assembled and analyzed nearly three hundred studies, covering the mentality and behavior of 300,000 feeble-minded, delinquent and normal persons. This mass of material she has classified and evaluated to help answer the question: Are good people stupid or smart?

She finally concludes (p. 470) that "The relation between morality and intellect in restricted groups is clearly direct. The obtained relation is extremely variable, but tends to be low. It is dependent upon the type of evidence, the type of group, the type of coefficient, and possibly even the country represented. . . . Expressed in correlational terms, the obtained relation may therefore usually be expected to fall between .10 and .39, and the true relation to be under .50."

"Undoubtedly the general relation between morality and intellect in the general population is considerably higher than that usually found in restricted groups. Nevertheless, it is hardly probable that this relation is high. Expressed in correlational terms, the relation in the general population may therefore be expected to fall below .70."

After this summary of her investigation, Dr. Chassell adds the findings of the character Education Inquiry (Hartshorne, May, et. al., *Studies in the Nature of Character*) to confirm her results. Evidently they do. So the author ends her research with the statement that "The principle of the mutual relationship of desirable qualities still remains unchallenged; as far as the relation between morality and intellect is concerned, correlation and not compensation is the rule" (p. 492).

This work is the development of a doctoral thesis, subsidized in part by a grant from the Social Science Research Council. It is a monument of industry and a mine of information. However, it is not easy or stimulating to read. Instead of presenting a summary account of the literature, a section on method, and a simple statement of results, the cautious writer pauses too often to repeat warnings about technical difficulties encountered throughout. So the book becomes a mass of details to be studied with an index, rather than a guide to fresh frontiers of knowledge.

Professor Eldridge rated the political intelligence of 1250 mid-west voters on

true-false replies to twenty questions about the League of Nations, Tariff, and Industrial Arbitration, as prescribed by "experts." Only 24 per cent were found "competent." College professors surpass farmers, and women outguess men. The first twelve years of school appear to darken knowledge; but higher education clears it up. Reading newspapers helps very little, whereas highbrow magazines elevate the mind. Age does not bring added wisdom. Those who follow the ways of their fathers are dumb. Migrants and Independents are saner. Republicans and business men are particularly dense regarding arbitration, which seems to be the criterion of Kansas acumen.

Why Professor Eldridge set up 34 tables and 15 graphs to prove these points may not be evident. It was a sad day for errant Democracy when a statistician staked her devious trail with linear correlations.

HOWARD WOOLSTON

University of Washington

Hotel Life. By NORMAN S. HAYNER. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1936. Pp. 195. \$2.50.

This little book is well written and filled with personal-interest materials collected by direct observation by the author. The opening chapter deals with hotel life as it influences the personality of the hotel guest. The lonely, unattached individual is known as a number identified by a key.

The book is divided into three parts. The first deals with habitats for travelers, in which the author traces the history of the habitat of travelers from the wayside inn to the modern tourist camp. The two significant trends are first, suburban hotels tend to grow outward, and secondly, the multiple type tend to become skyscrapers. Dr. Hayner finds that people like to live in hotels because this life permits freedom to do as one pleases, to be alone, and affords conveniences and protection.

In the second part a very interesting discussion of the people who live in hotels is given. Childless families and professional men represent the chief occupants. In case there are hotel children, very definite non-social attitudes are generally found among them. The modern hotel is beginning to provide play rooms and play grounds for the children in order to offset some of these social disadvantages.

Part three describes the behavior of individuals away from home. The hotel life is colored by many problems associated with unrestrained behavior.

The author feels that the increase in hotel living causes a general breakdown in home life. The hotel becomes a symbol of changes that are taking place not only in manners, customs and morals of American society, but wherever the influence of machine industry is felt.

This book should be of interest to the general reader as well as the student of sociology. It presents a vivid word picture of an important phase of contemporary society.

T. EARL SULLENGER

Municipal University of Omaha

The Social System of the Zulus. By EILEEN JENSEN KRIGE. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1936. Pp. xix+420 (with illustrations and maps). \$9.50.

The treasure of experience hidden in the records of ethnology is in a way more valuable for the appreciation of sociological processes than that of history. Ethnology provides more comprehensive studies of actual life than can be afforded by the

most painstaking investigations of a historian. Ethno-sociological studies are the more important, for hosts of antiquated theories derived from the old writings of Spencer, Morgan, Maine,¹ and others are still current. An enormous amount of new research work has been performed in the meantime to which not sufficient attention has been paid by sociologists.

An immense material is often scattered in pamphlets, articles and books referring to one "tribe" only, and covering sometimes many decades. In our time of rapid transition this material is becoming more precious as a record of the near past and also as, so to speak, "living milestones" of the process of transition. This process is going on under our very eyes, a process of the greatest sociological importance from the theoretical point of view as well as from the practical one. For we have to deal with people of changing attitudes, interests, and wants.²

Mrs. Krige presents a collection of data of the kind just described, about the Zulus. She has amplified the published documentation by the use of unpublished material and by correspondence with living authors, to which she added personal trips through Zululand and Natal. These constituent parts have been carefully coordinated in scientific form and offer a first-class source book for social life of one of the most important South African tribes. All the stages are covered from the origin of the Zulu nation to the flourishing phase of its empire and the transition and partial disintegration into the present condition.

The sociologist will find more than two-thirds of the book devoted to topics in which he is interested: social and political organization, village life, economics, division of labor, marriage, birth and education of the youth, law and justice, military organization, and the historical background of the Zulus.

In dealing with the early history the author might have with advantage considered the composition of the tribes from herdsmen stock and from agriculturists. There is ample evidence for special pastoral traditions preserved among the male part of the population, while the women stick to agriculture, must not have anything to do with cattle, and are kept in official subordination to the men. (I cite only few instances: wandering with flocks and herds (p. 14); royal cattle (15); mixture of races (21); women, as inferiors, addressing men (51); age classes—cf. Masai—(81); boys given advice to love cattle, for "no man is without cattle" (86); driving out cattle (88); circumcision (116); property in cattle, goats, and sheep, not in land (177); female agriculture (184), and so on.) The Bantu-speaking peoples particularly in South Africa, are extracted from these two racial and cultural stocks, each unit, of course, composed in its particular manner. Whether this amalgamation of herdsmen-fathers with agriculturist-mothers happened before the arrival of the migrating "Bantu" in South Africa or after that time would require special investigation.

A most interesting chapter of the book is that dealing with the coagulation of the clusters of families and clans into larger units, their migration, and their settlement. Then we observe the welding of states (kingdoms), *i.e.* the organization of those clusters by outstanding personalities. It is a process very different from certain theories about the "origin of the state," theories rather innocent in their knowledge of ethnological data. Domination had to be "discovered"; it seems that the possession of a decisive advantage which bestows power is always misused for imperialistic purposes. It is hard to say how much the contact with Europeans, particularly the acquisition of the "magical" firearms, was responsible for the comparatively rapid

¹ Cf. my review of Diamond's book on Maine's *Ancient Law* in this REVIEW, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 148-149.

² An exposition of these changing processes can be found in the reviewer's book, *Black and White in East Africa*, London, Routledge & Sons, 1935.

evolution of increasing power. Its representative is the so-called "Napoleon" of the Zulus, Chaka, who lived about the same time as the real Napoleon. Chaka amalgamated a number of kingdoms and exploited his power in a rationalistic manner. He emancipated himself partly from tradition, from the council of the elders (p. 15), and replaced time-honored customs by his own ideas. Most important was the use of the traditional age-classes for a military organization, the improving of armament through introduction of the long dagger (assegai) for the short one, and his new methods of warfare which consisted in following the enemy home, killing their chiefs and as many men as possible, and returning home with their cattle and women as booty (similar to the old Turks). Boys of various tribes were put into the army and later married with some raped women, thus bringing about a mixture of various people. Chaka moulded the national character by the military training. He was the type of an oriental despot given to the whims of the moment. When his mother died, in his grief he let loose a terrible massacre among his own men (p. 16).

It was the time of the early Boer *trekkers*, and white influence was beginning to creep in step by step. We are able to follow the changes until we reach the modern epoch.

The book is excellently written, without sentimentality or bias. It gives a naturalistic picture of the events and the changing and varying customs of one of the most interesting of "natural" peoples. It does not treat society in a timeless way, but stresses changes, particularly those which happened as the result of the contact with the white. The book is recommended to sociologists who care for the things mentioned. They will find that many old theories require revision.

RICHARD C. THURNWALD

Yale University

This Soviet World. By ANNA LOUISE STRONG. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1936. Pp. xi+301. \$2.00.

After her fifteen years experience in Russia, Miss Strong presents, as an answer to the queries of American friends and audiences, the basic philosophy and practices underlying the Marxian scheme for remaking the world. She maintains that the Socialist Revolution did not happen in Russia accidentally, as Hillquit has declared, nor because the Russians were so backward that they were willing to endure a ruthless dictatorship, as Norman Thomas has declared. It happened, she says, because world imperialism broke at its weakest link. Indeed, many mistaken ideas exist about the Russian dictatorship. The only real power in any nation exists in the hands of the owners. In America the real *rulers*, she insists, are the capitalists, whereas in Russia all the workers collectively own the means of production and hence constitute the real dictatorship. In final analysis all power rests in their hands.

Out of a background of hostile nationalities, the new governmental policies have welded the diverse and antagonistic groups into a brotherhood of nations. It has given the alphabet to the illiterate, and helped the various semi-barbaric tribes to develop a modern civilization. Leadership in the Communist party has succeeded only because it has maintained contacts with the peasants and workers. Miss Strong admits there have been heavy costs in suffering in developing their plan but only because of the stupidity and violence of the *local* leaders. With the second five-year plan enormous achievements in the new industrial and agricultural developments have taken place, assuring economic security for the future.

The Bolsheviks have made their stand for peace on basis of their acceptance of the thesis that class conflicts are the cause of war. They have built up the great Red Army, but the U.S.S.R. will take no part in any war unless invaded. If the Soviets go to war it will be to protect the Soviet Republics.

At the same time the new world is "building men." It has captured the enthusiasm of its young people and the loyalty of its workers in promoting a common cause. Women in particular have gained through their economic, political and legal equality; they now seek economic emancipation insofar as it is not physically injurious.

In the realm of marriage and the family, social opinion rather than legal penalty restrains men and women in their intimate relations, in their decision to have children, and so on. But the Soviet leaders have always discouraged casual attitudes toward marriage and sex. Women receive no recognition except on their own merit, and not because of their status as wives of honored men. Children are well protected. Abortions are allowed, but heavily frowned upon as dangerous to the mother's health.

Scientific achievements inspired by the Soviet regime take many forms; even farmers and workers have made practical scientific discoveries. Art, similarly, has been democratized, as the "natural expression of the collective life of the millions."

Thus Miss Strong writes the story of the new civilization which is "remaking human beings," and "setting youth free." Unquestionably she is an enthusiastic convert to the new Russian way of life. She minimizes the unpleasant aspects of disorganization and dislocation attending such a shifting of classes and theories because she regards them as temporary and secondary phases of the path to a new social order. Without any great use of statistics or compiled data she presents what one might call the *spirit* of the Russian plan.

MABEL A. ELLIOTT

University of Kansas

I Was a Soviet Worker. By ANDREW SMITH. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1936. Pp. 298. \$3.00.

Andrew Smith, with the collaboration of his wife, Maria Smith, records his reactions toward the Soviet regime. Smith, a Hungarian-born worker, had taken a prominent part in labor struggles in Hungarian iron mines. As the result of his agitation he was black-listed by the industry, and in 1907 decided to come to the United States. Here he became an active member of the radical labor movement—first as a Socialist and later in 1919 as a charter member of the Communist party of the United States. Revolting at the inequalities and evils of the American industrial system, Smith and his wife set sail for Russia in 1929, armed with an introduction from the American Communist party. Here he remained three years, but he became more and more dissatisfied and finally resigned from his factory and the Communist party.

On his arrival in Russia, Smith was greeted with a hearty welcome (he was an expert mechanic), and was very enthusiastic about the whole program. After the first rounds of banquets he was initiated into the Russian electrical industry. Soon he saw that the standards of organization, workmanship, and general industrial advancement were very low. Great distinctions in rate of pay of workers prevailed. No standard hours of work applied. Pettiness, conniving, and craftiness were common in the various ranks of industry and among the local leaders of the Communist party. Women were employed in cruel back-breaking toil. Small children worked long hours at strenuous labor. Old men performed tedious tasks for pitiful

sums; there was no peaceful old age. Food for the masses lacked variety and was often scarce. The lack of sanitation appalled him. The casual acceptance of sex leniency both Smith and his wife found horrifying. The censorship of press, the condemnation of religion, the propagandizing of education, and most of all the inequalities in rate of pay palled on him. This, he maintained, was not the Communism which he had thought to give his life to establish. With much gusto, Smith resigned from the party, refused to work in his factory. Finally he forced his factory to free him. Apparently the Russians were not anxious to lose this worker, despite his criticisms and despite his wife's "counter-revolutionary" activities. But Smith returned to American disgusted with the Russian workers and the dictatorship as it applies there.

To the reviewer, Smith's analysis of his experience presents a picture of a homesick idealist in Russia who yearns for his American standard of living. Ardent in his desire to build a classless society, he found himself in an industrial situation far less comfortable for the employed worker than the American scene which he had so vigorously criticized. His Russian comrades whom he quotes state the case as well as any might. He had expected the full fruit of Socialism, when all that Russia can be legitimately expected to have achieved is a direction toward a goal. In their determination to reach that goal, there have been ignorant and cruel blunders. As his Russian critics say of him when he handed in his resignation, "Only after we have established Socialism will we have things here like in America" (*sic*).

Life has been hard in Soviet Russia, but so was it in pre-revolutionary Russia, and the ground work for building a great industrial nation has already been laid. Smith may rightly object to certain situations which he met there. There is, however, no justification for his comparing the present industrial and cultural level of America with that of Russia. The political system of the Czars initiated patterns of conduct which not even a revolution may hope to obliterate completely in so short a time. To the Russians such behavior is "natural." To many liberty-loving Americans it seems tyrannical, but in sociological parlance it is better designated as "cultural lag."

MABEL A. ELLIOTT

University of Kansas

John Reed. By GRANVILLE HICKS. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1935.
Pp. x+445. \$3.50.

This book is well written and well printed, but it does not live up to its sub-title: *The Making of a Revolutionary*. As the story of the events of a colorful life it is excellent. His birth in Portland, Oregon, as a son of one of the leading families; his boyhood and his Harvard career; his swift rise to fame as a war correspondent with Villa in Mexico—all are told vividly. So are his experience as a correspondent in the World War, as a founder of the Provincetown Players, and as a reporter in Russia during the Revolution, where his observations resulted in the classic *Ten Days That Shook the World*. His work in founding the Socialist Labor Party; his last visit to Russia and his death by typhus in Moscow; October, 1919, aged thirty-three, are sympathetically handled. The notes and bibliography are complete and careful.

It is perhaps ungracious to cavil at a well-written biography which gives all the important external facts of the subject's life. But there is more to biography than well-documented narration of external events. This book, commendable in many respects, is of small value to social scientists. But perhaps there is little reason why

biography should be written for the special benefit of sociologists. It contains hardly even the attempt to give a systematic account of how a well-to-do American boy, reared in the Episcopal Church, became a Communist and an atheist. There is very little elucidation of the gradual process by which, within the total social situation, particular motives and desires came to have a higher relative urgency and value to Reed. There is no careful explication of the changes in this urgency and value, brought about by the trend of events and by divergent sanctions and attitudes of the different groups with which he came into contact. No adequate explanation is given of how the opportunities, obstacles and conditions of his earlier life prepared him so perfectly, on the one hand to write a literary classic, and on the other to take up the dangerous and exciting role of Communist agitator. The details of his life are given with admirable exactness, but his spiritual development, especially in his last years, is not made sufficiently clear.

LYFORD P. EDWARDS

Bard College
Columbia University

Die flämische Bewegung: Europäisches Problem oder innerbelgische Frage?

By KURT BÄHRENS. Berlin: Volk und Reich Verlag, 1935. Pp. 136.
RM. 4.50.

This is a well-rounded, reliable, and realistic study of the Flemish national movement from its beginnings about one hundred years ago until today. The Flemish movement has in its political importance been frequently exaggerated by German propagandists and, as is well known, was made use of during the World War. The author arrives at a more realistic conclusion. The Flemish problem is not one of European international politics, but only a question of Belgian internal policy. The development until now points towards a similar solution and cohesion in Belgium as has developed in a historically longer period in Switzerland. The Flemish movement is a cultural and linguistic one. Politically the Flemish movement is neither united nor well-grounded in the masses. The most interesting part of the book is devoted to the economic and social problems of the Flemish provinces and the changes brought about in the last decade. These chapters are especially valuable because they supplement well Dr. S. B. Clough's, *A History of the Flemish Movement in Belgium*, published six years ago and dealing primarily with the political aspects of the movement. The book contains a number of useful charts, diagrams, and maps.

HANS KOHN

Smith College

We Soviet Women. By TATIANA TCHERNAVIN. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1936. Pp. 304. \$2.50.

Madame Tchernavin, known to most of us as the author of *Escape from the Soviets*, presents these sketches of Russian women enmeshed in the revolution. Throughout she depicts the harsh brutality of the class struggle and its impact upon the women who were identified with the "enemy" group. Again, sex license so prevalent during the early days of the revolution brought its toll of disillusionment. The so-called freedom for women as exemplified in divorce has not always been an advantage of middle-aged mothers with a family of children divorced by a husband eager for a younger wife. Cases of deserting husbands have often been hard to trace. Imprisoned herself, because of the offense of burning letters which spies

believed to be counter-revolutionary documents, Madame Tchernavin met many other similar victims in prison.

There can be no doubting the harshness that the Soviet life has entailed for the Russian citizens and the Communists alike. But for "White Russians" of Madame Tchernavin's generation, such harshness has seemed unspeakably cruel. Her treatment of the Soviet situation however, is completely one-sided. She has no concern for the hope of the new generation, nor the aspirations for an improved standard of living for the masses.

MABEL A. ELLIOTT

University of Kansas

Black Bread and Cabbage Soup. By BROWNELL CARR. Cincinnati: Powell and White, 1936. Pp. 320.

Brownell Carr's travels in the Soviet Union are presented in a day-to-day account of his summer sojourn there, recording his impressions as he journeyed throughout Western and Southern Russia. After covering a good deal of the usual map, he at last took the train to the Polish border, much relieved to be once more in the trim, tidy atmosphere of Western Europe.

Mr. Carr's book is a somewhat amusing and not altogether unsympathetic account of his experiences. Unfortunately, Mr. Carr fails to mention what year he visited Russia. Situations change so rapidly there that it is consequently difficult to judge the accuracy of his report. He complains, for example, of a number of annoying experiences which I as a visitor to very nearly the same places in Russia last summer did not experience. But again the validity of Mr. Carr's complaints may depend upon the particular year, although much of what he relates is correct, particularly his remarks on the distressing state of Russian sanitation. At the same time, Russians are careful about boiling their drinking water, a fact which Mr. Carr seems not to recognize.

The whole treatment lacks historical perspective, without which there can be no fair interpretation of present-day Russia. There is no recognition of the Oriental nature of much of Russian culture. Of course, the book makes no pretense at profundity, but it is disappointing to find so little mention of the notable achievements of the Soviets, their great advances in education, industry and technology, nor the changes in social relationships, especially in the position of women.

MABEL A. ELLIOTT

University of Kansas

Propaganda and Dictatorship. Edited by HARWOOD L. CHILDS. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1936. Pp. vi+153. \$2.00.

This timely volume consists of a series of six papers which represent "an outgrowth of round-table discussions during the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association at Chicago, in December 1934" (p. 3).

Fritz Morstein Marx, in the first paper, discusses state propaganda in Germany vigorously and with illumination, in spite of referring chiefly to newspapers. The various roles played by the concentration camps, by the "German salute," the substitution of *Heil Hitler* for *Guten Tag*, by the swastika, and by *Der Führer*, are succinctly portrayed. The importance of uniforms and badges, the effectiveness of mass demonstrations, and the significance of Hitler's best-seller, *Mein Kampf*, are not adequately stressed. The all-inclusive scope of the German National Ministry

of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda is abundantly made clear. Incidentally, Marx points out that "the swing toward the one-party state was far less of an accident, and much more of a choice, than foreign observers appear inclined to concede" (p. 12), an interpretation which tends to minimize the importance of the terroristic force in the establishment of the "totalitarian" state in Germany.

Arnold J. Zurcher, after systematically discussing the Italian propaganda carried on by the various means of communication, such as the press, cinema, and radio, and by the various organizational media of propaganda, takes up what he terms the Fascist *mythos*. These "articles of faith and doctrine" and their "subsidiary bodies of faith or doctrine" include such items as the following: militarism, hero-worship, violence, action, and Romanism. Zurcher treats briefly of international propaganda, a fascinating art, but different in many and important respects from that of domestic propaganda. The tone of his paper is somewhat marred by the occasional use of such emotionally-colored terms as "distorted," "perversion," and "pernicious," which sound strangely out of place in a supposedly scientific and objective treatment of the subject.

"Political Propaganda in Soviet Russia," by Bertram W. Maxwell, is an orthodox and adequate treatment of the subject, with emphasis on the function of organizations such as clubs, schools, and the army as media of promulgating "political education" or "political grammar."

Austrian, Hungarian, Yugoslav, and Rumanian propaganda are briefly discussed by Oscar Jaszi. Rather inconsistently, apparently, he states first that in these countries is to be found only "a pale copy of the accomplishments of the Russian, the Italian, and the German practices" (p. 83), but demonstrates later that the Fascist movement in Hungary, as early as 1918-1919, had evolved a pattern which in certain ways strikingly anticipated Nazi developments in Germany (p. 92). Jaszi, even more strongly than Marx, stresses the superficial nature of propagandist influences and the basic importance of "patterns which emanate from the depths of an historic situation" (p. 92).

The paper by Harold D. Lasswell, on "The Scope of Research on Propaganda and Dictatorship," appears to the reviewer to be somewhat variable in quality. As a matter of fact, propaganda today seems to be very well understood as an applied art, but rather poorly understood as judged by scientific standards. Early in his paper, Lasswell uses the term "proportion" where "rate" would appear to be what he has in mind. This is at the point where he submits as one eligible index of dictatorship this criterion: "a high proportion of coercive acts directed against the members of a state by officials of the state" (p. 106). A more important criticism is that Lasswell seems to take too seriously the role of propaganda in fundamentally influencing the course of human affairs. He proposes, for example, to measure the effectiveness of Russian world-revolutionary propaganda by the extent to which the Soviet Union has expanded territorially. Finally, throughout this paper, the reviewer gets impressions of a poorly restrained disfavor for Italy and Germany as dispensers of propaganda, and an ill-concealed partiality for Russia in the same "gospel-dispensing" capacity, evidences of emotion hardly compatible with dispassionate research.

The concluding paper, probably the most provocative of all, is George E. Gordon Catlin's "Propaganda as a Function of Democratic Government," in view of which the volume might better have been titled, *Propaganda in Dictatorship and Democracy*. Although excellently delineating most of the main types of symbolic (non-coercive) social influencing, the writer unfortunately classes them all as types of propaganda. It is as though one discriminated nicely all shades of the rainbow, only to label each of them simply "color." Catlin maintains that in democracies: chil-

dren must be "exposed to such a variety of influences as gives moral training in choice" (p. 136); propaganda must be the product of voluntary agencies, rather than of the state; and the relativistic tolerance of dissent must be upheld at all costs, leading to the antinomy, it would seem, of absolutist or authoritarian dogma.

EDGAR A. SCHULER

Louisiana State University

Millions of Dictators. By EMIL LENGYEL. New York: Funk and Wagnalls Co., 1936. Pp. xiii+283. \$2.00.

Like many forerunners interested in problems of *Völkerpsychologie*, Lengyel offers his study of national characters of American, France, Germany, Russia, Italy and England. The hero of his book is the "Average Man," "a synthetic individual, combining the common characteristics of entire groups." The volume is, throughout, journalistic impressionism, and of course is superficial and hurried in its observations and reflections. But it is a readable and stimulating work which has succeeded in some respects in individualizing the elements of groups, in portraying their reactions and attitudes. Moreover, you do not have to agree with Lengyel's assumptions to enjoy reading it. It flows along in that easy journalistic style which this American-Hungarian journalist commands with such facility.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

New York University

Foreign Policy in the Far East. By TARAKNATH DAS. With a foreword by HERBERT WRIGHT. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1936. Pp. xiv+272. \$2.00.

Dr. Das, who was born and educated in India, came to the United States in 1905, took his degrees here, became a naturalized American citizen, and has since travelled widely in Asia and in Europe. During 1934-1935 he was special expert on Far Eastern Affairs at the Catholic University of America. A course of five public lectures which he gave there, and three other lectures delivered in America, are united in the present book. The popular and clearly written lectures give an objective but sometimes a little colorless picture of international policy in the Far East, and discuss in greater detail Japanese, British, and French foreign policy in Eastern Asia. The two most interesting lectures seem to me the first two, which were delivered originally at Howard University and at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. There Dr. Das succeeds well in interpreting the trends of Oriental awakening to an American audience. The conclusion of the second lecture that there is no fundamental difference between the East and West except in the tempo of the march towards the required changes for a new social order seem to me well borne out by the events of recent years.

HANS KOHN

Smith College

The Art of Cross-Examination. By FRANCIS L. WELLMAN. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936. Pp. xvi+479. \$5.00.

This is the fourth edition, revised and enlarged, of one of the better known guides to effective cross-examination, by one of the oldest members of the New York bar. Mr. Wellman has many delightful sidelights to report and has a facile

pen with which to report them. It is not the anecdotes, however, which constitute the value of the book. Mr. Wellman's purpose is to provide young attorneys and other legal practitioners with cases illustrating certain principles in the art of cross-examination. The outstanding objective, he advises, is to win your case. Since both sides cannot achieve victory, the one best equipped to tear his opponent's case to shreds and convince the jury of the utter inadequacy of the opposition's contention, will win. And that is the aim of every attorney—*win*—come hell or high water, or come hell *and* high water, the facts to the contrary notwithstanding. In jury trials the counsellor should always remember that the deciding dozen must be graciously treated, and the wise attorney will see to it that the nature and timing of questions and objections have the desired effect. It has been reported that one of America's outstanding criminal lawyers once said that the farther away one can get from the facts of the case the more likely is he to win. Mr. Wellman presents excerpts from famous trials illustrating the methods and techniques of celebrated cross-examiners. The volume contains many fine photographs of legal stars, past and present. For the forensic sociologist the book will be useful, for the young attorney helpful, and for the general reader delightful. Unfortunately there is no index.

J. P. SHALLOO

University of Pennsylvania

Theorie und Praxis des fascistischen Strafvollzugs. By GUNNAR DYBWAD. Bonn: Ludwig Röhrscheid, 1934. Pp. xvi+84.

In this book is contained a brief but concise account of the penal practices and penological theories of Fascist Italy. The author first discusses the theoretical considerations that led to and are at the basis of the new (1931) penal codes. He then turns his attention to the regulations governing the various institutions established by the penal code and relates these practices to the theoretical framework of the code. This discussion is followed by sections on the police and its function, the surveillance judge (*giudice di sorveglianza*), the penal colonies, the institutions for the gradual re-adaptation of offenders to normal social life, measures of security (*misure di sicurezza*), the treatment of wayward and delinquent juveniles, institution personnel, councils of patrons (*consiglio di patronato*).

In general, Dr. Dybwad has treated, although briefly, all of the most important features of Fascist penal creations. This book will be of value to those interested in obtaining an adequate and compact picture of Italy's machinery for the administration of criminal justice.

ELIO D. MONACHESI

University of Minnesota

Crime's Nemesis. By LUKE MAY. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936. Pp. xiii+244. \$2.00.

Farewell, Mr. Gangster. By HERBERT COREY. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1936. Pp. ix+297. \$3.00.

These two books have one thing in common, to wit, the solution of crime problems. Mr. May, from a magnificent background of experience in criminal investigation, sees the nemesis of the criminal in the ever-advancing developments of the modern scientific laboratory, while Mr. Corey, from a somewhat less than adequate background and experience, sees the same fate in the ever-advancing efficiency of Mr. Hoover's Department of Justice Special Agents. (*Laus Deo*, he does not refer

to them as G-Men!). In short, to use New Deal language, the criminal should and will be plowed under, the deeper the better.

Mr. May's work is the more important of the two for the student of modern criminal investigation. He presents innumerable examples and illustrations of the value of the scientific laboratory as an imperatively necessary adjunct to any police organization that contemplates efficient detection work. He is convinced that swivel-chair deductions have proven their own futility when applied to the problem of the modern criminal. Clues which escape the eye, such as dust upon a carpet, may prove the undoing of the most gifted malefactor. One case he cites had no clue except a fragment of a pine-needle, yet the murderer was apprehended and swung out over a vacant lot. For the layman (and I suspect that Mr. May was addressing this volume to John Public, rather than to his scientific *confrères*), there is an easily written and readable account of such scientific aids as blood, dust, dirt, ink, fingerprint, document and handwriting analyses, as well as the use of such scientific instruments as the microscope, magnascope, and the paraphernalia of the chemical laboratory. He believes that in the future it will be possible to discover the offender just by learning the fact that *someone* was in a given room at the time of the offense. Somehow, it seems that the criminal will not get much for his money.

Mr. Corey's chief concern would appear to be to explain the workings of the FBI, with its staff of highly trained, disciplined and selected Special Agents. There is a good description of the laboratory equipment and the work done by the specialists. The requirements for service in the Bureau of Investigation are adequately described, and some of the more celebrated cases handled and solved by the operatives are presented. Mr. Corey gives one the impression that his motivation is much more highly geared than his control. Nearly all good citizens in this more or less free republic look upon the government agents as much more efficient than the average policeman. It is quite likely that they *are* more efficient, and it is absolutely certain that they *should* be. The chief reason for the superiority of these agents, as I see it, is their freedom from the hoodlums currently called politicians (euphemistically, "legislators"). There is an inviolable rule in the department that any agent who attempts to seek promotion by having a Senator speak for him, for example, will be fired forthwith. That is all to the good. Further, the training required, and the starting salary, obviously attracts more competent men. I have a suspicion that, despite the excellent work done by these agents, some of our State police—and yes, city police!—have also done, upon occasion, some excellent police work. Mr. Corey evidently wrote in haste, or was misled by a uninformed source, since he states that only Newark and New York City have rid themselves of the medieval coroner and installed medical examiners. Massachusetts will be glad to know that. One other minor matter: no one, except perhaps a sheriff, believes that a *probation* officer can adequately supervise 208 *parolees*. A foreword was contributed by J. Edgar Hoover.

J. P. SHALLOO

University of Pennsylvania

Modern Criminal Investigation. By HARRY SÖDERMAN and JOHN J. O'CONNELL. New York: Funk and Wagnalls Co., 1935. Pp. xvi+461. \$3.00.

Some of us are in the habit of thinking that the discoveries of science are employed more or less exclusively by fictitious and highly cultured amateur detectives. However, an examination of this volume by Dr. Söderman, head of the Institute of Police Science in the University of Stockholm Law School, and Mr. O'Connell, Deputy Chief Inspector of the New York City Police Department, will convince

one that heroes of detective stories are not the only ones favored with the fruit of scientific investigation. *Modern Criminal Investigation* indicates that police forces have at their disposal an unbelievable array of scientific devices to aid them in the apprehension of criminals. The book is a convincing reminder of the fact that modern police work can no longer rely on physical fitness of personnel alone, and that a police system, to be efficient and up-to-date, must be administered by individuals with scientific training.

The authors of *Modern Criminal Investigation* believe that policing is a technical process which needs all the aid that science can give it. In their book, which could be described as a police science manual, the authors present in great detail the procedures employed in the following varieties of police work: tracing and identifying individuals; treatment of crime scenes; the use and treatment of traces (teeth, vehicles, tools, etc.); ballistics; stains; finger and footprints; questionable documents. In addition, several chapters are devoted to the investigation of homicide, larceny, burglary, robbery, and arson. The treatment of these subjects, although technical, is made intensely interesting by the use of illustrative cases taken from the annals of police work. The book is well equipped with illustrations and drawings which add materially to the reader's understanding and interest. It also contains a comprehensive bibliography on police science. The book should be of value not only to policemen but also to students of the problems of crime.

ELIO D. MONACHESI

University of Minnesota

Return to Philosophy: Being a Defense of Reason, an Affirmation of Values and a Plea for Philosophy. By C. E. M. JOAD. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1936. Pp. 280. \$2.50.

This book contains little that bears directly on sociology, but much that bears on the sociologist himself.

Pragmatically it is a defense of the proposition that human actions are in considerable measure, and tend in the evolution of mind more and more to become "motivated from the brain," over against the primitivists, the anti-rationalists, the low-brows in literature, art and life, who hold with the Aldous Huxleys and the D. H. Lawrences that the human intellect is "demonstrably subordinated to the stomach, the genitals, and the solar plexus." In fact, in reason's "success in bringing under its aegis spheres which have hitherto been under the province of emotion and feeling, lies the chief hope of the race."

The theoretical basis of this position, as this British philosopher has more fully indicated in his *Matter, Mind and Value*,¹ lies in a frank avowal of philosophical dualism. Mind and matter are independent experience-worlds, and the philosopher and all humanists are chiefly concerned with the former. In the study of either, the author insists, "each enlargement of human faculty, each acquisition of human skill, each extension of human sensibility or widening human apprehension, is in the nature of a jump; . . . whatever may be the case with nature, the human mind *omne facit per saltum*." Moreover, understanding comes only with integration, with seeing life situations as living wholes. In the study of living beings, therefore, the analytic, abstractive, quantitative methods of the natural sciences take one but a short distance.

It follows that science must be prepared to leave certain tasks to the more synthetic, more interpretive methods of philosophy. Moreover, the human mind, as it has already moved from doing to thinking, may be expected to move from proc-

¹ Oxford University Press, 1929.

esses chiefly logical to a knowing chiefly by a kind of intuitive perception of values.

The book will appeal to the reader of an idealistic bent who still has a firm regard for the world of fact; who would look beyond the facts to the connection of things; whose mind, though dealing strictly with the world of thought, moves toward those "furthest confines of that world [where it] is liable sooner or later to break through into the world of values." The style is throughout vigorous and extremely readable. There is no absence of hints as to the bearing of the discussion on the problems of politics and social policy.

W. C. LEHMANN

Syracuse University

Time's Arrow in Society: A Philosophy of Progress. By ANDERSON WOODS.

Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1935. Pp. xi+233. \$2.00.

This is an attempt to formulate a comprehensive system of social ethics, in terms of a monistic, mechanistic, evolutionary philosophy, with considerable utilization of the basic concepts of modern sociology and social psychology. Its ethical standpoint is that of a frank avowal of the hedonistic position. Its underlying psychology is a mechanistic one, centering about the concept of "desire" viewed as "movement," or rather of a complex of desires viewed as "movements," passing from (1) internal conflict, through (2) adjustment or compromise, and (3) equilibrium or harmony, to (4) co-operation in external conflict. Its underlying sociological concepts are, accordingly, conflict, a differentiation of the individual and the collective, and an analysis of the purposes and of the methods of collective control (influence).

The keynote is a consistent adherence to the doctrine of the inevitability of progress in human society—"the course of time's arrow, *i.e.* inevitable progress, pointing away," for example, "from policies of competition to those of co-operation" (p. 228), from egoism to altruism, from individualism to collectivism, from forceful to educational and persuasive methods of control, and so on. The whole work is, in fact, built on "the philosophical view of the world of desire as not static, but inevitably evolving, with its conflicts being progressively harmonized and reconciled after the fashion of equilibration going on throughout general nature." While making no small place in his system for rational control, and admitting the paradoxical coexistence of law and freedom, the author holds it folly to attempt to "arrest or invert the universal process, or change the course of time's arrow" (p. 232).

The book is divided into three parts. In Part One, "Necessary Ethical Truth," the author defines his basic concepts. Part Two is "Application in General." Part Three, "More Particular Application" to "changes in purposes of collective control" (chap. viii); to evolution in methods of influence" (chap ix); and to "outstanding systems of control" (chap. x). The eleventh and final chapter offers a convenient summary and conclusion.

This attempt to recast ethical theory in terms of the particular concepts employed is, perhaps of necessity, somewhat formal, not to say logistic, though its particular evolutionary orientation and empirical grounding is not lacking in originality. The application to current problems of economics, politics, education, international relations, and the like is timely, suggestive, and frequently illuminating in spite of its selective character and necessary brevity. Most readers will probably find the general and the particular application more valuable than the basic definition.

W. C. LEHMANN

Syracuse University

Die Religion der Ägypter. By ADOLF ERMAN. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1934. Pp. xvi+465. RM 7.50.

This book is from the pen of a man who for more than forty years has been a profound and thorough student of ancient Egypt, and who has earned the distinction of being both the greatest German Egyptologist and one of the foremost in the world. It is a worthy companion volume to his famous *Die Literatur der Ägypter* (1927).

Die Religion der Ägypter is itself the ripe product of more than thirty years of continuous devotion to the subject. In 1904 Dr. Erman published his first volume on Egyptian religion, which was revised in 1909. The present volume is a completely reworked and greatly expanded successor to these earlier works on the richest and most extensive of ancient religions. The treatment is systematic and exhaustive, historical and analytical, and presents in a clearcut way the extensive array of archaeological materials now available on this, the most abundantly revealed, but at the same time the most complicated, aspect of ancient Egyptian life.

Beginning with a concise treatment of the general nature of religion, he takes up in turn, with illuminating detail, the several great gods and goddesses of the land, the development of the older religion of Egypt, the mythology connected with the gods, Egyptian theology, piety (especially as expressed in prayers), the oracles, the ethics, the cults of both the Old and Middle Kingdom, the body of beliefs about the dead, the care of the dead, magic, and sorcery. There is an excellent chapter on the heretic, Amenophis IV (Ikhnaton), and the rise and expulsion of his monotheistic Aton religion. Special mention must also be made of the chapters dealing with historical occurrences and their effects, the modifications of the religion which took place with, first, the Persian, and then the Greek and Roman suzerainty over Egypt, and finally the influence of the Egyptian religion in neighboring lands, especially in Rome.

Dr. Erman shows himself to be as great a scientist of religion as he is an Egyptologist. The thesis that the reviewer notes throughout the book is that Egyptian religion has been a natural phenomenon, highly reflective of the physical and biological environment, the major economic, political and social conditions, and the extent and types of contact made with other cultures; above all, that it has itself fluctuated in content, emphasis, and institutional efficacy with every change of any consequence in the life of the people.

Since this is the most comprehensive and authoritative summary of Egyptian religion available, it is hoped that it will be speedily translated into English.

J. O. HERTZLER

University of Nebraska

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- "Catch 'em Alive Jack." By John R. Abernathy. New York: Association Press, 1936. Pp. 242. \$2.00.
- Reine und Angewandte Soziologie: Eine Festgabe für Ferdinand Tönnies.* By Gerhard Albrecht and others. Leipzig: Hans Buske Verlag, 1936. Pp. vii+403. RM 12.37.
- Our Contemporary Civilization.* By Roscoe Lewis Ashley. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1935. Pp. xv+608. \$2.90.
- Diagnosis and Treatment of Behavior-Problem Children.* By Harry J. Baker and Virginia Trap-hagen. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936. Pp. xiv+393. \$2.50.
- The Discussion of Human Affairs.* By Charles Austin Beard. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936. Pp. vii+124. \$1.75.
- The Restoration of Property.* By Hilaire Belloc. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1936. Pp. 144. \$1.50.
- A Bibliography of Studies of Social Conditions in the Pittsburgh Area, 1930-1935.* Pittsburgh: Bureau of Social Research, Federation of Social Agencies. Pp. 111. \$1.00.
- The Conquest of Yucatan.* By Frans Blom. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1936. Pp. xi+238. \$3.50.
- The School in American Society.* By S. Howard Patterson, Ernest A. Choate and Edmund DeS. Brunner. Scranton, Pa.: International Textbook Co., 1936. Pp. xii+570. \$3.00.
- The Re-establishment of the Indians in their Pueblo Life through the Revival of their Traditional Crafts.* By Henrietta K. Burton. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1936. Pp. vi+96. \$1.60.
- Organizing to Reduce Delinquency. The Michigan Plan for Better Citizenship.* By Lowell Juillard Carr. Ann Arbor: Michigan Juvenile Delinquency Service, 1936. Pp. 62. 25¢.
- Frontiers of Science.* By Carl T. Chase. New York: D. van Nostrand and Co., 1936. Pp. xi+352. \$3.75.
- El Jimmy, Outlaw of Patagonia.* By Herbert Childs. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1936. Pp. 398. \$3.00.
- Administration of Workmen's Compensation.* By Walter F. Dodd. New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1936. Pp. xviii+845. \$4.50.
- Propaganda, Its Psychology and Technique.* By Leonard W. Doob. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1935. Pp. x+424. \$2.40.
- Revolutionary Turkey.* By H. Malik Evrenol. Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1936. Pp. 145. 20 francs.
- Fire on the Earth.* By Paul Hanly Furfey. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936. Pp. ix+159. \$2.00.
- Northeastern and West Yavapai.* By E. W. Gifford. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1936. Pp. 107. \$1.50.
- The Struggle for Population.* By D. V. Glass. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936. Pp. x+148. \$2.75.
- Preventing Crime.* Ed. by Sheldon and Eleanor T. Glueck. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1936. Pp. xi+509. \$4.00.
- Marriage Conditions in a Palestinian Village.* By Hilma Granqvist. Vols. I and II. Helsingfors, Finland: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1931; 1935. Pp. 200; 366. Mk 75; Fmk 160.
- Potlatch and Totem.* By W. M. Halliday. London: J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., 1935. Pp. xvi+240. 15 shillings.
- Human Genetics and Its Social Import.* By S. J. Holmes. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1936. Pp. viii+414. \$3.50.
- Der Staat.* By F. W. Jerusalem. Jena: Gustav Fischer Verlag, 1935. Pp. xx+324. RM 15.

- Psychologie des Gemeinschaftslebens*. Ed. by Otto Klemm. Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1935. Pp. viii+317. RM 18.
- Population Movements*. Robert Kuczynski. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936. Pp. 121. \$1.75.
- Principles of Topological Psychology*. By Kurt Lewin. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1936. Pp. xv+231. \$2.50.
- The Dream in Primitive Cultures*. By Jackson Steward Lincoln. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins Co., 1935. Pp. xiii+359. \$4.00.
- Forces Affecting Participation of Farm People in Rural Organization*. By D. E. Lindstrom. Urbana: University of Illinois, Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 423, 1936. Pp. 48.
- Modern Italy*. By George B. McClellan. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1936. Pp. x+319. \$3.00.
- Slums and Slummers: A Sociological Treatise on the Housing Problem*. By C. R. A. Martin. London: John Bale Sons and Danielsson, 1935. Pp. v+185. 6 shillings.
- Second Southern Policy Conference Report*. Ed. by Francis P. Miller. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1936. Pp. 23. 15¢.
- The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors, 1801-1927*. (Rev. ed.) By William Miller. Cambridge: The University Press; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936. Pp. xv+642. \$4.75.
- Contraception as a Therapeutic Measure*. By Bessie L. Moses. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins Co., 1936. Pp. xiii+105. \$1.00.
- Body, Soul and Society*. By Charles Obermeyer. New York: Basic Books, 1936. Pp. 106. 50¢.
- The Middle Classes Then and Now*. By Franklin C. Palm. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936. Pp. xiv+421. \$3.50.
- Principles and Laws of Sociology*. By Harold A. Phelps. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1936. Pp. xii+544. \$4.00.
- Les Enquêtes ouvrières en France entre 1830 et 1848*. By Hilde Rigaudias-Weiss. Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1936. Pp. xi+262.
- The Fascist Government of Italy*. By Herbert W. Schneider. New York: D. van Nostrand and Co., 1936. Pp. xii+173. \$1.25.
- Europe Under the Terror*. By John L. Spivak. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1936. Pp. viii+243. \$2.50.
- Twenty Thousand Homeless Men*. By E. H. Sutherland and H. J. Locke. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1936. Pp. ix+208. \$2.50.
- Robespierre*, Vols. I and II. By T. M. Thompson. London: B. H. Blackwell Ltd., 1935. Pp. lv+312; ix+300. 24 shillings.
- The Seething African Pot*. By Daniel Thwaite. London: Constable and Co., Pp. v+248. 7 shillings 6 pence.
- History of Ancient Civilization*. By Albert Augustus Trevor. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1936. Pp. xx+585. \$3.50.
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Contents

The Nature of Culture	ALBERT BLUMENTHAL	875
The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action	ROBERT K. MERTON	894
Population Prediction in Nineteenth Century America	JOSEPH J. SPENGLER	905
Social Problems and the Mores	WILLARD WALLER	922
Social Planning Through Education	FRANCIS J. BROWN	934
Cultural Determinants of Naturalization	WILLIAM S. BERNARD	943
Official Reports and Proceedings		954
Editorial Notes		967
Persons and Positions		969
Current Items		970
Foreign Correspondence: The Development of Sociology in Yugoslavia	JOSEPH S. ROUCEK	981
Periodical Literature		989
Book Reviews		991
Books Received		1044

- Psychologie des Gemeinschaftslebens.* Ed. by Otto Klemm. Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1935. Pp. viii+317. RM 18.
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